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Title: 1816: “The Mighty Operations of Nature”: An Environmental History of the Year 
Without a Summer   
  
 
  The catastrophic eruption of the Indonesian volcano Mt. Tambora in April 1815, 
which ejected a cloud of sulfur dioxide into the upper atmosphere, plunged the world into 
a rapid temporary climate change event. A series of bizarre weather anomalies, including 
snowstorms in June and repeated heavy frosts throughout the rest of the summer, earned 
1816 the moniker “the Year Without a Summer.” This paper examines the various ways 
in which Americans reacted to the climate change—seeking causation explanations 
through science and superstition, political and religious responses, and the efforts to ap-
preciate what the events meant in terms of the world’s changing climate. Through these 
various reactions, a picture emerges of Americans’ incomplete understanding of science 
and nature, as well as an uneasy reckoning with the impossibility of fully explaining their 
environment and the potential dangers it presented to them. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: PITCHING QUOITS IN THICK OVERCOATS 
  
 In 1860, on the eve of the Civil War, Chauncey Jerome, a 67-year-old New 
England clocksmith, recalled in his memoirs a particularly memorable summer that had 
occurred forty-four years before. “I well remember on the seventh of June,” he wrote, 
“while on my way to work...my hands got so cold that I was obliged to lay down my 
tools and put on a pair of mittens which I had in my pocket.” He noted that it snowed an 
hour that day. He also described the Fourth of July celebrations in Plymouth, 
Connecticut: “I saw several men pitching quoits in the middle of the day with thick 
overcoats on, and the sun shining bright at the same time. A body could not feel very 
patriotic in such weather.”1 Jerome’s book was primarily a history of the American clock 
business. Yet the weather anomalies of a summer long past found their way into his 
memoirs; they were obviously on his mind until nearly the end of his life. He died in 
1868. 
 A decade later, another memoir-writer similarly remembered the cold summer of 
1816. Sarah Anna Emery, then a young New Hampshire woman, looked back on it in 
1879, when she was in her nineties. She recalled Thursday, June 6, the day before the 
snow squall that Chauncey Jerome remembered. On a trip with relatives to Boscawen, 
New Hampshire, Emery and her party paused to attend the inauguration of Governor 
William Plumer. “Our teeth chattered in our heads,” she wrote, “and our feet and hands 
were benumbed...even Mr. Emery, who never feared anything, was a little discomposed.” 
                                                 
1Chauncey Jerome and Lockwood Barr, History of the American Clock Business for the Past Sixty Years 
and Life of Chauncey Jerome (New Haven, CT: F.C. Dayton, Jr., 1860), 31-32. 
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She recalled staying at an inn that night where she and her party clustered around the 
fireplace for warmth.2 
 From these accounts, each written decades after the event, emerge two haunting 
pictures of the “Year Without a Summer.” Chauncey Jerome’s image of men pitching 
quoits in their heavy overcoats on the Fourth of July is an artifact—a sort of anecdotal 
“sound bite”—that continues to resurface in folkloric accounts of the summer of 1816, 
even now, nearly two centuries later.3 Emery’s recollection of her party huddled around a 
fire echoes one of the most common observations made by contemporaries of this “cold, 
ungenial, unprolific and churlish” season,4 namely, that it was so persistently cold that 
fires were required indoors even in the deep summer. This refrain reappears constantly in 
people’s accounts.5 The clarity of Jerome’s and Emery’s narratives, and their consistency 
both with contemporary observations and other remembrances written long after the 
event, suggest the indelible impression that the climate anomalies of 1816 made on the 
people who lived through them. Jerome and Emery both mentioned the snow squall of 
June 6-7, and both remembered the exact date. It is possible that the events of early June 
in New England may have triggered in certain observers what psychologists call a 
“flashbulb memory,” a specific and unique type of recall that preserves the time, place 
and circumstance of an event, analogous to the taking of a snapshot.6 Such recollections 
                                                 
2Sarah Anna Emery, Reminiscences of a Nonagenarian (Newburyport, MA: William H. Huse & Co., 1879), 
289. 
3See Conclusion, note 10. 
4 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, September 20, 1816, John Quincy Adams, Writings of John Quincy 
Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), VI: 90. 
5See, e.g., Isaiah Thomas, Diary, June 8, 1816, Isaiah Thomas Papers 1748-1874, Mss. Octavo Vols. T, Vol. 
8 American Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
6Roger Brown and James Kulik, “Flashbulb Memories,” Cognition 5, no. 1 (1977): 73-99. In modern times 
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demonstrate the extraordinary quality, the oddness and the significance that observers 
associated with the event. 
 Yet there was another side too. Americans in the Early Republic possessed an 
incomplete and sometimes contradictory picture of the world around them—a worldview 
shaped not only by science, then still imperfectly formed in its methods and conventions, 
but by religious belief, superstition, folklore, and practical knowledge of the natural 
world and the environment. In this “pastiche of knowledge,” no one category of 
information or belief possessed greater legitimacy than any other. From this pastiche of 
knowledge, Americans in 1816 drew not only potential explanations for what was 
happening to the weather and the climate, but also explanations as to why the anomalies 
might not have been so truly anomalous. In contrast to the strong reminiscences of 
Jerome and Emery, worthy of triggering “flashbulb memories,” some in 1816 argued that 
these strange events were nothing surprising. They were, in the words of one 
Massachusetts editor, simply examples of “the mighty operations of nature, and though 
uncommon, are a part of the system of things.”7 This tone of resignation—whether 
hopeful or pessimistic—betrays the imperfections of Americans’ worldview at this time. 
While at once they were desperate for an explanation, at the same time they were 
cognizant that they could perhaps never know it.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the paradigm examples of “flashbulb memories” are when people recall where they were and what they 
were doing when they learned of traumatic events such as the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the 
space shuttle Challenger explosion or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
7 “Spots on the Sun,” Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 31, 1816, 2. 
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 The Year Without a Summer was a dramatic example of large-scale temporary 
global climate change.8 Being global in its scope and profound in its implications, 
without a doubt it was an important and momentous event. Historians have tended to treat 
the Year Without a Summer dismissively, regarding it as an amusing aside or an 
environmental anomaly with little capacity to tell us about the time in which it occurred. 
To the contrary, this paper will argue that the climate change events of 1816 are uniquely 
illustrative of broader trends in how the people of the time viewed their relationship to 
their environment. They evidence an embryonic appreciation of humankind’s delicate and 
precarious position in a changing world that was incapable of being fully understood by 
scientific or rational means. The pastiche of knowledge from which the people of the time 
drew their answers did not purport to be comprehensive and capable of explaining 
everything, as we tend to view our modern scientific discourse. The gap between what 
the people of 1816 knew about the natural world and what their knowledge base was 
competent to explain is often difficult to discern, but the struggle to come to terms with 
what was essentially inexplicable shows a curious collective negotiation—and 
reckoning—with the limits of their understanding. 
 The important ways in which Americans sought to explain the anomalies 
demonstrate a number of key features of the reaction. The inordinate amount of attention 
given to astronomical phenomena in the summer of 1816, particularly sunspots, 
                                                 
8 Throughout this paper, the reader should be cognizant that “weather” and “climate” are two different 
things. Simply put, weather is what is happening outside your window at the present moment. Climate 
is the overall aggregation of weather patterns and atmospheric and hydrological processes over an ex-
tended period of time and in a wider area than a single point source. We may have had a cold, wet win-
ter in Eugene, Oregon, but that does not necessarily mean that the climate has gotten colder; a succes-
sion of cold, wet winters, or one such winter manifested worldwide, might indicate that a climate 
change could be taking place. The distinction between weather and climate is fairly basic, but often 
poorly understood. Modern deniers of anthropogenic climate change will sometimes attempt to refute 
the fact that climate is changing by using weather events, such as heavy snowfalls or a cold snap, to ar-
gue for a broader trend.   
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challenged both science and superstition. Theories that the cold summer was caused by 
sunspots were hotly debated, and though most expert opinion held that sunspots were not 
the cause, the public could not quite seem to shake the suspicion that they were somehow 
involved. Other theories of causation drew from different parts of the “pastiche of 
knowledge,” but none—even some that, perhaps by coincidence, came close to the 
truth—seemed to resonate with any greater authority or persuasiveness than any other. 
The causation arguments illustrate a view of the natural world that occupied a transitional 
step between traditional belief-system knowledge, such as superstition and old wives’ 
tales, and more systematic and rational approaches rooted in Enlightenment sensibilities. 
 Political reaction to the Year Without a Summer is a field almost wholly 
unexplored by historians. Public discussion of the events in the United States tended to 
focus on the weather’s likely effect on the upcoming harvest, and this discussion 
undoubtedly had political undertones; in Europe, where the climate anomalies triggered 
full-scale famines in many areas, reactions manifested themselves in open riots and 
political unrest. This did not happen in the United States, but that does not mean that the 
anomalies weren’t interpreted in a political context; there is some indication that political 
party affiliation correlated with a tendency to express optimism or pessimism about the 
likely harvest prospects. Furthermore, the tendency in some circles to deny what was 
happening—or deny that it was significant—evidences that the possibility of climate 
change was deeply unsettling to some Americans. 
 The anomalies unquestionably impacted people on a spiritual and cultural level. 
Concerns about the strange weather events became embedded in the narrative 
surrounding at least one end-of-the-world prediction that was prominent on both sides of 
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the Atlantic; the prediction involved sunspots, the suspected (by some) causal agent of the 
cold summer. Even beyond overt fears of apocalypse, the weather events drove 
Americans into their churches in large numbers in the summer of 1816, and at least in 
some areas served as the impetus for religious conversions and increased evangelical 
fervor. On a more subtle level the climate anomalies cast an uncomfortable pall of gloom, 
melancholy and apprehension over the nation and its public consciousness. 
 Perhaps most surprising to modern-day observers, the events of 1816’s cold 
summer became a significant issue in an ongoing debate then occurring in America about 
climate change and the extent of man’s responsibility for it. Lengthy arguments raged in 
newspapers that summer over whether the Earth’s climate was growing warmer or colder, 
and depending on one’s point of view, the climate anomalies were either strong evidence 
of a cooling trend, or a fluke that had to be dismissed or distinguished from the broader 
trajectory of a warming planet. Either way, the debate illustrated awareness, at least by 
some, that human activity—especially deforestation and cultivation—had the potential to 
alter the climate of the planet. The implications of this climate change were almost 
universally assumed to be either easily endurable or a positive good, perhaps even 
reflecting America’s political destiny to dominate the continent and advance its 
democratic values by exerting dominion over its physical environment. It is in these 
debates that the historical relevance of the Year Without a Summer becomes most clear, 
as we seek in our own time to come to terms with anthropogenic global warming and to 
craft a socially, scientifically and politically appropriate response. 
 Finally, the ways in which the Year Without a Summer became assimilated into 
public memory—and the ways in which it has been forgotten—themselves demonstrate 
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the relevance of and the enduring fascination with this event. Except among scientists, 
who continue to debate the physical causes and effects of the anomalies, the summer of 
1816 is remembered today almost exclusively in folklore and popular culture, where a 
few certain immutable tropes continue to be rehashed with regularity. Our popular 
remembrance of the Year Without a Summer oddly resembles reactions at the time: it is 
slightly colored with, though not dominated, by science, and it views the event with a sort 
of bafflement that implicitly weaves uncertainty and resignation into the narrative itself. 
In an era when our modern science should be able to, and frequently purports that it does, 
explain precisely what happened in 1816 and why, we still seem drawn to depictions of 
the event that include a certain degree of wonder and amazement. Perhaps by favoring 
these depictions, modern observers seek to participate in the events themselves on 
roughly co-equal terms with those who lived through it, who did not have the benefit of 
modern climatological disciplines to draw from. In this sense the cold summer of 1816 
did not end with the vernal equinox. Its long tail continues right up until the present day. 
 The theme of continuance is an important one. The curious summer of 1816 is a 
snapshot in time, a frozen diorama of thought, attitude and belief in early nineteenth 
century America. For many people of that year, who like Sarah Emery chattered through 
snowstorms in June and like others lamented as their crops crumbled into frosty mush in 
August, it seemed as if the winter simply never ended. By remembering the Year Without 
a Summer in the way that we do today, however, we ensure that it continues, and in 
senses more meaningful than just the appreciation of an interesting historical event. 
Recent trends of anthropogenic global warming challenge us to consider: do modern 
Americans, two centuries after 1816, trust science more implicitly or fundamentally than 
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Chauncey Jerome and Sarah Anna Emery’s contemporaries did? Do we not suffer from 
the same fears, or at least similar ones, that our planet might be slowly (or rapidly) 
becoming uninhabitable? The fact that these questions are still cogent today 
demonstrates, in and of itself, why the Year Without a Summer matters. We can see in it, 
reflected darkly, reflected incongruously, glimmers of our own time and our own world. 
Eighteen-sixteen should interest us because it can tell us about ourselves. 
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 CHAPTER II 
WINTER WITHOUT END: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE YEAR WITHOUT A SUMMER 
  
 A. Beginnings: Tambora and “Mountain X” 
 Most accounts of the Year Without a Summer begin with Tambora. Since at least 
1913, or possibly earlier,1 the standard scientific explanation for the climate anomalies of 
1816 has been that the massive eruption of Tambora in April 1815 ejected a large mass of 
ash and other tiny particulates into the upper atmosphere, which had the effect of 
diffusing sunlight and preventing a certain amount of solar radiation from reaching the 
surface of the Earth.2 Acceptance of this view is not universal, even among modern 
climatologists.3 Whether the “Tambora causation theory” is or is not the explanation for 
the Year Without a Summer, as a matter of scientific fact, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless, given the wide endorsement that the Tambora causation theory has 
received in the past century, it is relevant to understanding the events of 1816. 
 Tambora—usually called “Tamboro” or “Tamporo” in the nineteenth century4—is 
located on the island of Sumbawa, now Indonesia.5 Prior to 1815 it may have been as tall 
as 14,000 feet, making it the tallest mountain in the archipelago. Its awakening seems to 
                                                 
1See Chapter VII, notes 29-31. 
2Michael R. Rampino, Stephen Self, Richard B. Stothers, “Volcanic Winters,” Annual Review of Earth 
Planetary Science 16 (1988): 73-99, 74-76. 
3See J.P. Sadler, J.P. Grattan, “Volcanoes as Agents of Past Environmental Change,” Global and Planetary 
Change 21, Issues 1-3 (July 1999):181-196. 
4National Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), July 9, 1825, 4. 
5 Sumbawa was not under effective European colonial rule until later in the nineteenth century, but it was 
very close to the island of Java, which was then under British administration. The whole area later be-
came the Dutch East Indies and eventually Indonesia. 
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have begun in 1812 when European observers reported rumbling sounds emanating from 
the mountain, which also ejected periodic clouds of ash.6 On April 5, 1815, the mountain 
was rocked by a tremendous explosion. Lieutenant Governor Stamford Raffles likened it 
in his memoirs to cannon fire.7 The mountain was relatively quiet for the next five days. 
Then, early in the evening of April 10, Tambora exploded in an eruption so powerful that 
it sheared off the top of the peak and spat a cloud of ash over 25 miles tall. Magma, 
which solidified as pumice, cascaded down the sides of the mountain, destroying native 
villages below.8 The explosion and its aftermath killed at least 10,000 people 
immediately, and up to 90,000 died of disease and famine over the next two years. It was 
the most powerful volcanic eruption in 500 years,9 possibly the most devastating in 
recorded history.10 The volume of ash and other materials expelled from the volcano—
“ejecta,” in the parlance of volcanologists—was 100 times the amount emitted by the 
eruption of Mt. St. Helens in May 1980.11 
 If the climate anomalies of 1816 had a volcanic cause, there seems little reason to 
doubt that an eruption as large as Tambora’s could have done it. Only in the last few years 
                                                 
6C. Oppenheimer, “Climatic, Environmental and Human Consequences of the Largest Known Historic 
Eruption: Tambora Volcano (Indonesia) 1815,” Progress in Physical Geography 27, no. 2 (June 2003): 
231-32. 
7Ibid. (quoting Stamford Raffles, Memoir of the life and public services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, 
F.R.S. &c., particularly in the government of Java 1811-1816, and of Bencoolen and its dependencies 
1817-1824: with details of the commerce and resources of the eastern archipelago, and selections from 
his correspondence (London: John Murray, 1830).  
8Ibid., 233-34. 
9Alan Robock, “Volcanic Eruption, Tambora,” The Earth System: Physical and Chemical Dimensions of 
Global Environmental Change, ed.s Dr. Michael C. MacCracken and Dr. John S. Perry, Encyclopedia of 
Global Environmental Change (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2002) 1:737-38. 
10Oppenheimer, 255. 
11Henry Stommel & Elizabeth Stommel, Volcano Weather: The Story of 1816, The Year Without a Summer 
(Newport, RI: Seven Seas Press, 1983), 10. 
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has a more complex story begun to emerge. Evidence of a global fallout of Tambora 
ejecta is scientific fact: a layer of it, dated to 1815, can be seen in ice cores taken in 
Greenland and Antarctica.12 Scientists have recently identified, however—in the same ice 
cores—evidence of a previous volcanic eruption of sufficient magnitude to affect climate. 
Given the placement of layers of sulfur dioxide in ice cores from both poles, researchers 
know that a major volcanic eruption occurred somewhere in tropical latitudes, and they 
can date its eruption to approximately February 1809. If evidence of a significant 
eruption in this time frame exists in historical records, it has not yet been identified as 
such. Consequently, the identity and location of this “Mountain X” is unknown.13 
 The revelation of the “Mountain X” eruption alters the scientific narrative of the 
Year Without a Summer. Instead of a global climate change directly caused by the single 
event of the April 1815 Tambora eruption, the emerging theory paints a picture of the 
Earth’s climate, already affected by the 1809 “Mountain X” eruption, being given a 
sudden large shove in the same direction six years later by Tambora. Indeed, even before 
Tambora, there is significant evidence that the years 1810 and 1811 were generally colder 
than average.14 The beginning of a cold period around 1810 may account for some of the 
controversy in scientific circles about whether Tambora can be considered a causal agent 
of climate change at all—such contentions usually argue that temperature and climate 
                                                 
12Robock, 738. 
13Jihong Cole-Dai, David Ferris, Alyson Lanciki, et. al., “Cold Decade (AD 1810-1819) Caused by 
Tambora (1815) and Another (1809) Stratospheric Volcanic Eruption,” Geophysical Research Letters 
36, no. L22703 (November 21, 2009): 2. According to this analysis, only stratospheric eruptions in 
tropical latitudes can result in deposition of sulfur dioxide at both poles. This sort of eruption is also the 
only kind of volcanic eruption that can result in a global climate change. 
14Ibid, 2-3. 
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anomalies in 1816 were not significantly worse than lows in other years with which 
volcanic cause is not associated, including the early 1810s.15  
 People at the time may not have connected the eruption of Tambora with climate 
anomalies, but they clearly knew it was a significant eruption. Evidence of the disaster 
lingered for months after the April blast. In October 1815, a passenger on the British ship 
Fairlie recorded seeing “quantities of stuff...burnt cinders, evidently volcanic” covering 
the sea for two days in a region about 1500 miles southwest of Sumbawa.16 This was 
most likely a raft of pumice from the eruption of Tambora.17 As news traveled slowly 
from the tropical Pacific—typically it first had to reach the capitals or ports of the 
European countries who held colonies there—American newspaper readers seem to have 
first learned of the eruption of Tambora in the latter part of February 1816, where a 
widely-reprinted article speculated on the connection between it and another recent 
eruption on the island of Batavia (Java).18 By that time the Earth’s climate was 
undoubtedly under the effect of the Tambora eruption, and the strangest season in the 
memory of many Americans were about to begin. 
 
 B. 1815 to Spring 1816: The Anomalies Begin 
 The first atmospheric effects of the Tambora eruption discernible to humans were 
probably the sunsets. In the summer of 1815, many people noted the presence of 
                                                 
15Sadler & Grattan, 188. 
16Independent Chronicle (Boston, MA), July 4, 1816, 1. 
17Oppenheimer, 241. 
18New York Evening Post, February 27, 1816, 2. 
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spectacular sunsets, especially in London.19 The stunning color of the sunsets that year 
may have influenced English Romanticist painter J.M.W. Turner, who painted a number 
of landscapes after 1815 portraying abnormally brilliant or colorful skies.20 The skies 
were not the only thing that the eruption of Tambora may have colored. On New Year’s 
Eve, in Terramo, Italy, an unusual quantity of snow fell, and according to reports widely 
circulated on both sides of the Atlantic it was colored red and yellow.21 The strange 
coloration was most likely the result of sulfur dioxide particles from the eruption 
suspended in the atmosphere.22 
 There does not seem to have been a widespread perception, at least in New 
England and the rest of the eastern United States, that the winter of 1815-16 was 
particularly harsh or cold. When the winter began to linger unusually long into the spring, 
however, people began to take notice. Comments from diarists begin to show concern and 
puzzlement about the weather in April and early May. It was common in the early 
nineteenth century for people to make a short record of the day’s weather, usually at the 
beginning of a diary entry. If the diarist was diligent, a relatively accurate reconstruction 
of weather conditions at specific point sources can be reconstructed. William Paine, a 
doctor residing in Worcester, Massachusetts, provides such a source. Entries for his diary 
show the words “cold” or “very cold” in five of the first seven days of May. On May 8 he 
noted “[W]eather cold, but very dry.”23 Drought conditions had persisted at least since 
                                                 
19Oppenheimer, 244. 
20Stanley Williams and Fen Montaigne, Surviving Galeras (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 198. 
21Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), June 6, 1816, 4. 
22John D. Post, The Last Great Subsistence Crisis in the Western World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), 25. 
23William Paine, Diary, May 1-8, 1816, Paine Family Papers c. 1721-c.1918, Octavo Vol. 33, American 
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April.24 At this same time newspapers were reporting heavy snows in Quebec in mid-
April, leading to cattle die-offs and rising grain prices.25 Early May was also a period of 
intense interest in sunspots, which were more visible than usual at this time.26 
 The first true weather shock of the year struck on May 14. On that day a severe 
cold front affected much of the eastern United States, bringing snow to many areas. Dr. 
Paine’s diary describes May 14 as “showery,” “squally,” and bearing a “snow wind.”27 
Isaiah Thomas, the venerated philanthropist who founded the American Antiquarian 
Society and who also lived in Worcester, reported in his diary that there was “some 
snow.”28 Joseph Goffe, a diarist who lived near Boston, also reported a snow squall on 
May 14.29 Enough snow fell in Albany, New York to cover rooftops.30 The next day there 
were frosts and deep cold in Philadelphia, Richmond,31 and regions along the Ohio 
River.32 Frost was again reported in Richmond on May 30; a newspaper noted that 
“[t]this is an extraordinary Spring.”33 
                                                                                                                                                 
Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
24Joseph Goffe, Diary, April 1816 (interlineated in The Clergyman’s Almanack), Joseph Goffe Papers 1721-
1846, Mss. Octavo Vols. G, Octavo Vol. 14, American Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
25Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), May 4, 1816, 3. 
26See Chapter III. 
27Paine, Diary, May 14, 1816. 
28Thomas, Diary, May 1816. 
29Goffe, Diary, May 1816. 
30London Times, July 20, 1816, 3. 
31Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), June 1, 1816, 3. 
32London Times, July 20, 1816, 3. 
33Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), June 4, 1816, 3. 
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 Extraordinary though frosty temperatures might be in Virginia in late May, snow 
in New England is not that unusual at this time of year.34 The rest of the month seems to 
have been much more typical. At least in some places the season appears to have warmed 
in late May and early June. Georgia, in fact, suffered a heat wave; temperatures above 90 
degrees Fahrenheit were recorded on May 29 and June 3.35 There was also a warming 
trend in New England. Dr. Paine’s and Isaiah Thomas’s diaries do not contain weather 
observations for this crucial week at the end of May and beginning of June, a week which 
contained the change in weather, but Ruth Henshaw Bascom, another Massachusetts 
diarist, reported that Wednesday, June 5 was clear and warm, with a thunderstorm in the 
evening.36 A precise temperature reading at Williamstown, Massachusetts, taken that day 
has survived: 83 degrees Fahrenheit.37 The next, and to many people the most 
memorable, weather event was about to occur. 
 From temperatures in at least the low eighties, on June 5-6 the mercury plunged 
forty-three degrees in Boston and forty-nine degrees in Salem, Massachusetts, over the 
course of twenty-six hours.38 A similar severe temperature swing of at least forty degrees 
                                                 
34Choosing a data set at random, weather records for Worcester, Massachusetts show that in thirty-four 
Mays spanning roughly the middle third of the twentieth century, snow was recorded in eleven of them. 
In almost all cases it was a trace of snow, which was recorded in 1947, 1954, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1967, 
1968, 1970, and 1977. In May 1945, 1.5 inches of snow fell. The only other snowfall greater than this 
was in May 1978, when Worcester received a staggering 12.7 inches of snow—definitely a blizzard. 
Weather of U.S. Cities (Detroit, MI: Gale Research Company, 1981), 492-93. Due to the effects of 
anthropogenic climate change developing during this period, however, this data set may not be truly 
representative of how “usual” snow in May was in the early nineteenth century. 
35Georgia Journal (Milledgeville, GA), June 5, 1816, 3. 
36Ruth Henshaw Bascom, Diary, Ruth Henshaw Bascom Papers, Mss. Octavo Vols. B, Vol. 23 (1816), 
American Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
37Willis I. Milham, “The Year 1816—The Causes of Abnormalities,” Monthly Weather Review 52, no. 12 
(December 1924): 563, 564 (citing Williamstown, MA Meteorological Observation Book, June 1816). 
38American Telegraph (Brownsville, PA), July 3, 1816, 2. 
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was noted in Albany, New York, as the cold front moved in.39 Snow was already falling in 
Bennington, Vermont on Wednesday, and continued for the next thirty hours.40 On 
Thursday, June 6, the rest of New England experienced similarly wintry conditions. Snow 
fell during the day in Marlboro, Vermont, and began in the evening in Hollowell, 
Maine.41 The storm was especially severe in Quebec, which saw not only snow 
measuring a foot deep but also a great die-off of birds that simply dropped out of the sky 
from cold.42 One newspaper reported snow eighteen inches deep in Waterbury, 
Vermont.43 It is unlikely this is a raw snowfall measurement; perhaps the reporter had 
measured a snowdrift or simply exaggerated, but it is undeniable that significant 
quantities of snow fell in New England that day. 
 Thursday, June 6, was the day Sarah Anna Emery attended the inauguration of 
New Hampshire Governor William Plumer and spent the evening in an inn shivering 
around the fireplace. The next day, Friday, June 7, was the day recalled so vividly by 
Chauncey Jerome forty-four years later. It was still snowing in some places on Friday, 
including Hollowell,44 but it was exceptionally cold just about everywhere on the Eastern 
Seaboard. The Worcester diarists, Isaiah Thomas and Dr. Paine, did not record snow that 
day, but both commented on the cold,45 the former observing, “Fires as agreeable as in 
                                                 
39Albany Argus, June 11, 1816, 2. 
40Green-Mountain Farmer (Bennington, VT), June 10, 1816, 2. 
41Connecticut Mirror (New Haven, CT), June 24, 1816, 2. 
42New-England Palladium & Commercial Advertiser (Boston, MA), June 21, 1816, 2. 
43American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), July 1, 1816, 3. 
44Connecticut Mirror (New Haven, CT), June 24, 1816, 2. 
45Paine, Diary, June 7, 1816; Thomas, Diary, June 7, 1816. 
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Winter.”46 Jacob Porter, like Sarah Anna Emery, was traveling that weekend. On June 7 
he rode from Concord, New Hampshire, to Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, noting: “At 
Sudbury I was informed that there was a severe frost in that place this morning and ice 
nearly as thick as window glass.”47 The snowfall in Boston is said to have aroused fear in 
the local populace.48 
 The snowstorm of Friday, June 7, was also the day on which another famous 
incident allegedly occurred. According to the story: 
In Peacham, VT, on the 7th of June, Mr. Joseph Walker, aged 88, lost 
himself in a wood in a snow storm, and his feet were frozen so that it was 
necessary to amputate his toes!49 
   
 The Walker amputation story—an unforgettable and colorful anecdote—was 
repeated by many papers across the United States.50 Beyond this one oft-repeated account 
there is no other record of Joseph Walker. Although the story cannot be verified, it has 
survived well into modern times, having been asserted as truth as late as the 1980s.51 The 
Walker story is not the only folk tale generated by the events of that specific day. James 
Winchester, a Vermont native, told a similar, even more dramatic story to a newspaper in 
the 1890s, in which his uncle lost his way in the snow and froze to death on June 17, 
                                                 
46Ibid. Interestingly, Thomas records “Snow in several places” the next day, Saturday, June 8, but it is 
unclear whether he means that snow actually fell in Worcester or if he was reporting that he had heard 
of snowfalls in other places (which I judge to be more likely). 
47Jacob Porter, Diary, June 7, 1816, Jacob Porter Papers 1802-1846, Mss. Boxes P, American Antiquarian 
Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
48William Jenison, Diary, June 8, 1816, Jennison Family Papers 1729-1860, Mss. Octavo Vols. J, Vol. 9, 
American Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. Jenison recorded this on June 8, but does not 
assert the snowfall happened that day; he is probably referring to the previous day. 
49Georgetown Gazette (Georgetown, SC), September 14, 1816, 3. 
50See, e.g., Reporter (Brattleboro, VT), September 17, 1816, 3. 
51Stommel, Volcano Weather, 103. 
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1816. This tale, which also cannot be verified, purports to represent the summer’s only 
confirmed fatality.52 Winchester insisted the date was June 17,53 but while it seems to 
have been cold that day in New England in general, there is no record of significant 
snowfall on that day in Vermont or anywhere else, and thus he was almost certainly 
referring to the June 7 storm. 
 On Saturday, June 8, the storm abated but the cold persisted. Continuing his 
journey from Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, to Brookfield, Jacob Porter remarked, “The 
Lapland weather still continues.”54 The nightmare weekend apparently ended with fair 
weather, but remained especially cold.55 
 The weather in Boston was clear enough on the evening of Sunday, June 9, for 
observers in the city to witness a total lunar eclipse. According to contemporary 
almanacs, the moon would rise eclipsed at 7:26 PM, with the period of totality lasting 
from 7:55 to 9:07.56 These predictions were matched almost exactly by newspaper 
accounts of the eclipse itself, where it was said that in Boston “[t]he evening was clear.”57 
                                                 
52Ibid., 101-02. I was unable to identify the exact newspaper in which the story ran or the date. The 
Stommels’ book, which appears to be aimed at a popular science audience, is poorly sourced insofar as 
historical records are concerned, and simply says that the account “comes from a newspaper clipping on 
file at the Vermont Historical Society.” Ibid., 166. 
53“The big storm of the 17th began along about noon...” Ibid., 102 (quoting unsourced account of James 
Winchester, 1892). 
54Porter, Diary, June 8, 1816. 
55Thomas, Diary, June 9, 1816. 
56The Clergyman’s Almanack; Or, an Astronomical Diary and Serious Monitor, For the Year 1816 (Boston: 
Printer for the Author, 1815), 2. This is the book that has been cited in this work as Joseph Goffe, Diary. 
Goffe’s notes and entries are written on pages of the printed almanac itself. The Isaiah Thomas Diary 
also takes this form. 
57New-England Palladium and Commercial Advertiser (Boston, MA), August 30, 1816, 2. Modern 
astronomical data compiled by NASA indicates slightly different times. 
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The eclipse, centered over the South Atlantic,58 was visible from London as well, where it 
was also clear.59 At least in New England, the appearance of a lunar eclipse immediately 
after the bizarre June snowstorm cannot have failed to have struck some observers as 
eerie. 
 Over the next few weeks the weather fluctuated wildly. Cold seems to have 
persisted in parts of Massachusetts until June 17.60 Isaiah Thomas noted the previous day 
that “[f]ires continue to be regularly made in our parlors.”61 That same week, a gale raged 
farther south; a ship, the Homer, was sunk in the storm off the coast of Charleston, South 
Carolina, around June 16. A Charleston newspaper observed: 
It is very remarkable, at this season of the year, to witness a northeasterly 
gale of five or six days continuance....Indeed the seasons, for the last six 
months, appear to have experienced a complete revolution. During the 
continuance of the storm, the weather was so cold as to render a fire not 
uncomfortable; and now we are, after an interval of three days, scorching 
under the most ardent rays of a summer sun.62 
 
 Heat soon struck New England too. On June 22, after five days of sun, the 
temperature in Boston was 96 degrees Fahrenheit.63 It was the first day of summer. 
 
 
 
                                                 
58NASA, “Five Millennium Canon of Lunar Eclipses,” http://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/5MCLEmap/1801-
1900/LE1816-06-10T.gif (accessed January 19, 2012). 
59New-England Palladium and Commercial Advertiser (Boston, MA), August 30, 1816, 2. 
60 Paine, Diary, June 17, 1816. 
61Thomas, Diary, June 16, 1816. 
62Connecticut Journal (New Haven, CT), July 2, 1816, 2 (reporting dispatch from Charleston, SC). 
63Poulson’s Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), 28, 1816, 3. 
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 C. Summer 1816: Fluctuations and Frost 
 The heat wave in the last week of June 1816 was severe. Diarist Ethan Allen 
Greenwood recorded that in Boston on June 23 the mercury rose to 102 degrees.64 In 
Salem, it was 101 on the same day.65 The weather quickly changed across the region. In 
Albany, New York, temperatures fell the next day, June 24, as clouds moved in, bringing 
another severe storm.66 Although it manifested itself as heavy rain in Massachusetts,67 
three feet of snow were reported in parts of Quebec.68 Temperatures rose around June 28, 
then plunged again at the beginning of July.69 The unusually erratic nature of the weather 
resulted in conditions that varied widely from day to day, even hour to hour. 
 On July 2, a weather-related event occurred that would be widely repeated 
throughout the summer and figure in later conjectures about the causes of the climate 
anomalies. A violent thunderstorm burst over West Chester, Pennsylvania, that Tuesday 
afternoon, bringing hail strong enough to smash window glass. A shower of stones—
quartz, feldspar and flint, according to observers—fell into the yard of one Colonel 
McClellan. The stones were said to be the size of walnuts, and none of the types of stones 
described in the incident were believed to be of local origin.70 
                                                 
64Ethan Allen Greenwood, Diary, June 23, 1816, Ethan Allen Greenwood Papers 1801-1839, Mss. Octavo 
Vols. G, Vol. 21, American Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
65Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), September 12, 1816, 1. 
66Vermont Gazette (Bennington, VT), July 23, 1816, 3. 
67Paine, Diary, June 25, 1816. 
68Montreal Gazette, September 30, 1816, 3. 
69Paine, Diary, June 28-July 4, 1816. 
70Essex Register (Salem, MA), July 10, 1816, 3. 
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 The Fourth of July, a Thursday in 1816, saw chilly weather across much of New 
England. The other element of Chauncey Jerome’s iconic reminiscences—the image of 
players pitching quoits while wearing cold-weather gear—dates from this day.71 In this 
era the traditional celebrations of Independence Day took place outdoors, often involving 
barbecues, orations, toasts and games often convened by entire communities in town 
squares and other public spaces.72 While the weather was not cold enough to transform 
these celebrations into winter festivals, observations such as Chauncey Jerome’s 
demonstrate that New Englanders observing the Fourth certainly noticed and appreciated 
the strangeness of the climate that summer. 
 Cold weather persisted throughout July in most places. Isaiah Thomas recorded 
frost on the morning of July 8 and remarked the next day, once again, about how fires 
indoors were necessary.73 In Maryland, the weather in mid-July was described as “clear 
and cool,” but farmers were still going about their harvests as best they could.74 For some 
observers, even as far south as Virginia, it seemed that summer had not yet arrived at all. 
A writer in a Norfolk newspaper complained: 
It is now the middle of July, and we have not yet had what could properly 
be called summer. Easterly winds have prevailed for nearly three months 
past...[t]he sun during that time has generally been obscured and the sky 
overcast with clouds; the air has been damp and uncomfortable, and 
frequently so chilling as to render the fireside a desirable retreat.75 
 
                                                 
71Jerome, 32. 
72Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early 
Republic (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997), 208-17. 
73Thomas, Diary, July 8-9, 1816. 
74Boston Independent Chronicle, July 22, 1816. 
75Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), July 27, 1816, 2. 
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 This was also the case on the other side of the Atlantic. The London Times 
reported unseasonable cold and incessant rain during July,76 an observation echoed by 
John Quincy Adams, then American minister to the Court of St. James. On July 19 he 
recorded that the weather was “so unusually and constantly cold that fires have been kept 
without intermission in almost every house.”77 Indeed the only isolated pockets in the 
Atlantic world that were not suffering from cold, heavy rain, or both seemed to be in the 
American Deep South: in Charleston, South Carolina, a heat wave in the third week of 
July drove temperatures high enough to cause casualties from heat stroke.78 
 August brought both warm and cold to many regions. Widespread frosts, 
particularly in the later part of the month, adversely affected crops in Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, parts of New York, and Canada.79 Frost also 
struck Virginia on August 20 and 21.80 William Paine and Isaiah Thomas, both in 
Worcester, each described conditions on these days as “very cold” or “severe.”81 In Utica, 
New York around August 29, not only was severe frost reported, but “ice nearly the 
thickness of a dollar.”82 Yet the cold conditions were not observed everywhere, and they 
fluctuated wildly. Joseph Goffe recorded August as “a warm month.”83 In Albany, New 
York, a high of 80 degrees was recorded in the morning, and that same night it was cold 
                                                 
76London Times, July 20, 1816, 3. 
77John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 
1848, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1874), III: 404-05. 
78Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 10, 1816, 2. Temperatures were said to be 95 degrees in the shade. 
79Boston Intelligencer, September 7, 1816, 2. 
80American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), September 9 1816, 3. 
81Paine, Diary, August 22, 1816; Thomas, Diary, August 21-26, 1816. 
82Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, DC), September 9, 1816, 2. 
83Goffe, Diary, August 1816. 
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enough to frost.84 That cold and warm air masses were clashing violently over much of 
the Eastern Seaboard is borne out by numerous reports of violent thunderstorms in the 
latter weeks of August, in New England85 and locations in mid-Atlantic states.86 
Thunderstorm activity is common where warm and cold air masses collide.87 
 By September it seemed that people everywhere had become weary of the strange 
climate. It was now harvest-time for many crops, and farmers of all classes were 
concerned with the weather’s depressing effect on their yields.88 Despite spotty patches of 
warm or even unseasonably hot weather, the perception was taking shape that the winter 
of 1815-16 had never really ended, and continued in an essentially unbroken continuum 
right through the spring and summer. Isaiah Thomas, after noting that the summer “has 
been the most extraordinary that I can remember” (he was then sixty-seven years old), 
noted that there had been a frost in every month since the previous autumn.89 From 
London, John Quincy Adams wrote to his mother that “we have had...not one evening 
and scarcely a day in 1816, when a fire would have been superfluous.”90 Even before the 
autumnal equinox officially rang out the extraordinary season, the idea that 1816 was a 
“Year Without a Summer” seems to have already taken hold in the public consciousness. 
 
 
                                                 
84Albany Argus, August 23, 1816, 3. 
85Paine, Diary, August 18, 1816. 
86Albany Argus, August 22, 1816, 2. 
87Choji Magono, Thunderstorms (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1980), 2-3. 
88Boston Intelligencer, September 7, 1816, 2. 
89Thomas, Diary, August 31, 1816. 
90John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, September 20, 1816, Memoirs, VI: 90. 
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 D. Into the Autumn: Frost, Hurricane and Fire 
 In September, a month that would normally have trended cooler even without the 
volcanic climate changes, reports of severe frosts were rampant. Frost was responsible for 
the destruction of tobacco crops in Virginia,91 corn in Massachusetts92 and vegetables in 
New York state.93 In Northampton, Massachusetts, a day of prayer and fasting was 
declared in early September due to drought, cold and crop failures.94 In the later part of 
the month, Massachusetts and New Hampshire experienced “four of the greatest frosts 
ever remembered here at this season of the year.”95 The mean temperature for the month 
of September in Williamstown, Massachusetts, was 55 degrees Fahrenheit, only slightly 
warmer than May.96 
 In early September communities up and down the Atlantic coast experienced what 
may have been a hurricane, or something close to it. In Petersburg, Virginia, heavy rain 
began on September 6 and continued unrelenting for the next week.97 The rain began in 
Philadelphia on the 8th, a Sunday, and hit Boston on the 12th. The storm was 
characterized as a “gale.” New York City received a staggering ten inches of rain over the 
course of sixty-six hours.98 In Rhode Island the storm evidently manifested itself as a 
classic Nor’easter, with rain falling “in torrents, almost without intermission, for eight 
                                                 
91American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), September 7, 1816, 3. 
92Goffe, Diary, September 26, 1816. 
93Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), October 12, 1816, 2. 
94Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), September 7, 1816, 2. 
95Boston Independent Chronicle, October 7, 1816, 2. 
96Post, 10. 
97Essex Register (Salem, MA), September 21, 1816, 2. 
98 Albany Argus (Albany, NY), September 20, 1816, 2. 
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days in succession.”99 Although hurricanes were not recognized or classified in the early 
19th century as they are today, the reports of the storm, its widespread geographic 
coverage, and the time of year in which it occurred all seem to point to a strong tropical 
storm that struck at least a glancing blow on the east coast of the United States. 
 Some people believed that the great storm of September 1816 was foretold in the 
skies shortly before it happened. On September 8, just before the heavy rains began, 
“solar halos”—also commonly called “sun dogs”—were observed in New England skies 
between two and three o’clock in the afternoon. These bright halos surrounding the sun 
were said to have shone with prismatic qualities and lasted nearly an hour. “Halos or 
circles, around the sun or moon,” remarked a Rhode Island newspaper, “have always 
been considered as the precursors of rain.” This same paper identified the torrential 
downpour that began the next evening as a specific fulfillment of this “precursor.”100 In 
fact such solar phenomenon has, in modern scientific understanding, been associated with 
volcanic particles suspended in the stratosphere.101 
 While coastal areas reeled from a deluge, areas further inland had the opposite 
problem: drought. Contemporary reports throughout the summer mention disturbingly 
dry conditions in many areas,102 but by early October Maine’s forests and fields, dry and 
parched, their yields stunted by numerous hard frosts, were a tinderbox ready to explode. 
Fires began in Oxford County sometime in the first week of October. The blazes were 
impossible to combat due to the low level of water in local streams; what crops weren’t 
                                                 
99Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, DC), October 3, 1816, 3. 
100Ibid. (quoting the Rhode Island Republican, September 11, 1816). 
101Richard B. Stothers, “Cloudy and Clear Stratospheres Before 1000 A.D. Inferred from Written Sources,” 
Journal of Geophysical Research 107, no. D23 (2002): 17-1. 
102Dedham Gazette (Dedham, NH), July 19, 1816, 1. 
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already decimated by frost were consumed by fire.103 Vast clouds of smoke from the 
Maine fires began to drift over New England, reaching Boston no later than October 7.104 
William Paine recorded in his diary, “[A]tmosphere appears to be full of smoak.”105 A 
writer in Albany, New York, after lamenting that the ground had not received a drop of 
moisture since June, went on to remark that “the woods are every where on fire, and the 
smoke so thick, that while I now write, at 4 in the afternoon, to’ there are no clouds, the 
sun is not to be seen.”106 
 When the fires ended—there is no record of them after mid-October—the weather 
was now uniformly cold and communities were bracing for winter. The cold summer and 
numerous weather shocks had resulted in poor harvests across the United States, from 
New England to the South, with the worst effects centered in the West.107 Indeed across 
the entire Atlantic world, disappointing harvests were common; their effects were 
especially severe in Europe, where local and national economies were still fragile from 
the ravages of twenty years of war.108 The threat of hunger was real in many places in 
America as well. In November, a Quaker missionary in western New York wrote to his 
governing committee appealing for cash to buy corn for local Indians, whose crops had 
been wiped out by the frosts and whose families were already on the verge of 
destitution.109 Even the Essex Register, a Salem, Massachusetts paper that had spent 
                                                 
103Essex Register (Salem, MA), October 5, 1816, 3. 
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much of the summer simply denying that any significant climate anomalies were taking 
place,110 was forced to admit that harvests were generally bad, though it added hopefully 
that “when we settle the year’s account, it will not be the worst ever known.”111 
 Most narratives about the Year Without a Summer end with the harvest and the 
anxieties it caused. In reality, however, the weather anomalies did not end with the return 
of cold weather in its normal course in the fall of 1816. The long wake of the Tambora 
disaster—which will be discussed in a later chapter112—was by no means over simply 
because its odd, climate-shifting weather events became indistinguishable from those 
normally occurring in the autumn and winter. Indeed, as the trees lost their leaves and the 
snows returned again in November and December 1816, the people of the eastern United 
States seem to have had no sense that anything was truly ending. The accustomed winter 
was not beginning anew. It had simply never ended. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Records, Microfilm F824, American Philosophical Society, from Quaker Collection Originals, Special 
Collection, Haverford College, Philadelphia, PA. 
110See Chapter IV, Section C. 
111Essex Register (Salem, MA), October 16, 1816, 1 (emphasis added). 
112Chapter VII. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
“THE GREATEST ACTIVITY OF THE CAUSE”: SCIENCE, PSEUDOSCIENCE 
 
AND THE CAUSATION ARGUMENT 
  
 A. The Sunspot Obsession 
 Such an extraordinary event as the Year Without a Summer, global in scope and 
potentially catastrophic in its consequences, could not have occurred without intense 
public discussion of its causation. Americans in 1816—and many overseas—speculated, 
hypothesized, wrote, responded, argued and joked about the potential causes of the 
climate events. The contentious public conversation regarding causation provides one of 
the key insights into the worldview of Americans in this era and how they evaluated the 
physical world around them. Part science, part superstition and part practical knowledge 
of the land and nature, the sources of this worldview represented various areas of thought 
that were sometimes symbiotic and sometimes contradictory, in an era where science had 
not yet fully emerged into the light of day as a trusted and presumably rational discipline 
for understanding the environment. 
 Judging from the frequency of its mention in public discussion, the contemporary 
explanatory theory that seems to have had the most cachet in the public mind was 
sunspots. The theory was not usually elucidated in scientific or even pseudoscientific 
terms: it was largely a naked assumption that increased sunspot activity concomitant with 
climate change could not be pure coincidence. A Boston newspaper summed up the 
sunspot causation theory succinctly: 
The philosophers assure us there is nothing to be apprehended from the 
spots on the sun; but by a strange coincidence, the coldness of the present 
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season, both in Europe and America, has chilled the earth at the very 
period when those spots were largest and occurred most frequently.1 
 
 Another newspaper in the same city, proceeding more cautiously, concluded that it 
was “at least worthy of remark” that sunspots, “each time, have been preceded by an 
extraordinary change in the weather.”2 This was in the first few days after the June 7 
snowstorm, when doubtless public interest in the weather anomalies was high. 
 Sunspot causation was something akin to a popular superstition. The reasoning 
was fairly simple: because the sun warms the Earth, sunspots—whatever they are—
darken the disk of the sun and thus allow less solar radiation to reaching the Earth than 
would otherwise be the case. This belief was not held in high regard by experts or 
educated persons in general. An editorial, written in late June, evaluating this theory 
mentions that it was the butt of ridicule: 
The notion is so generally laughed at, that one dare hardly ask, ‘if the 
spots on the sun may not have had some influence in producing our late 
unexampled cold weather? Is it certain that ‘the thing is impossible?’...If 
the rays from 30,000 miles of [the sun’s disk] affects not the heat of this 
planet, would an object covering 60,000 miles or a million of miles, render 
it colder here?3 
 
 Scientists were quick to push back against this theory. Probably the most 
influential astronomer in the world in 1816 was the German-born British scientist 
William Herschel, discoverer of the planet Uranus and some of its moons.4 When 
                                                 
1Boston Intelligencer, September 7, 1816, 2. 
2Boston Independent Chronicle, June 10, 1816, 2. 
3Columbian (New York, NY), June 27, 1816, 2. The writer is assuming that sunspots are caused by some 
celestial object lying between the sun and the Earth, which was a fairly common supposition. 
4In fact Uranus was widely, though not officially, called “planet Herschel” in his honor up until the 1850s. 
Mark Littmann, Planets Beyond: Discovering the Outer Solar System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1988), 9-11. 
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Herschel opined that sunspots were harmless, his opinion was regarded by many as 
definitive.5 He went so far as to plot sunspot activity on a graph against an analysis of the 
price of wheat, and pronounced that the lack of correlation between them was proof that 
they did not and could not affect climate.6 Another German, a Dr. Sturmer—his exact 
credentials unknown—wrote from Nuremburg in late June that “there is no connection 
between them [sunspots] and the weather, which is rather influenced by winds and 
vapours.” Sturmer cited data from 1761 and 1783, both years of remarkable sunspot 
activity, where there were no observable climate effects, and harvests and vintages were 
bountiful.7 John Quincy Adams, an enthusiastic observer of scientific as well as political 
phenomena, was not willing to endorse unequivocal belief in either the scientists or the 
popular wisdom: “What agency the spots in the sun have had in all this,” he wrote to his 
mother in September, “is more than I, or perhaps anybody else is astronomer enough to 
know.”8 
 Regardless of whether people believed they caused the weather anomalies or not, 
the general subject of sunspots was a virtual obsession in the spring and summer of 1816. 
The appearance of a new spot, or a significant change in existing spots, was frequently 
reported in the news.9 In early May, which seems to have been the most intense period of 
visible sunspot activity, the Washington, D.C. Daily National Intelligencer, the semi-
official mouthpiece of the James Madison administration, published an ongoing series of 
                                                 
5“Spots on the Sun,” Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 31, 1816, 1-2. 
6“The Climate,” Connecticut Journal (New Haven, CT), September 17, 1816, 2. 
7Connecticut Journal (New Haven, CT), September 3, 1816, 2. 
8Letter, John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, September 20, 1816, Memoirs, III: 90. 
9See, e.g., Boston Independent Chronicle, June 10, 1816, 2. 
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articles detailing sunspot minutiae and hypothesizing as to the cause and nature of the 
spots. Most of the articles were credited to a particular writer who signed them simply 
“Z.”  “Z” made it perfectly clear that he did not believe sunspots were responsible for the 
weather anomalies. “[A] spot on the Sun, which does not cover a ten thousandth part of 
its surface,” he argued, “can produce no sensible diminution of his light or heat.” 
Adopting an almost sneering tone at those who were alarmed by sunspots, “Z” cautioned 
that “real evils are numerous—we ought not to create imaginary evils.”10 
 Despite his apparent disdain for the sunspot causation argument, “Z” served the 
readers of the Daily National Intelligencer a veritable smorgasbord of sunspot facts, 
factoids and naked conjecture. As well as chronicling the appearance, location and 
probable size of particular sunspots,11 he gave much attention to various theories of what 
they are: “solid opaque bodies swimming upon the liquid matter of the sun,” “excavations 
in the luminous matter of the sun,” or even craters left by the impact of a comet, which 
may have carried away enough solar matter to form a new planet.12 Comet collision was 
evidently the pet theory of a Philadelphia astronomer, David McClure, who cited a 1680 
work by Isaac Newton as its inspiration.13 This theory, reminiscent of the unorthodox 
ideas of Velikovsky in a much later era,14 aroused controversy; one irate Massachusetts 
                                                 
10Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), May 9, 1816, 3. 
11“Spots on the Sun’s Disk,” Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), May 1, 1816, 3. Reporting 
on his observations through a telescope, “Z” speculates, for instance, that one particular sunspot cluster 
is about 40,000 miles across, and states that it looks like a cluster of islands such as the Bahamas. 
12Ibid.; Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), May 9, 1816, 3. 
13Montreal Gazette, June 3, 1816, 2. 
14 Immanuel Velikovsky (1895-1979) was a Russian-born psychiatrist who argued that collisions or near-
collisions of celestial objects with the Earth, including Venus, Jupiter and various comets, influenced 
various events in human history and prehistory. His theories were roundly rejected by mainstream sci-
ence. The publication by a major publishing house of Velikovsky’s infamous 1950 book Worlds in Col-
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farmer penned an angry letter to a newspaper editor demanding that McClure withdraw 
his statements. This reader—who argued that sunspots were caused by transits of 
Mercury or Venus across the sun—fulminated that to believe God constructed the solar 
system so poorly that celestial objects were in danger of running into each other was 
blasphemy: “worse than Atheism itself, and no man can believe it without horror.”15 
 The unique fascination that sunspots held for observers in 1816 is entirely 
understandable given the circumstances. Twenty-first century science usually explains 
sunspots as temporary localized areas of inhibited convection on the photosphere of the 
Sun, resulting in lower surface temperatures in those areas which appear to us as dark 
spots.16 But there remains even today much misunderstanding, and even superstition, 
regarding sunspots. Modern literature, often denounced by experts as pseudoscience, 
continues to assert a connection between sunspot activity and climate change or weather 
events.17 Indeed, sunspots are sometimes still asserted as a causal factor in the Year 
Without a Summer, mostly in pop culture pieces and on the Internet.18 Today’s popular 
                                                                                                                                                 
lision triggered a controversy within and without the scientific community regarding the appropriate di-
viding line between science and pseudoscience. 
15Letter to the Editor, Green-Mountain Farmer (Bennington, VT), May 18, 1816, 3. This writer, who signed 
his letter simply “A Farmer,” might not have realized that it would have been easy enough to test 
whether this theory is true. Any common almanac available at the time included measurements and 
calculations of the exact positions of Mercury and Venus night after night, and extrapolating where they 
were during the day—and if they happened to transit the sun—would not have been difficult. See, e.g., 
Miner’s Pennsylvania and New Jersey Almanac for the Year of Our Lord 1816 (Doylestown, PA: Asher 
Miner, 1815). 
16David Alexander, The Sun (Santa Barbara, CA: ABL CLIO, 2009), 69. 
17See, e.g., Rasmus E. Benestad, Solar Activity and Earth’s Climate (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2006). 
18Today, ironically, it is the lack of sunspots which is sometimes cited as a causal, or at least a contributing, 
factor. See, e.g., Jeremy Ross, “Solar Activity Lowest in Almost 100 Years, Implications for Climate 
Potentially Significant,” SOTT.net, April 9, 2009, http://www.sott.net/articles/show/181839 (accessed 
January 31, 2012). It is noteworthy that websites of this nature are sometimes associated with 
anthropogenic climate change denial. See, e.g., R. John Muench, “Data Doesn’t Support Global 
Warming Theory,” SOTT.net, May 30, 2008, http://www.sott.net/articles/show/159029-Data-doesn-t-
support-global-warming-theory (accessed January 31, 2012). The relationship between the Year Without 
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conceptions about sunspots have not strayed far from the parameters of the debates about 
them that occurred in 1816. 
 There is no way to gauge how widespread belief in the sunspot causation theory 
was among ordinary Americans in 1816, but some clues suggest a disconnect between the 
oft-repeated denials of the theory among the scientific elite, and what people really 
believed (or suspected). The sheer volume of articles refuting the sunspot causation 
theory seems to indicate that it had significant support in some sectors of the public, or at 
least that people were prepared to consider it. The diary of one Joseph Trumbull, written 
in an almanac, contains a curious note about sunspots, totally unlike anything else in his 
diary, which is overwhelmingly preoccupied with financial accounts and household tips. 
Yet opposite the page for May 1816—the very month when visible sunspot activity 
reached its maximum—he wrote: 
Solar Spots. 
It is a well known principle that an affect produced by the continued 
agency of any cause is not simultaneous with the agency; and the greatest 
effect is produced posterior in time to the greatest activity of the 
cause...Witness the greatest heat of the day is usually after the Sun passes 
the Meridian...the greatest heat of Summer after the Sun leaves the tropic 
the flood in the tides after the Moon makes the meridian...19 
  
 This passage might have been quoted, but Trumbull did not identify its source; 
nevertheless, its cryptic ruminations on causation of astronomical events, and the express 
identification of this idea being associated in his mind with sunspots, seems to indicate 
that Trumbull was thinking about sunspots as being the potential delayed cause of 
something. The curious weather events of that year had not yet begun to manifest 
                                                                                                                                                 
a Summer and modern climate change denial is explored in Chapter VI. 
19Joseph Trumbull, Diary, May 1816, Trumbull Family Papers 1773-1903, Mss. Octavo Vols. T, Vol. 6, 
American Antiquarian Society Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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themselves by May. The passage could have been written later in the summer and 
backdated to the month where Trumbull recalled sunspots—a potential cause—as being 
at their peak. 
 Americans’ unusual preoccupation with sunspots in the spring and summer of 
1816 gives rise to the question: if sunspots were not somehow involved with the weather 
anomalies, why did people think they were? Was there something special about sunspot 
activity at this time? 
 Sunspots wax and wane on an eleven-year cycle. Having been a subject of 
systematic scientific observation since at least 1611, the rise and fall of sunspots can be 
easily graphed and evaluated.20 Examining such a graph, one sees that not only did 1816 
fall on the down-slope of one of these cycles, but that year also occurred during a period 
called the “Dalton Minimum,” a historically low interval of sunspots spanning much of 
the first third of the 19th century.21 During the Year Without a Summer, sunspots were not 
only rarer than most other times during a normal eleven-year cycle, but even less 
numerous than usual due to the Dalton Minimum. Yet it is clear from contemporary 
accounts that people generally perceived that sunspots were at an all-time high. Why? 
 The answer—again—is Tambora. The sulfur dioxide in the air resulting from the 
eruption diffused light and caused a diminution in the general transparency of the 
atmosphere. Scientists have observed this effect by compiling and comparing eyewitness 
historical reports of lunar eclipses to determine how clear or occluded the atmosphere 
was. In this study, the lunar eclipse of June 1816, visible from London and New England, 
                                                 
20Karen C. Fox, “Celebrating 400 Years of Sunspot Observations,” NASA Website, March 9, 2011, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/sunearth/news/400yrs-spots.html (accessed February 2, 2012). 
21Robert A. Rodhe, “400 Years of Sunspot Observations” (Graph), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sunspot_Numbers.png (accessed February 2, 2012). 
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is a remarkable outlier—“one of the darkest ever recorded,” according to scientific 
literature.22 Many contemporary reports speak of the sky having a hazy appearance, 
especially in May,23 and reports of brilliant sunsets throughout the summer24 also indicate 
hazy conditions. Simply put, the volcanic haze dimmed the atmosphere to the point 
where sunspots were visible to the naked eye to a much greater degree than they usually 
were. Sunspots were not more numerous, but because people could see them much more 
readily, many quite naturally assumed that there were more of them. Due to their unusual 
visibility, sunspots became an inevitable scapegoat for the weather anomalies. 
 
 B. Glaciers, Vapors and Musket Fire: Other Potential Causes 
 Shaky though its support was, sunspot activity was the only potential cause of the 
climate anomalies that commanded any significant degree of consensus. Americans did, 
however, occasionally advance other potential causes, some insightful, some ridiculous, 
and at least one that was somewhat close to the truth. 
 Aside from sunspots, global wind patterns were cited as a potential cause. “The 
extraordinary state of the weather,” said a Connecticut newspaper, “is evidently caused 
by the prevalence of easterly and northerly winds blowing over the bleak, snow-clad 
mountains and islands of ice in the frozen regions of the north.” The article raised the 
question of why wind patterns had been so different than usual but did not venture an 
                                                 
22Richard B. Stothers, “Stratospheric Transparency Derived from Total Lunar Eclipse Colors, 1801-1881,” 
Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific 117 (November 2005): 1446. 
23Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), May 1, 1816, 3. 
24American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), September 9, 1816, 3. 
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answer.25 Dr. Sturmer of Nuremberg, as mentioned above, generally thought the same, 
citing the general cause as “winds and vapours.”26 Winds blowing over glaciated and 
snow-covered terrain was a more prosaic and perhaps intellectually unsatisfying 
explanation, but at least it had the advantage of ascribing the weather events to a 
terrestrial cause. 
 In the midst of the cold summer there was no indication of how long the climate 
change event would last. Questions about whether the alterations were temporary or 
permanent in nature led almost inevitably to speculation that the Earth’s climate, as a 
whole, was growing permanently colder.27 The curious argument over whether the Earth’s 
climate was gradually becoming cooler or warmer—“global cooling” versus “global 
warming”28—will be discussed more fully in Chapter VI, but it important to note that 
debates about causes were almost inseparably intertwined with questions or assumptions 
about the transience or permanence of the phenomena, as well as the degree to which 
human agency was culpable. The basic idea of human activity being capable of altering 
                                                 
25Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), July 27, 1816, 2. 
26Ibid., September 3, 1816, 2. 
27See, e.g., Ibid., June 18, 1816, 2. 
28The term “global warming” is, for those of us who live in the twenty-first century, a loaded term. For 
purposes of this paper I am using the term “global warming” to refer to the concept of the Earth’s 
climate as a whole growing warmer, regardless of cause, and conversely, I will use the term “global 
cooling” to refer to the opposite effect. Both global warming and global cooling, in the way I am using 
these terms, are subsets of “climate change,” which I define as a significant, non-transitory alteration in 
the climate patterns of the Earth, regardless of cause. Later, and particularly in Chapter VI, I will use the 
term “anthropogenic climate change” to refer to a climate change caused or at least greatly accelerated 
by human activity. The paradigm example of anthropogenic climate change is the current condition of 
the Earth’s climate growing warmer as a result of pollution by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases from industrial processes, deforestation and other human causes. That is undoubtedly a form of 
global warming, but there is a tendency, at least among lay people, to interpret the term “global 
warming” (or “anthropogenic global warming,” AGW) as referring solely to this modern example of 
climate change, which I feel is a misnomer. 
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planetary climate seems to have been less controversial than the specific activities that 
may have been to blame. 
 In the context of the global warming versus global cooling debate, another 
theory—perhaps better characterized as an observation rather than a theory—surfaced in 
a South Carolina newspaper. After a lengthy dissertation on climate change in general, 
the opinion of one Lord Dreghorn was given, relying principally on the testimony of a 
brewer who allegedly told him in 1784 that the global climate was even then growing 
colder, as attested by changes in the characteristics of barley. The changes began, 
according to Lord Dreghorn’s brewer, in 1755, the year of the great earthquake in Lisbon. 
Dreghorn went on to say that the brewer’s account was corroborated by reports from 
French wine makers that they had been unable to make the same varietals of wine since 
1755, and they believed the Lisbon quake was somehow responsible.29 The article did not 
explain the supposed linkage between the earthquake and climate change, but Dreghorn 
clearly asserted a causal relationship.30 The 1755 Lisbon quake was a tremendous shock 
to the western world of the Enlightenment era and directly and indirectly motivated 
various efforts to better understand earth sciences.31 Given the impact this event had on 
the psyche of the Atlantic world, it is not surprising that it was considered as a potential 
cause. 
                                                 
29“Climate of the U. States,” Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), September 12, 1816, 1. 
30In another parallel between the Year Without a Summer and modern anthropogenic climate change, 
modern scientists are again asserting that such a link between climate change and tectonic activity 
exists; however, today’s theories have the chain of causation reversed, i.e., anthropogenic climate 
change may be causing earthquakes rather than the other way around. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, 
“Climate Change Affects Tectonic Plate Movement, Causing Earthquakes: Study,” The Raw Story, April 
13, 2011, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/04/13/climate-can-drive-seismic-shifts-study/ (accessed 
February 9, 2012). 
31Jelle Zeilinga de Boer and Donald Theodore Sanders, Earthquakes in Human History: The Far-Reaching 
Effects of Seismic Disruptions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 88. 
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 One of the most creative causation arguments, and one that alleged human agency, 
linked the Year Without a Summer to the recent end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. 
An article reproduced in the Daily National Intelligencer referenced a treatise by an 
unnamed German writer entitled “The Effects of War Upon the Seasons,” which asserted 
that there was a more or less permanent current of cold air flowing from the Arctic 
regions to the equator. This current could be directly affected by wars in Europe, to wit: 
[T]he concussion produced in the atmosphere by large and frequent 
discharges of gunpowder, obstructed this current, and often cause a current 
in an opposite direction. According to this writer, therefore, the prevailing 
coldness of this year, may be explained from the universal peace which at 
present pervades the nations of the European world.32 
 
 This theory seems absurd at first blush, but it has at least a spiritual kinship with 
modern scientific arguments on the effect of war upon the global environment. Indeed, 
the theory of a planet-killing “nuclear winter,” popularized by astrophysicist and peace 
activist Carl Sagan in the 1980s, hypothesizes the effect of smoke from burning atom-
bombed cities in the wake of a nuclear war as a larger and more pronounced version of 
precisely what Tambora did to the atmosphere in the nineteenth century.33 The nuclear 
winter theory argues for global cooling as a result of war rather than peace, but the basic 
concept of climate change as a side effect of large-scale military conflict—and 
presumably its moral implications—was not unknown in 1816. 
 Speculations on the effect of smoke in the atmosphere led some, at least, to 
conclusions that landed remarkably close to the right answer. William Young, an educator 
who in the fall of 1816 had been elected to the New York state legislature, penned a letter 
                                                 
32Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), September 3, 1816, 2.  
33Paul J. Crutzen and John W. Birks, “The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon,” Ambio II, 
no. 2/3 (1982): 114-25. 
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expressing alarm at the forest fires that were raging in many parts of the Northeast in late 
September and early October, due in large measure to drought conditions. Young wrote of 
the fires: “I fear that the smoke which they produced, accumulating in the atmosphere, 
must intercept the rays of the sun, and deprive us of much of that genial heat of which the 
earth seems everywhere so much in want.”34 Young was elucidating, in colloquial terms, 
a theory of atmospheric cooling caused by particulates—which he could not have known 
was precisely what had already happened on a much larger scale and more distant cause 
than the particulates produced by the New England forest fires. This sort of reasoning, if 
considered in conjunction with speculations, some voiced by none other than Benjamin 
Franklin in the previous century, that volcanoes could produce atmospherically 
deleterious particles,35 demonstrates that the various component pieces of the Tambora 
causation theory all existed in some nascent form at the time the climate anomalies were 
happening. All that was needed was someone to put the pieces together. In short, given 
the state of knowledge at the time, it would not have been surprising if scientific thinkers 
or even a lay person in 1816 had come up with an accurate scientific explanation for what 
was happening to their world. Whether such an explanation would have been generally 
accepted, however, is quite another matter. 
 
 C. Causation Arguments and the “Pastiche of Knowledge” 
 An admittedly unquantifiable—and possibly unscientific—impression that 
emerges from a broad survey of public debates about causation is a sense of bafflement. 
Despite the many opinions raised and circulated in various quarters, some acknowledging 
                                                 
34Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), October 19, 1816, 4. 
35See Chapter VII, note 35. 
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naked conjecture in the midst of others that purport to be the absolute truth, no single 
hypothesis seems to have commanded a significant consensus among the American 
public. Indeed the dynamic of the public discussion seems to indicate that the various 
causation opinions were more or less considered to be on an equal footing with one 
another, not in the sense of the number of adherents any one theory may have had (which 
is impossible to tell), but in the remarkable lack of competition for an implicit standard of 
legitimacy. Today, that implicit standard is scientific accuracy. Americans’ discussions 
about climate anomalies in 1816, however, do not seem to presume that scientific 
accuracy was the bottom line. Particularly with regard to sunspots were, people did argue 
about what was scientifically accurate and what was not. However, scientifically accurate 
information does not seem to have been as impressive to Americans in 1816 as it would 
be today. 
 The various reactions to the climate events seem to indicate that the Year Without 
a Summer fell into what in many ways was a transitional period in how science was 
perceived as a means for explaining convincingly the processes of the physical world. 
Various writers’ constant invocations of scientists, such as William Herschel or the 
mysterious Dr. Sturmer, show that learned scientific explanations could and probably did 
have some cachet. But 1816 was an era when institutional science—organized bodies of 
credentialed experts in carefully-delineated specialized fields, with common standards of 
proof and methodology—was in its infancy. Herschel had his views on what sunspots 
were and whether they were affecting the weather, but these views competed on a more 
or less equal playing field with the suppositions of Lord Dreghorn and his brewer. I 
believe this points in favor of a sort of uneasy coexistence in the public consciousness 
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between scientific understanding on the one hand, and knowledge derived from more 
common sources, such as the practical experience of farmers or artisans. 
 The attraction of practical and folk knowledge in this period is easily recognized 
in the profusion of “Farmer’s Almanac”-type publications, such as the very almanacs in 
which diarists recorded their thoughts about the strange events of that year. These 
pamphlets are filled with astronomical tables and authoritative-sounding weather 
predictions, but they are also rife with catchy verse, religious sayings, amusing anecdotes 
and common agricultural and household tips. Almanacs were the perfect embodiment of 
the character of the body of knowledge that informed Americans’ worldview about their 
environment: it is a curious pastiche composed partly of hard science, partly of 
superstition, seasoned with practical observation and animated by folklore. This “pastiche 
of knowledge”—to coin a term—was incomplete and self-contradictory, and it was also 
organic, changing over time as experience, particularly of practical field knowledge, 
expanded and grew more diverse. In contrast to our modern scientific or social scientific 
doctrines, which we view as the work of experts handing down their newly-minted 
wisdom from universities and research institutions, the pastiche of knowledge was a 
collaborative effort that involved the general public. Today we would call it “open 
source.” In addition to the farmers’ almanacs—every region had one or more published 
locally—newspapers in 1816 frequently ran, as front-page news, tips for seeding or 
harvesting crops, dealing with animals or general housekeeping. All of these 
contributions, whether from lay people or “philosophers,” mingled together in a 
nebulously-defined body of understanding that existed without gatekeepers, central 
direction, or even implied judgments of legitimacy or veracity. 
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 This pastiche of knowledge directly shaped the environmental worldview of the 
people of 1816. Because it was an amalgam of knowledge derived from many sources, 
there was no particular expectation that it was infallible or complete. Consequently, the 
explanations for the natural world that derived from the pastiche of knowledge could not 
be considered authoritative, at least not in explaining extreme or unusual phenomena. 
One might expect, for example, that the advice in a farmer’s almanac regarding the best 
time to harvest rye would be generally accurate, so long as conditions that season were 
consistent with past experience. In a year as wildly unpredictable as 1816, however, the 
same advice might well be disastrous. Could the pastiche of knowledge reasonably be 
expected to provide answers for such bizarre events? The reality that some things are 
inherently unexplainable was a key element of this worldview. 
 Nevertheless, peoples’ reactions to the climate anomalies of 1816 demonstrate 
that, while they realized the limitations of such a worldview, these limitations made them 
uneasy. The search for answers to what was causing the phenomena clearly demonstrates 
the deep desire to understand and evaluate it, and the denialist tendencies of some people 
such as Warwick Palfray, Jr. indicate that uncertainty and incompleteness regarding 
natural phenomena was not always easy to accept. When one steps back and considers the 
early 19th century as a time of transition between a world of superstition and faith and the 
newly-emerging modern world of Enlightenment-guided science and reason, this tension 
between acceptance of the inexplicable and unease at the failure to explain it makes 
sense. The world of 1816 was not rocked to its foundations by the climate anomalies, but 
neither did it simply shrug them off and take no notice. This may be why the events have 
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been difficult to grasp in a historical context. At once they were earth-shaking, and at the 
same time they were ephemeral. 
 Seen in this sense, the sense of bafflement with which the world confronted the 
events of the Year Without a Summer seems to have been an entirely predictable and 
appropriate response. The pastiche of knowledge was not competent to explain 
everything, and while it assumed that there was much in the natural world that was 
inexplicable, that realization was on some level unsatisfying. The limitations of your 
worldview, even if you are aware of them, will not help you struggle through a 
hardscrabble winter after frost in August destroys the corn crop on which your economic 
prospects largely or wholly depend. With no readily identifiable agency to blame, even 
asking why seems strangely academic. Yet many Americans did ask why, and they came 
up with a wide array of possible answers. The act of questioning was itself a significant 
response. Sometimes questions carry more meaning than answers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“A GREAT PARTY QUESTION”: POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS 
  
 A. Political Trends: Moribund Federalists and Sullen Voters 
 By the physical accidents of the timing of Tambora’s eruption and the conditions 
in the atmosphere that carried its blanket of disaster across the globe, the Year Without a 
Summer happened to fall within an election year in the United States. There is no 
question that the climate events had some impact on politics or were at least interpreted 
by some in political contexts. The only question is what impacts the events had. This is, 
necessarily, a very difficult question to answer; what is surprising, however, is how few 
historians have chosen even to ask it. 
 As political contests go, 1816 is not generally regarded as particularly pivotal. 
That autumn, James Monroe, the “last of the Founders,” won the presidency in his own 
right with minimal Federalist opposition, and he would replace the retiring James 
Madison in March.1 The congressional, gubernatorial and local elections resulted in the 
continuation of large Democratic-Republican majorities at both national and state levels 
of government—not a surprising outcome, given the traditional historical analysis that the 
Federalist party was suffering its final Götterdämmerung as a result of its opposition to 
the War of 1812.2 As 1816 was not politically noteworthy, there has been little incentive 
to analyze the climate anomalies in a political context. Indeed, as any evidence linking 
                                                 
1Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Presidency of James Monroe (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
1996), 15-26. 
2Shaw Livermore, Jr., The Twilight of Federalism: The Disintegration of the Federalist Party 1815-1830 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 11-46. 
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climate and weather to political sentiment is necessarily speculative and conjectural, 
virtually no historians have thus far made an attempt to do so. 
 One exception is C. Edward Skeen, who advances one example of the weather 
events’ impact upon politics. The most contentious national political issue of 1816 was 
the “Compensation Law,” a federal act to raise the salary of Congressmen, which had not 
been adjusted since 1789. Portions of the bill were retroactive, meaning Congressmen 
would receive significant sums up-front. After a contentious debate in the House and 
Senate, the bill passed and was signed into law by President Madison on March 19. The 
idea of federal representatives, most of them already wealthy gentlemen, raising their 
own salaries retroactively outraged the public, and a colossal furor played out on the 
nation’s newspaper editorial pages—and at the ballot boxes.3 Angry voters threw out 
nearly seventy percent of the incumbent members of Congress in the fall elections, a 
record high turnover that still stands today.4 Chastened by their defeats, after the elections 
the lame-duck Congress quickly repealed the offending law. Skeen argues that “[t]he 
outrage of the citizenry over this act was undoubtedly fanned by the general malaise 
created by crop failures and threatened famine.”5 This is probably true. However, 
focusing on a single political result—however dramatic—as a potential effect of the 
weather anomalies overlooks the myriad other political or politically-influenced 
responses which are admittedly much more diffuse but possibly more representative of 
peoples’ reactions to the events. 
                                                 
3Skeen, 77-91. 
4By contrast, in 1994, a modern Congressional election generally regarded as a significant political sea 
change, less than 7% of incumbents were defeated. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 
“Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 8, 1994,” 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electioninfo/1994/94Stat.htm (accessed February 15, 2012). 
5Skeen, 13. 
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 B. The Linchpin Issue: Harvests and Food Security 
 An important clue to how to begin evaluating the political impact of the Year 
Without a Summer comes from the correspondence of John Quincy Adams, concerning, 
not American, but British politics. In a letter to his mother on August 30, 1816, Adams, 
after describing the dismal weather in England and predicting that harvests would not be 
abundant, noted: 
I have been surprised to find that from the beginning of [August], it has 
been here a great party question whether the harvest of this present year 
would be good or bad. Cobbett, who is the literary representative of the 
reformers...announced that [the harvest] would be scanty. Mr. Hunt, 
another ardent reformer...pledged his honor that it would be bad. But all 
the newspapers, ministerial and oppositionist, Whig and Tory, have opened 
in full cry against these predictions...[T]his question is made a subject of 
acrimonious party discussion...all the ruling parties in this country...have 
agreed that most of the distresses now weighing down this country are 
owing to excessive plenty...while no small part of their population are 
nearly perishing with famine.6 
 
 Adams here clearly identifies the linchpin issue underlying the political debates in 
England: food security. In 1816 most people in the United States and across the world 
depended on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood. Naturally, whether harvests 
would be good or bad was a paramount concern everywhere. The political landscape was 
obviously different in England than in the United States, but, as the climate anomalies 
manifested themselves in more or less the same magnitude on either side of the Atlantic, 
the question becomes fair: were concerns about the effect of the climate anomalies on 
harvests interpreted in the United States, as they seem to have been in England, in 
partisan political terms? In order to answer this question, we must investigate what 
                                                 
6 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, August 30, 1816, Writings IV: 77-78. 
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people in the United States were saying about harvests, and whether there is any evidence 
that political orientation may have influenced these opinions. 
 The subject of harvests was easily the most-discussed potential impact of the 
climate anomalies. It was a topic of public conversation everywhere in the United States, 
with mention of the subject increasing sharply in late August and September as traditional 
harvest times approached. On September 13, a Virginia newspaper reported that corn 
crops would be one-half to two-thirds short, and lamented that “[t]he cold as well as the 
drought has nipt the buds of hope.”7 Another Virginia paper in mid-August gave capsule 
predictions of the likely harvests for a laundry list of crops, from hay, flax and oats to 
potatoes, cherries and apples, some of which would be favorable, while others damaged 
by cold and drought would be “uncommonly short.”8 Other people were more optimistic. 
In New Haven, Connecticut, a newspaper declared brightly that “reports of scanty crops 
have been very exaggerated or entirely unfounded.”9 In Georgia, which suffered less 
from cold and weather shocks than many parts of the country, corn and cotton were 
described as having “never been better,”10 while a Boston newspaper savaged those who 
predicted short harvests, warning them “not lightly to prejudge the ways of 
Providence...Peace and Plenty.”11 Clearly, whether a harvest would be good or bad 
depended heavily on the particular crop, local weather conditions and other non-weather 
                                                 
7“Crops,” American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), September 13, 1816, 3. 
8Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), August 14, 1816, 4. 
9Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), August 9, 1816, 2. 
10Georgia Journal (Milledgeville, GA), July 17, 1816, 3. 
11New-England Palladium & Commercial Advertiser (Boston, MA), August 20, 1816, 1. 
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factors such as the presence or absence of flies or other pests.12 But some trends 
involving political affiliation are faintly discernible in some sources. 
 In 1816, newspapers were the key bellwether of politics. The era of fierce political 
partisanship between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans, which had begun 
in the 1790s, had not quite run its course by 1816, and newspaper editors were still the 
foot-soldiers of political parties.13 Newspapers usually attracted and retained their readers 
on the basis of their openly-acknowledged political affiliations. The Washington, D.C. 
Daily National Intelligencer, for example, was one of the most influential newspapers in 
the country precisely because of its close connections with Democratic-Republican 
politicians, and in fact it was regarded as a semi-official mouthpiece for the Madison 
administration.14 Conversely, Federalist newspapers such as Boston’s New-England 
Palladium & Commercial Advertiser did their best to keep alive the fading spark of the 
opposition party in the gloomy winter of public scorn that followed New England 
Federalists’ ill-advised Hartford Convention of 1814, which had, in many peoples’ minds, 
crossed the line from reasoned opposition to the War of 1812 to outright sedition.15 
Virtually nothing that happened in the United States that was worthy of public attention 
escaped comment by the sharply-honed party press machinery. If, therefore, there were 
                                                 
12It is certainly conceivable that in some areas the weather anomalies might have directly affected 
populations of invasive or helpful insects and thus had an effect upon crops. Consideration of this 
potential effect is beyond the scope of this paper. 
13Jeffrey L. Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 1-23. 
14Carol Sue Humphreys, The Press of the Young Republic, 1783-1833 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1996), 75. 
15Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 
255-80. 
  49 
political dimensions to the climate change events, we can expect to see them reflected in 
these newspapers. 
 It is helpful to divide newspaper comment on the climate events, and particularly 
the effects on harvests, into two categories. What can be termed “harvest downbeat” 
stories would usually report a weather event or related crop damage, and then add a 
gloomy prediction about harvests in general. A typical example comes from the American 
Beacon of Norfolk, Virginia, a Democratic-Republican paper, reporting on frosts in Cape 
May, New Jersey, in late June: 
In this place we had hard frost five successive nights...The farmer’s 
prospects are at present quite unpromising here, as the vegitable [sic] 
kingdom has suffered exceedingly by the uncommon course of the 
season...[N]ot a green leaf is to be seen for acres together...The oldest 
person here has no recollection of a like season.16 
 
 By contrast, “harvest upbeat” stories less often conveyed hard news about specific 
weather events. They usually took a reactive tone, responding to reports of crop failures 
or predictions that harvests would be short; the message was invariably that the reality 
would not turn out to be as bad as feared. This representative example comes from the 
Columbian Register of New Haven, also Democratic, from early August: 
A gentleman, who travelled over the northern and western parts of this 
state [Connecticut], as well as through New-Jersey, informs us that the 
crops in general are very good; that wheat is abundant, and corn, potatoes, 
&c &c, look very well. We believe that reports of scanty crops have been 
very exaggerated or entirely unfounded.17 
 
 “Harvest upbeat” and “harvest downbeat” stories were not mutually exclusive. 
Papers sometimes took an equivocal tone, acknowledging shortages in one crop or area, 
                                                 
16American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), Vol. II, Issue 124 (July 4, 1816), 3. 
17Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), August 9, 1816, 2. 
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while expressing hope that another crop or locality was unaffected or would yield 
bountiful results.18 Reporting on harvests was also inconsistent. It is rare to find a 
newspaper that consistently took either an upbeat or downbeat approach for most of its 
harvest reporting, although one such example can be identified.19 Given the irregular 
patterns of which papers were being published, in what cities, and which of those papers 
have yielded relevant and accessible source material that has survived into modern times, 
there can be no pretense that any given sample of news sources is comprehensive, 
representative or totally free of selection bias. Nevertheless, quantitative analysis yields 
some potentially instructive results. 
 Consider a pool of sixty-three news items, selected largely at random,20 published 
nationwide between May 4 and October 16, 1816 that can be fairly characterized as 
“harvest upbeat,” “harvest downbeat,” or both. Of this total, forty-five were published in 
papers that were solidly Democratic-Republican and the remainder, eighteen, solidly 
Federalist. Of these totals, forty items from Democratic-Republican papers and seventeen 
from Federalist papers are unequivocal—meaning, they cannot be classified as 
expressing both “harvest upbeat” and “harvest downbeat” sentiments in the same piece. 
 Of the Democratic-Republican reports, 52.5% were “harvest upbeat” and 47.5% 
“harvest downbeat.” This suggests that the split between optimistic and pessimistic 
harvest predictions was generally small. However, the numbers are much more 
                                                 
18See, e.g., Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), October 12, 1816, 2 (reporting that corn is short, but rye 
and wheat “are abundant, and sufficient, we apprehend, for the consumption of the people.”) 
19See next section. 
20By largely at random I mean that my only criteria in selecting them was that (1) the source was available 
to me in my research, and (2) the source contained a story that fit either the “harvest upbeat” or “harvest 
downbeat” model. I made no effort to favor (or disfavor) newspapers of any particular political 
persuasion or city. My research in general focuses more on New England simply because there are more 
sources available there. 
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interesting on the Federalist side. When Federalist newspapers within this selection made 
comments on the harvest, 35.3% could be characterized as “harvest upbeat,” while nearly 
two-thirds—64.7%—were “harvest downbeat” stories. Within this sample, then, it 
appears that writers for Federalist papers were almost twice as likely to express 
unequivocal pessimistic opinions on the harvest than were their counterparts at 
Democratic-Republican presses. A very narrow majority of Democratic-Republican news 
items are optimistic about the harvests, while the Federalists who took that view number 
barely more than a third. 
 This spot-check survey cannot be regarded as conclusive. However, it 
demonstrates that the notion of political affiliation affecting peoples’ estimation of the 
impact of the climate events, at least in agricultural terms, may be more than pure 
conjecture. In the absence of sophisticated modern polling data, informal surveys of this 
kind may be the best we can do. 
 Why might political party affiliation have affected these perceptions? Why were 
harvests and food security an explicit political issue in Britain, and at least a potential one 
in the United States? 
 The obvious answer is that harvests and food security posed a latent threat to 
political stability, and political leaders understood this chain of causation all too well. The 
evidence is quite explicit in Great Britain. The failure of crops in 1816, caused in large 
measure by the weather anomalies, triggered a serious subsistence crisis in many parts of 
Europe, which manifested itself in Britain in the form of demonstrations and riots by 
working-class people who had been severely harmed by the rising prices of food staples. 
In February 1817 the British government suspended the right of habeas corpus, and June 
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saw the “Pentrich Revolution,” an abortive attempt by radicals to take over the town of 
Nottingham.21 Revolutionary flare-ups of this nature did not occur in the United States, 
but not because food security was significantly greater. Indeed the winter and spring of 
1816-17 was a lean one for many Americans, particularly in New England, with wheat 
and corn prices spiking in the face of severely decreased yields.22 Europe was, in 1816-
17, recovering from nearly twenty years of war, and agitation for liberal political reforms, 
a long-term manifestation of French Revolutionary ideas, roiled under the surface of 
nearly every European country.23 This was not true in the United States, forty years 
removed from a revolution designed to institute a liberal political order, and only a year 
following the end of its second war with Great Britain to preserve that revolution. 
Therefore, it makes sense that Americans’ responses to food insecurity would be 
markedly different than those observed in Europe. 
 Ruminations on the impact of party affiliation on the severity of impacts aside, it 
is clear that poor harvests and the possibility of food insecurity translating into bread riots 
or other political discontent did not become an explicit political issue in the United 
States. Indeed, governmental response to the climate events and their effects was 
minimal. In the winter of 1816-17 a few tepid petitions were introduced to Congress, 
some requesting a temporary ban on export of foodstuffs, and others more vaguely 
suggesting that committees study if government measures were necessary to alleviate 
distress from crop failures. None of these petitions got out of committee.24 No reference 
                                                 
21Post, 84-85. 
22Stommel, Volcano Weather, 81-87. 
23Eric J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1962). 
24Stommel, Volcano Weather, 87. 
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to food shortages or anything similar appears in the public papers of James Madison as he 
prepared that winter to leave the presidency. This is not surprising. In 1816-17 there was 
no general perception that ameliorating the effects of poor harvests or addressing food 
insecurity was the business of government at any level. Many Americans responded by 
pulling up stakes and moving west. Ohio was an especially popular destination; in late 
1816 roads into the state were choked with wagons carrying settlers to what they hoped 
were more bountiful agricultural lands than they had left behind in New England.25 
Westward migration was itself a form of political response. Since Thomas Jefferson’s 
election in 1801, the idea of an American “Empire of Liberty,” spreading west and 
Americanizing the wilderness, had been a cornerstone of Democratic-Republican 
political thought as well as social engineering.26 Ironically, in that sense, the climate 
events of 1816 helped to advance the ideological interests of the ruling party, instead of 
undercutting them as they seem to have done in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. 
 
 C. Climate Change Denial: The Strange Case of the Essex Register 
 We have seen in our own time that issues involving climate and climate change 
can become heavily politicized.27 This seems to have been true in 1816. One newspaper, 
the Essex Register of Salem, Massachusetts, a rabidly pro-Democratic-Republican press, 
stands alone in its treatment of the climate change events of that year. While most 
newspapers were not consistent enough in their presentation of “harvest upbeat” versus 
                                                 
25Skeen, 13. 
26Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 357-399. 
27See, e.g., The Great Global Warming Swindle (2007), directed by Martin Durkin. 
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“harvest downbeat” stories to warrant an inference of conscious editorial choice to slant 
the issue one way or another, the Essex Register’s incessant drumbeat of optimistic news 
stories seems to indicate that its editor had a very strong opinion on the matter that he 
wanted others to share. This newspaper did not express its views in explicitly political 
terms. Nevertheless, its virtual denial of what was happening in the summer of 1816 
intuitively seems appropriate to consider in a political context, given what we have seen 
about the possible propensity to interpret the climate change events through a lens of 
political partisanship. 
 The Register’s first comment on the weather of the summer appeared on June 29. 
“Our very cold weather,” it noted, “has been succeeded with such warm weather as gave 
us 90 degrees of Fahrenheit’s thermometer within doors.” It went on to remark blithely, 
“The account will be balanced probably before the season is ended.”28 A week or so later 
it charged boldly into the global warming vs. global cooling debate29 by declaring “[t]hat 
the whole Atmosphere of the Globe has not become colder,” on the basis of a single 
article reporting a plague in Greece that was supposedly caused by an uncommonly mild 
winter.30 Later in July the Register noted that “the northern [harvest] is not so desperate 
as represented,”31 and repeatedly predicted that both corn and potatoes would do well.32 
Twice within the same week, at the end of July, the paper glowed that the harvest would 
                                                 
28Essex Register (Salem, MA), June 29, 1816, 3. 
29See Chapter VI. 
30Essex Register (Salem, MA), July 6, 1816, 1. 
31Ibid., July 20, 1816, 2. 
32Ibid.,; Ibid., July 27, 1816, 3. 
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be “beyond our most sanguine expectations,”33 then that “[w]e hear from every quarter 
more favorable opinions of the season.”34 These rosy predictions continued unabated 
through the end of August, though the language of optimism becomes increasingly more 
general. On August 28: “[T]he demand of our prudence will be safe to our economy and 
to our eventual prosperity.”35 The Register even hailed the September hurricane as good 
news, calling it “very favourable” and assuring the world that “[w]e are not suffering in 
this neighborhood.”36 On the rare occasions the paper did admit that a certain crop was 
short, the news was invariably couched with statements that the harvests in general would 
be plentiful and abundant.37 
 If these uncommonly cheery reports stood alone, it might be regarded as merely a 
curiosity. However, the Essex Register went further in its reporting, evincing what can be 
characterized as nothing else but active denial of the facts. It is clear that, on the North 
American continent, climate-related impacts were the most severe in Canada. There are 
reports that a snowstorm deposited three feet of snow in parts of Quebec on June 27 and 
that lakes remained still frozen from winter in mid-July.38 Weather-related grain shortages 
in Canada were already pinching by July, and the price of flour spiked to over $20 per 
barrel, when it could be procured at all.39 The situation was so severe that the British 
government of Lower Canada province enacted a total embargo on wheat, flour, grains or 
                                                 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid., July 31, 1816, 3. 
35Ibid., August 28, 1816, 2. 
36Ibid., September 23, 1816, 2. 
37Ibid., July 27, 1816, 3. 
38Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), October 12, 1816, 2. 
39Ibid., July 27, 1816, 2. 
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anything that could be used to make bread.40 Yet in early August, the Essex Register 
calmly reported that in Canada, “lately the season had been uncommonly favorable.”41 
The Register was absolutely alone in this view. No other newspaper seems to have opined 
that the situation in Canada was anything other than dire. 
 Furthermore, the Essex Register ran other articles pushing back against claims, 
assumptions and fears about the coldness of the season. Some items made the argument 
with subtlety, while others were frontal assaults. In the latter category, the Register tried 
to prove with temperature measurements that the summer was not that much cooler, 
statistically, than previous seasons. Comparing temperature measurements in Washington, 
D.C., and Salem for July 1816 to the Julys of 1815 and 1814, the Register concluded that 
there was “a difference of one twelfth in the mean heat of the two places, and of one 
thirteenth in the two seasons at Salem, but only of a twenty third in the year before 
that.”42 In the subtler category, the Register ran an article on mortality, stating that “[t]the 
general health is a subject of congratulation.” Again using statistical comparisons—this 
time involving bills of mortality from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore—the article 
showed that deaths from “consumptions,” presumably tuberculosis, declined slightly 
between 1815 and 1816. Linking this effect specifically to weather, the article stated, 
“The excellent season we now enjoy has put an end to all the murmurs we heard in the 
last month of Spring and the first of summer, and we are in good hopes the year will end 
with blessings.”43 
                                                 
40“Embargo in Canada,” Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), July 27, 1816, 2. 
41Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 3, 1816, 4. 
42Ibid., August 10, 1816, 2. 
43Ibid., August 7, 1816, 2. 
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 Most telling is the tepid concession the Register made in mid-October, after the 
disappointing harvests were in and the façade of denial could no longer be maintained 
without equivocation. A short article admitted that harvests in various places were 
“extremely various.” However, the article ends with a sort of damning with faint praise: 
“We trust when we settle the year’s account, it will not be the worst ever known.”44 
 The editor of the Essex Register was one Warwick Palfray, Jr., an avowed 
Democratic-Republican. He had become the editor of the paper (then called the Salem 
Register) in 1805, replacing William Carlton who had died. Carlton was locally famous 
for having established a proudly Democratic-Republican paper in staunchly Federalist 
Salem in May 1800, when the bitter Jefferson-Adams presidential contest was heating up. 
Palfray worked as a journeyman printer at the paper before he became the editor. He later 
went into politics—while still editing the paper—and was elected to several terms as a 
Massachusetts state representative. He would continue as the Register’s editor until his 
death in 1838.45 Palfray’s personal stamp on his newspaper was marked. The second page 
of the paper usually contained a long editorial, written by Palfray himself, opining on 
whatever subjects he deemed relevant that day. As we will see,46 in these editorials 
Palfray had some strong opinions on the subject of global climate change. The conclusion 
that he personally directed the Register’s reporting of weather and climate-related stories, 
or at least that it was done at his direction, is a reasonable one. 
 We can only speculate on Palfray’s reasons for his hostility to the notion that the 
summer of 1816 was anomalous or that it would result in bad harvests and reduced crop 
                                                 
44Ibid., October 16, 1816, 1. 
45Palsey, 210, 221-22. 
46See Chapter VI, notes 20-21. 
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yields. The possibility that they were politically-motivated cannot be ruled out. What is 
noteworthy is the similarity of Palfray’s arguments, and his paper’s reporting, to 
contemporary examples of climate change denial. Modern skeptics of anthropogenic 
climate change frequently cherry-pick temperature data from individual places, as the 
Register did in its comparison of the summers of 1816, 1815 and 1814, to argue that 
modern warming trends are less severe than scientific consensus has predicted;47 they 
have also claimed, again as the Register did, that mortality trends from infectious 
diseases tend to show that global warming is not happening.48 Furthermore, the 
consistency and intractability of the Register on the issue of climate and harvests even in 
the face of conflicting evidence reflects similar result-driven consistency of modern 
climate change skeptics, which from all appearances is ideologically-motivated.49 
 The case of the Essex Register demonstrates that the climate anomalies of 1816 
carried implications that were deeply disturbing to some people. While fear of the 
political and social repercussions of bad harvests and food insecurity is an educated guess 
as to the motivation behind the tendency to downplay the severity of the events, it is 
unlikely to be the whole story. Americans’ reactions to the Year Without a Summer were 
complex and often contradictory. The Essex Register is but one example. 
 
 
                                                 
47See, e.g., James Taylor, “Carbon Dioxide Emissions Are Up Sharply, Yet Temperatures Are Flat?”, Forbes 
(Online), November 11, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/11/09/carbon-dioxide-
emissions-up-sharply-yet-temperatures-are-flat/ (visited February 21, 2012). 
48See, e.g, Ronald Bailey, “Matt Ridley’s Rousing Defense of Climate Change Skepticism,” Reason.com, 
November 4, 2011, http://reason.com/blog/2011/11/04/matt-ridleys-rousing-defense-of-climate (visited 
May 4, 2012). 
49See, e.g., Charles W. Schmidt, “A Closer Look at Climate Change Skepticism,” Environmental Health 
Perspectives 118, no. 12 (December 2010): 536. 
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 D. Putting on a Happy Face: Humor and Jokes 
 Although the weather in the summer of 1816 was often gloomy and sometimes 
downright alarming, reactions to it were not uniformly negative. Some Americans chose 
to poke fun at the events or the issues surrounding them. Not all of these humorous 
expressions were colored by political expressions, but enough were to warrant a brief 
discussion of humor in a political context. 
 Needless to say, humor in 1816 was somewhat arcane by modern standards. 
Appreciating the full impact of jokes, especially political ones, often requires a 
considerable breadth of knowledge not only in the contemporary political situation but in 
the bodies of knowledge, especially classical literature, that politically-active people in 
1816 drew upon as a common basis. Take, for example, this joke from the Democratic-
Republican Columbia Register of New Haven, Connecticut, which appeared shortly after 
the hurricane of early September: 
During the last Wednesday and Thursday we have been favored with rain 
in abundance....We have yet heard of no damage being sustained, 
excepting the destruction of a few packages of [Federalist] electioneering 
handbills—and a chilling damp to federal prospects on Monday 
next....[C]urious observers in natural history, although no Almanac 
makers, predict a sudden and rapid growth of scions in the political 
nursery about this time, that will be almost as wonderful as a host of 
Cadmus’s men springing from the earth.50 
 
 The punch line of the joke is the notion that the only thing harmed by the weather 
is the fortunes of the Federalist party. Obliquely this can be read as a reassurance that the 
harvests will not be so bad as predicted. Cadmus was a Greek hero, the founder of 
Thebes, who sowed dragon’s teeth in the earth from which sprang a race of fierce 
                                                 
50Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), September 14, 1816, 3.  
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warriors, the Spartoí, said to be the children of Ares. The reference to “scions in the 
political nursery” and the comparison to a mythological army of warriors may express the 
idea that the disappearance of the Federalists as a potent force in state politics will 
enervate Democratic-Republican voters and bode well for the party’s long-term program 
for Connecticut and the nation. 
Another Democratic-Republican paper, the Green-Mountain Farmer of 
Bennington, Vermont, joked about the sunspot phenomenon while ribbing the opposition 
party: 
We have some fears that [sunspots] will extinguish the Vermont luminary 
next September, and cover the state with darkness...that part of it which 
looks toward Washington has a peculiar blackness. We are somewhat 
fearful that the creators of this darkness, will put their own lights out, or be 
obliged to hoist BLUE ones; but we still hope they will soon set to work, 
rub off their RUST and brighten up again. If not we may think it our duty 
to join others in rubbing it off for them.51 
 
 Like the Columbia Register joke, this passage adopts a dismissive tone regarding 
the true practical impact of the climate anomalies, suggesting that it may be a tool of 
cosmic retribution for backing the wrong political party. In any event, it mocks both the 
sunspot hysteria and Federalists in general. The reference to colors is not entirely clear. 
The concept of “rub[bing] off their rust” may be a suggestion that Federalists are like old, 
decaying metal, whose entrenchment in the ways of the past can be wiped away by 
conversion to Democratic-Republican principles. 
A writer to an Albany, New York newspaper, in a letter reprinted in the Madison 
administration’s de facto mouthpiece, used the weather events and the debate over global 
warming versus global cooling to raise the specter of an unfinished aspiration of the War 
                                                 
51Green-Mountain Farmer (Bennington, VT), June 3, 1816, 2 (emphasis in original). 
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of 1812: the conquest of British-held Canada. “It seems very strange to me,” wrote the 
correspondent, identified merely as H.G.S., “that ever since our late ‘just and necessary 
war,’ those Canadian winds have all blown cold upon us.” H.G.S. joked that if Canada 
was the source of the cooling, either the United States must conquer it, “or we must all 
migrate southward in a very few years.”52 This same issue of the Daily National 
Intelligencer presented the bizarre theory that the lack of musket fire occasioned by peace 
in Europe may have been the cause of the weather anomalies—an article that, in 
conjunction with H.G.S.’s letter, may have been intended in jest.53 
 Sunspots were a particular source of mirth, whether expressly connected to a 
political context or not. Even the Daily National Intelligencer, whose anonymous writer 
“Z.” flung so much ink at its pages regarding sunspots, was not above picking fun at the 
subject. A joke article published in September announced that the “disorder” afflicting the 
Sun was “spotted fever,” but then: “We are happy to state that His Highness is upon the 
recovery.”54 Referring to the infamous “Bologna prophecy,” which foretold that sunspots 
supposedly causing the weather anomalies would ultimately mean the end of the world,55 
a Virginia paper quoted “an old miser” who was supposedly glad to hear the sun would 
soon be extinguished, “for then property would doubtless be got at a bargain!”56 
                                                 
52Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), September 3, 1816, 2. 
53See Chapter III, note 32. 
54Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), September 9, 1816, 2. “His Highness” is presumably 
British heir apparent and regent George IV, about whose social life articles frequently appeared in 
American newspapers in the summer of 1816. If this joke seems somewhat unsatisfying to us today, 
consider that puns had a far greater appreciation as humor in the early 19th century than they do 200 
years later. 
55See Chapter V, Section A. 
56American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), August 21, 1816, 3 (emphasis in original). 
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 Reactions such as these fit comfortably with our own contemporary expectations 
of how people could be expected to deal with weather events of the severity, strangeness 
and potentially disastrous implications as those of 1816. Scientific, religious, or political 
issues aside, if the Year Without a Summer happened to recur today, who could not 
imagine the phenomena being rich fodder for The Daily Show or Saturday Night Live? 
Humor is a comfortable defense mechanism. Especially when something is puzzling or 
inexplicable, a common and quite natural reaction is to laugh at it. 
 
 E. Political Dimensions Considered: An Incomplete Picture 
 There can be no single or predominant answer to the question of how the climate 
anomalies of 1816 affected politics, or how political views affected perceptions of the 
events. Even to search for a single or clearly identifiable political effect ignores the rich 
complexity of how these events affected Americans and the myriad ways in which they 
reacted. Some Americans worried about the coming harvest. Others were unconcerned. 
Some voted with their feet and moved west. Others denied the events were happening. 
Others still made jokes. Perhaps the extraordinary voter revolt over the Compensation 
Law was somehow tied to the climate anomalies; perhaps not. Necessarily this is an 
incomplete picture. 
 The main point to be made is that there is evidence that the climate events did 
have some political repercussions, however diffuse. The suggestion of a very weak 
correlation between party affiliation and perception of the severity of the climate impacts 
is one argument for this political dimension. Another is the resemblance of the Essex 
Register’s stance of denial to arguments raised in contemporary climate change discourse, 
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which no one would deny contains a fundamental political component.57 The exploitation 
of the climate anomalies and related issues for purposes of political humor is another 
small mark on the canvas of an incomplete and murky picture of how these events 
resonated throughout the United States. If we are to understand the Year Without a 
Summer in its proper context, we must acknowledge its political dimensions, however 
faint and inscrutable they may be. 
                                                 
57 It is true that contemporary denial of anthropogenic climate change is driven, at least to some extent, by 
the efforts of industry lobbies and business interests to inject a coloring of doubt into the public dis-
course about climate change. That clearly is a difference between today’s climate debates and those of 
1816; however, the point made in this chapter regards the structure and narrative of denialist arguments, 
which one can evaluate independently of the motivations for creating them. 
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CHAPTER V 
“END OF THE WORLD WEATHER”: 
APOCALYPSE, RELIGION AND FEAR 
  
 A. Apocalypse: The Bologna Prophecy 
 In the summer of 1816, English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, then living in 
Highgate, England and trying to conquer an opium addiction,1 had been in ill health. In 
mid-July he wrote to a friend, “I have had no relapse for three weeks: tho’ I have been 
otherwise unwell twice—and this end of the World Weather is sadly against me...”.2 He 
was not the only European literati to think of the climate events in 1816 in apocalyptic 
terms, whether seriously, in jest, or in artistic context. Coleridge’s friend Lord Byron, 
who spent much of that summer vacationing at the Villa Diodati on the shores of Lake 
Geneva in Switzerland, composed a poem called “Darkness,” which speaks vaguely of 
the end of the world occasioned from the extinguishing of the sun.3 His housemate at the 
Villa Diodati, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, had also been influenced by the climate 
events. She wrote later that the gloom of that “wet, ungenial summer,” and the ghost 
stories that she and her companions told each other to amuse themselves while being 
cooped up indoors, inspired her classic novel Frankenstein.4 
                                                 
1Basil Willey, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (W.W. Norton & Co., 1972), 174 
2 Samuel Taylor Coleridge to J.J. Morgan, July 17, 1816, in Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), IV: 660. 
3Jeffrey Vail, “The Bright Sun Was Extinguish’d’: The Bologna Prophecy and Byron’s ‘Darkness,’” The 
Wordsworth Circle XXVIII, No. 3 (Summer 1997): 183-92. 
4Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus, The Original Two-Volume Novel 
of 1816-1817 from the Bodleian Library Manuscripts (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2008), 439. The origin 
of Frankenstein, which was hatched at the same time as Poledouri’s Vampyr, has had an interesting 
resonance in popular culture. At least two horror films have been made dramatizing the events at the 
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 There is no record of any apocalyptic predictions associated with the climate 
events that fostered wide belief in the United States. That was not the case, however, in 
Europe. As the London Times reported in late June, running an item from an unnamed 
French paper dated June 1: 
According to the calculations of an astronomer of Bologna, who has lately 
published here [in Fermo, Italy] some observations on the subject, on the 
18th of July a great solar catastrophe is to put an end to the world by 
conflagration. The signs of this are the spots to be remarked at present on 
the sun’s disk. The government, thinking it improper to suffer the 
circulation of such predictions, has put the astronomer under arrest.5 
 
 Information on the origin of the “Bologna Prophecy” is surprisingly scant. It is not 
known precisely who made the prediction, or if he was really an astronomer, and when or 
under what circumstances the prophecy was made. As it was on the minds of Europeans 
by June 1, before the sustained assault of unseasonably wintry weather through the 
summer, the prediction was likely made months or perhaps even years earlier, but then 
became incorporated into narratives involving sunspots and the weather anomalies. The 
London Times noted the conflation of the prophecy with weather and sunspot lore, 
remarking that “[t]hese spots are said to be the cause of the remarkable and wet weather 
we have had this Summer, and the increase [in sunspots] is represented to announce a 
general removal of heat from the globe, the extinction of nature, and the end of the 
world.”6 Whatever was the Bologna prophet’s rationale for choosing July 18 as the date 
of doomsday, it undoubtedly resonated with these narratives perfectly. In modern terms 
                                                                                                                                                 
Villa Diodati in the summer of 1816: Gothic (1986), directed by Ken Russell, and Haunted Summer 
(1988), directed by Ivan Passer. Furthermore, the controversial novel Haunted by iconic author Chuck 
Palahniuk features a modern redress of the Diodati-and-Frankenstein genesis legend. Chuck Palahniuk, 
Haunted (New York: Doubleday, 2005). 
5London Times June 2, 1816, 3. 
6Ibid., July 19, 1816, 70. 
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we could characterize the Bologna Prophecy as having “gone viral,” at least in Europe, 
though word of it was also widely circulated in the United States.7 To believers its 
plausibility could be confirmed by a mere glance at the sun and observation of the 
dreadful weather. 
 The prophecy deeply frightened many people. In London, one Eleanor Saunders, a 
sixty-two-year-old domestic servant, was so terrified of doomsday that she hanged 
herself. This incident was noteworthy enough to be reported in newspapers in New York 
City,8 and mention of it found its way into John Quincy Adams’s diary for July 19, the 
day after the predicted doomsday. “The effect and agitation of [the prophecy] story,” 
Adams wrote on that day, “have been very considerable, both in France and England. The 
churches and chapels have been unusually crowded.”9 London newspapers also reported 
a story about a woman from Somersetshire who believed in the prophecy and tried, 
without success, to cause younger members of her family to believe it as well. One 
morning when a little girl of the household ran into the woman’s bedchamber crying, 
perhaps as a joke, “The world’s at an end!” the woman was supposedly struck by fear 
into a catatonic state.10 In various communities in Belgium, fear of the Bologna Prophecy 
drove large crowds of people, mostly women, into churches “to prepare themselves 
against this dreadful catastrophe.”11 
                                                 
7John Quincy Adams, discussing the Bologna Prophecy in a letter to his mother, prefaces it with the words, 
“as you must have heard,” indicating that knowledge of the prediction (if not belief in its truth) was 
widespread on both sides of the Atlantic. John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, September 20, 1816, 
Writings VI: 90. 
8New-York Weekly Museum (New York, NY), October 19, 1816, 366. 
9Adams, Diary, July 19, 1816, Memoirs III:404-05. 
10London Times, July 23, 1816, 3. 
11New York Courier, August 30, 1816, 2. 
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 Learned people reacted to panic over the Bologna Prophecy with chagrin. “Such 
is human credulity!” lamented John Quincy Adams.12 A writer in the Essex Register, 
perhaps Warwick Palfray himself, commented regarding the Bologna Prophecy that “all 
the fears of superstition are of the same nature, and the slave of one easily becomes the 
slave of another.”13 In a New York paper, a writer commented on Eleanor Saunders’s 
suicide, wondering why, if the world was going to end anyway, she thought that denying 
herself the grace of God by committing the sin of suicide was a preferable way to enter 
the afterlife. Another commenter rebuked him, noting that “he is asking the question as a 
sane, reasoning person, whereas [Saunders] had lost that sanity which would have 
enabled her to see it in the same point of view.”14 
 Some tried actively to stamp out belief in the Bologna Prophecy. Some authority, 
whether civil or ecclesiastical, seems to have arrested the original Bologna astronomer 
who made the prediction, evidently on charges of disturbing the peace.15 In France, an 
astronomer named Rouy published an open letter in the Paris newspapers refuting the 
prophecy.16 In the week leading up to the supposed doomsday, M. Rouy advertised that 
he would give public lectures about sunspots “in order to convince the credulous, that 
there need be no fear of the extinction of that luminary.”17 Protestations that the Bologna 
Prophecy was false assumed much the same character as more general assertions, 
unconnected to specific apocalyptic predictions, that sunspots were harmless. 
                                                 
12Adams, Diary, July 19, 1816, Memoirs III:405. 
13Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 17, 1816, 2. 
14American (New York, NY), September 4, 1816, 2. 
15Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 17, 1816, 2. 
16American (New York, NY), September 4, 1816, 2. 
17American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), September 9, 1816, 2. 
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 The Bologna Prophecy was by no means the only doomsday prediction circulating 
during the summer of 1816. Others, perhaps copycats, seemed eager to get in on the 
action: 
In Naples, as in most of the cities in Italy, there have lately been prophets 
who predicted the end of the world. In the beginning of June, a priest 
named Carillo, preaching in the church of St. James, announced that the 
city of Naples would be destroyed on the 27th of that month. It was to rain 
fire for four hours—and those who escaped the fire were to be devoured 
by serpents...[T]he police were compelled to arrest the prophet and several 
other individuals.18 
 
 Constant talk of the end of the world had people on edge. On July 11, in Ghent, 
Belgium, a regiment of cavalry happened to be on maneuvers at the same time a 
thunderstorm struck. The roar of thunder combined with the cavalry’s bugle calls for 
retreat frightened the townspeople, who streamed into the streets in a panic. “The good 
folks of Ghent, persuaded that the end of the world was at hand,” said one newspaper, 
“believed they had heard the Seventh Trumpet, which, according to Revelations...is to 
announce the last judgment.”19 In the United States, a group of Shakers, said to be 
influenced by “a pretended prophet,” began buying up large quantities of grain in 
anticipation of a famine that would last seven years—reminiscent of various seven-year 
famines mentioned in the Bible.20 In addition to illustrating apprehensions about the end 
of the world, these reaction show that many people were inclined to interpret the events 
of that summer and the rumors about them in a religious context, to which we turn our 
attention next. 
                                                 
18Repertory (Boston, MA), September 7, 1816, 1. 
19London Times, July 23, 1816, 3. 
20Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 3, 1816, 3. 
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 B. Crowding the Churches: Religious Reactions 
 As with politics, it is difficult to quantify the religious impact of the Year Without 
a Summer. Although the Bologna Prophecy was evidently not couched explicitly in 
religious terms, the panic in Ghent on July 11 indicates that some people sought to define 
their fears of the end of the world in the context of religious eschatology. Much more 
frequent in contemporary accounts, however, are references to people appealing to God 
directly, either for forbearance from the dreadful weather events, or amelioration of their 
effects, especially upon the harvest. 
 Quincy Adams’ mention of unusually crowded churches in England21 was 
mirrored in many other places. In Sweden, where crops were also failing, people 
crammed into churches to offer daily prayers to God to stop the unfavorable weather.22 
Church attendance in New Hampshire increased too, and observers noted with approval 
that “[a]n improved state of religious society became strikingly evident.”23 In other parts 
of New England, such as Brandon, Vermont, the weather and its effects upon the harvest 
drove increased attendance at religious conference meetings, some of them cutting across 
denominational lines.24 The desire to beseech God for deliverance from the weather 
appears in Thanksgiving proclamations from that autumn, which were both a religious 
and political ritual in the United States. New Hampshire Governor William Plumer’s 
                                                 
21Adams, Diary, July 19, 1816, Memoirs III:404. 
22Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), September 21, 1816, 2. 
23John Milton Whiton, Sketches of the History of New-Hampshire From its Settlement in 1623 to 1833: 
Comprising Notices of the Memorable Events and Interesting Incidents of a Period of Two Hundred and 
Ten Years (Concord: Marsh, Capen and Lyon, 1834), 189. 
24Joshua Bradley, Accounts of Religious Revivals in Many Parts of the United States from 1815 to 1818 
(Wheaton, IL: Richard Owen Roberts, 1980), 138. 
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proclamation, for instance, noted that in 1816 “the earth has not yielded her usual supply 
for our returning wants,” and stated that it was the duty of the people “to humble 
ourselves for our transgressions, and to practice that righteousness which exalts and 
renders a nation prosperous.”25 
 The religious reaction to the climate anomalies, at least in the United States, is 
typified by an account of the small town of Poultney, Vermont. Joshua Bradley, a minister 
from Albany, New York, published in 1819 a volume of anecdotes regarding religious 
revivals of the past few years. Describing the story of Poultney, Bradley stated: 
In 1816 an uncommon gloom spread over that whole state. The season 
was truly alarming, and every month through the year was whitened with 
frost or snow. This severe judgment seemed to produce a solemnity upon 
the minds of the multitudes...In [September], a work of grace began in one 
corner of the town. The pious were held in a state of suspense, between 
hope and fear, whether, it would continue and spread its blessings, or take 
its flight, and leave the people in their sins.26 
 
 This question as to the collective spiritual fate of Poultney, Bradley recorded, was 
settled by the sudden simultaneous religious epiphanies of several young girls who were 
“suddenly struck with solemn awe.” The girls, overwhelmed by the holy spirit, retired to 
a house to read the Bible and soon began spreading the message of Christian salvation 
through the rest of the town.27 This anecdote is interesting for a number of reasons. For 
one thing it illustrates the idea of human spiritual action—the redoubling of religious 
fervor—as a direct and appropriate response to the weather events and crop failures. For 
another, it emphasizes the collective nature of both the curse and the cure; the story is not 
                                                 
25Boston Independent Chronicle, October 10, 1816, 2. 
26Bradley, 130-31. 
27Ibid., 131-32. 
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about the personal salvation of the girls, but how they became agents of redemption of 
the entire community, which was affected equally by the weather. Finally, it does not end 
with an explicit affirmation of the material effect of this spiritual awakening. We do not 
know from Bradley’s account if the bad weather abated or if the next year’s harvest was 
improved, though we assume it must have been. The happy ending is not about the 
amelioration of the weather or harvest conditions, but about the collective spiritual 
improvement of the character of the town. These undercurrents—improvement of the 
world through human spiritual solutions, implemented largely on a collective level—
became key themes in the Second Great Awakening.  
 The Year Without a Summer itself proved to be formative in the life of one of the 
major figures of the Second Great Awakening. The climate anomalies of that summer 
struck the hardscrabble farm of the Smith family in Norwich, Vermont, especially hard. 
Their previous two attempts at establishing a prosperous farm in New England had been 
thwarted by crop failures in 1814 and 1815. The strange cold summer and the crop failure 
it caused—their third in a row—nearly wiped them out. “This was enough,” wrote Lucy 
Smith. “My husband was now altogether decided upon going to New York.” That fall of 
1816 the Smith family removed to Palmyra, New York, which two decades later would 
become famed as the “Burned-Over District” seared by religious revivals. The Smiths’ 
eleven-year-old son, Joseph Jr., would fail there too, first at running his family’s farm and 
then as a treasure hunter; but his claims of having discovered the Golden Plates 
ultimately triggered the most enduring legacy of the Second Great Awakening: the 
Mormon religion.28 
                                                 
28 Richard Lyman Bushman and Jed Woodworth, Joseph Smith, Rough Stone Rolling (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006), 27-32. 
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 Religious reaction to the climate events of 1816 was different in Europe than it 
was in the United States. On the continent, as we have seen with certain reactions to the 
Bologna Prophecy, increased religious fervor tended to take a more eschatological, or at 
least quasi-eschatological, form. In Austria, where rains and flooding had caused severe 
food shortages, a Catholic priest named Pöschl gathered a modest following that 
demanded equality and community of property, and believed that a thousand-year period 
of peace and plenty would soon be at hand. Austrian authorities, paranoid of any spark of 
revolutionary spirit, arrested Pöschl and eighty-six of his disciples.29 In Switzerland, a 
similar sect anticipated the imminent return of Christ, which was presaged by the climatic 
conditions and attendant famine. “The Rhine rots with corpses,” wrote Baroness Julie de 
Krüdener, the sect’s leader. “Misery is rampant...The time is approaching when the Lord 
of Lords will reassume the reins.”30 These sorts of reactions call upon the personal 
intervention of God rather than the spiritual awakening (or reawakening) of people, but 
they share a common thread. Whether as the cause of the Year Without a Summer or the 
cure of its ills, people who reacted in a religious context clearly saw the agency of God in 
these events as direct and self-evident. 
  
 C. Emotional Reactions: Gloom and Melancholy 
 These reactions—religious fervor, belief in eschatology and apocalypse, and the 
seeking of solace from environmental dangers in religion—are closely intertwined. What 
pervades all of them, sometimes mentioned explicitly, other times lurking beneath the 
                                                 
29Post, 96-97. 
30Ibid. (citing Ernest J. Knapton, The Lady of the Holy Alliance: The Life of Julie de Krüdener (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1939), 178)). 
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surface, is a marked sense of gloom, melancholy and fear. It is well-understood in our 
modern world that weather trends affect the moods and psychology of the public.31 This 
was no less true in 1816 than it is today, and people who lived through such an 
extraordinary climatological event could not have avoided being affected by it. 
 Faithful diarists who wrote every day, or nearly every day, provide an interesting 
road map of the rise and fall of their moods and emotions over the summer. Thomas 
Robbins, a pastor in South Windsor, Connecticut, often included comment on the weather 
in his diary entries, and these inclusions provide an interesting means of tracking his 
emotional states in tandem with weather trends. In April and May, while his diary 
frequently noted drought conditions and expressed concern for them, he seems to have 
delved into a deep funk. Watching a woman die right in front of him on May 3 may have 
exacerbated his gloomy feelings.32 “Devoted a considerable part of the day,” he wrote on 
May 14, “to meditation and prayer under my severe trials.”33 He commented on May 29, 
a cold day, that “Our churches generally are in a pretty cold state.”34 Through the ups and 
downs of June and July Robbins kept careful track of the weather and harvest prospects, 
about which he was obviously concerned. In late August he noted that his congregation 
“had a very solemn and interesting season of prayer on account of the drought.” The very 
next day, when rain came, his entry was very upbeat, crediting the blessing of God for the 
deliverance. Just three days later, when frosts struck at the end of August, his spirits 
                                                 
31Stephen J. Lurie, M.D., Ph.D., Barbara Gawinski, Ph.D., Deborah Pierce, M.D., M.P.H., and Sally 
Rousseau, M.S.W., “Seasonal Affective Disorder,” American Family Physician 74, no. 9 (November 
2006): 1521-1524. 
32Thomas Robbins, Diary of Thomas Robbins, D.D., 1796-1854, ed. Increase N. Tarbox (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1886), I: 665. 
33Ibid., 668. 
34Ibid., 669. 
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plunged again: “It is a melancholy time. There was a fast here yesterday on account of the 
season.”35 Not long after he recorded another “solemn season of prayer” for relief from 
the drought.36 
 The words that Robbins chose to describe weather events are telling. In entries 
between May 10 and September 24, comments on negative weather events and his own 
moods include terms like distressed, concerned, afflictions, great trials, melancholy, 
alarming, and even evil. The word Robbins repeated most often in this period was severe, 
appearing several times in the context of both weather and emotional states.37 Another 
word that does double duty is season—as shown above, Robbins used it to refer to an 
outpouring of prayer, but he also often used it in its conventional sense, i.e., “Very cold 
for the season.”38 These trends, though very subtle, seem to suggest that Robbins 
perceived—perhaps even subconsciously—a relationship between the weather events, his 
own personal trials, and religious and spiritual responses. 
 In the multitude of various reactions to the Year Without a Summer it is difficult 
to separate gloom and melancholy from outright fear. Newspapers often spoke of fear in 
terms of harvest predictions, for instance, “fearing a scarcity.”39 But fear in general was 
on some peoples’ minds, even without being connected specifically to a looming 
apocalypse. Diarist William Jenison recorded the early June snowstorm in New England 
                                                 
35Ibid., 677. 
36Ibid., 679. 
37Ibid., 668-681. 
38Ibid., 673. 
39Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), July 27, 1816, 2 (emphasis added). 
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by stating: “Considerable flurry of snow fell in Boston to scare the people.”40 In 
Philadelphia, “cold and fear” were spoken of as being pervasive by late September.41 In 
most instances people seemed to know what they were afraid of: failing crops, animal 
die-offs or other specific results that could threaten economic well-being. In these more 
isolated cases, however, the subject of fear seems to stand alone. 
 In the absence of medical statistics comparable to the breadth of records kept 
today, we cannot know how profoundly the emotional, spiritual and psychological effects 
of the climate anomalies affected various communities. We do, however, have some 
tantalizing bits of evidence to suggest that melancholy, depression and fear were marked 
during the summer of 1816. In addition to the evidence presented above regarding church 
attendance, increased religious fervor and general feelings of malaise and apprehension, 
there is some indication that suicide rates were unusually high. “The Paris Papers remark 
the increase of suicides in the Netherlands and in Naples,” noted a Boston newspaper. 
“The same increase has been observed in every country in Europe, England excepted.”42 
No such indication can be found for the United States, but given the trends observed in 
American sources, an increase in people taking their own lives during the middle months 
of 1816 would certainly not be surprising. 
 
 D. Cultural and Spiritual Reactions Considered: Confirming Intuition 
 The climate anomalies of 1816 defy easy description. They were complex, 
various, contradictory and puzzling. It is therefore entirely predictable that cultural, 
                                                 
40Jenison, Diary, June 8, 1816. 
41Essex Register (Salem, MA), September 11, 1816, 2. 
42Intelligencer (Boston, MA), September 14, 1816, 1. 
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spiritual and personal reactions to them would be as complex, puzzling and difficult to 
conceptualize as the phenomena must have seemed at the time. Lord Byron, Eleanor 
Saunders and the young girls of Poultney, Vermont all experienced the strange season in 
different contexts and from different perspectives. Byron responded by writing a poem 
called “Darkness.” The girls of Poultney responded by proselytizing for Christ. Eleanor 
Saunders responded by putting her own head into a noose. Each of these reactions 
represents the culmination of a fabulously complex set of individual motivations and 
perceptions. The difficulty in categorizing or finding commonalities in these reactions 
reflects, in a way, the central mystery about them: people simply did not know what to 
make of them. There was no accepted framework of interpretation, a level ground from 
which responses could depart. Merely noting the wide variation of cultural and spiritual 
responses is almost the best we can do. 
 It is clear, however, that the climate anomalies did affect people in ways both 
subtle and profound. Eleanor Saunders’s suicide lies at perhaps the most extreme pole of 
spiritual reaction. At the other pole we have the terse diary entries of Thomas Robbins, 
suggesting a sort of pall or malaise that can only be discerned from careful examination 
of his words. What cannot be ignored is that the Year Without a Summer did demand 
reaction and response to a degree significantly greater than ambient climate conditions. It 
was an extraordinary event; the reactions it engendered were also extraordinary, even if 
they weren’t always spectacular or even immediately apparent. 
 The various reactions catalogued here indicate that the climate events of the Year 
Without a Summer cast an uncomfortable pall of gloom, fear and apprehension across 
many parts of the United States and Europe. Doomsday panics do not flourish when the 
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public is generally content and untroubled; church attendance does not swell markedly in 
short periods of time when people are optimistic and complacent. Intuition tells us this, 
and historical experience bears it out. One of the reasons why reactions were so varied is 
that the institutions with which humans try to explain the wider processes of the world 
around them—churches, for instance, or scientific establishments—could not offer any 
satisfying answers to why the anomalies were happening or what should be done about 
them. The Year Without a Summer found the world somewhat baffled, and left it in much 
the same state. 
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CHAPTER VI 
“OUT OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THINGS”: 
GLOBAL WARMING VS. GLOBAL COOLING 
 
 A. Conceptions of Climate Change Pre-1816 
 In the early nineteenth century, before the balkanization of scientific opinion into 
a myriad of insular and often mutually-exclusive subfields, an educated man with a 
background in any learned discipline could lay legitimate claim to being a scientific 
expert. Such a man was Hugh Williamson, M.D., L.L.D., member of the Holland Society 
of Sciences, the Society of Arts and Sciences of Utretcht, and the American Philosophical 
Society.1 In a book on subjects as wide-ranging as climate science, racial theories and the 
history of Native Americans in North Carolina, Dr. Williamson opined that the climate of 
the United States was growing warmer. “It is generally admitted,” he wrote, “that in 
Massachusetts and New-Hampshire, the quantity of snow that fell, during the winter, fifty 
years ago, was more than double of what has fallen, in any winter, for several years past.” 
He also cited observations that certain American rivers no longer froze in the winter, as 
they had done half a century before. Furthermore, this change was not limited to North 
America: warmer climates had also affected prevailing winds across the oceans, 
evidenced by the fact that ships could make the crossing from Europe in one-third less 
time than they had before. The cause of these climate changes, according to Dr. 
                                                 
1 Hugh Williamson, Observations on the Climate in Different Parts of America, Compared with the climate 
in corresponding parts of the other continent. To which are added remarks on the different complexions 
of the human race; with some account of the aborigines of America. Being an introductory discourse to 
the history of North-Carolina (New York: J.T. & Swords, 1811), ix. 
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Williamson, was clearing and cultivation of forested land by humans.2 His book was 
published in 1811, five years before the Year Without a Summer. 
 From the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, we would recognize 
Williamson’s theory as remarkably prescient. He was describing a potentially global 
climate change driven primarily by human activity—a theory of anthropogenic global 
warming. Williamson’s theory was not new in 1811. He had been espousing similar 
theories at least forty years before. He was not alone. As early as 1721, Cotton Mather 
had observed that New England winters had become milder as a result of deforestation, 
and in 1763, Benjamin Franklin suggested much the same thing.3 These observations and 
theories evinced an awareness that the activity of human beings, collective and 
cumulative, was capable of changing the climate of the planet, decades before the world’s 
first internal combustion engine sputtered furtively to life. 
 Thomas Jefferson, who could lay no less legitimate claim to scientific expert 
status than Williamson could by the standards of the time, also believed in anthropogenic 
global warming. In his famous Notes on the State of Virginia he observed that winters in 
his home state had become milder in years past, winter temperatures less severe, and 
frost-related crop failures less frequent. Like Williamson, he believed the chief cause of 
this climate change was the clearing and cultivation of lands and the encroachment of 
settlement.4 Most of his observations about what climate had been like in the past were 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 9-10. 
3 James Rodger Fleming, Historical Perspectives on Climate Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 24-25. 
4 Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia,” in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. 
Peterson (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 118-19. 
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based on anecdotal evidence rather than more systematically gathered empirical data. He 
wrote in 1785: 
A change in our climate is taking place very sensibly. Both heats and colds 
have become much more moderate within the memory even of the middle-
aged…[The snows] are remembered to have been formerly frequent, deep 
and of long continuance. The elderly inform me the earth used to be 
covered with snow about three months in every year.5 
 
 
 The almost bemused observational tone of Jefferson’s notes on Virginia’s climate 
dimly reflect his likely indifference to, or perhaps even optimism about, the effects of 
climate change. He couched his conception of the agency of climate change in terms that 
mirrored his own certainty about the expansion of American civilization westward into 
the frontier. Regarding the patterns of moisture-bearing winds, he noted that “[a]s the 
lands become more cleared, it is probable they will extend still further westward.”6 Dr. 
Williamson was even more explicit about both the beneficial effects of anthropogenic 
global warming and the development of that phenomenon in tandem with American 
political liberty. He contended that a moderately warming climate would stimulate 
scientific and political development of the American people: 
[I]t is certain, that in the progress of settlement, when the face of the 
country is cleared, the American atmosphere will become more pure, for it 
will be less charged with vegetable exhalations. The pure state of the 
atmosphere must have a considerable effect upon the temper and genius of 
the inhabitants…I should venture with confidence to predict that…the 
American states, in a few ages, would not shrink from a comparison with 
the Grecian republics, or any other people in recorded history.7 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 119-20. 
6 Ibid., 116. 
7 Williamson, 175-78. 
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 The Williamson/Jefferson theory of anthropogenic global warming did not go 
unchallenged. The most vocal critic of the theory was Noah Webster, who in 1799 penned 
an essay “On the Supposed Change in the Temperature of Winter.” Webster argued that 
the main determinant of climate temperature was sunlight absorbed by the Earth from the 
sun, and if the inclination of the Earth’s axis has not changed appreciably in modern 
times, there was no reason to suggest that climate would be getting warmer (or, 
presumably, colder either). He particularly criticized the use of anecdotal evidence such 
as the recollections by elderly people of what climate had been like in the past. If clearing 
and cultivation did have an effect, Webster contended, it was probably to redistribute heat 
and cold, but not increase or decrease it in absolute terms.8 Webster’s rejection of 
anthropogenic global warming was shared by others, such as Dr. Johann David Schoepf, 
a Hessian doctor who attacked the theory in his book The Climate and Diseases of 
America During the Revolution. Explorer and naturalist William Dunbar, who often 
corresponded with Jefferson on scientific matters, took the critique a step farther by 
suggesting that clearing and cultivation might actually make winters colder by allowing 
the freer circulation of Arctic air.9 In an era before widespread systematic empirical 
weather observations generated a reliable body of climate data to draw from, in the early 
nineteenth century debates over anthropogenic climate change were largely academic, 
incapable of being supported or refuted with a substantial degree of persuasiveness. It 
was mostly just anecdotes and arguments among disinterested parties. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Fleming, 45-47. 
9 Ibid., 31-32. 
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 B. The Debate of 1816: Global Warming vs. Global Cooling 
 With the subject of climate change an open question at the time, it was inevitable 
that the weather anomalies of the Year Without a Summer would change the debate in 
America about climate. How the anomalies should be interpreted in a broader climatic 
context became a very public conversation during the summer of 1816. 
 Prior to 1816 it was difficult to find a coherent argument that the Earth as a whole 
was growing cooler—as opposed to merely a critique of the global warming theory or a 
supposition that winters were growing cooler.10 When the anomalies of the Year Without 
a Summer struck, however, one previously obscure assertion of global cooling was 
suddenly rediscovered. As discussed earlier, several newspapers became interested in the 
observations of one “Lord Dreghorn,” who argued on the basis of the testimony of his 
brewer that the Earth was growing colder, not warmer.11 “Lord Dreghorn” was in fact 
John MacLaurin, the Earl of Dreghorn, a Scottish jurist who had published a book in 
1798 that dealt mostly with British legal history. Lord Dreghorn’s views on climate 
change were contained in a brief but fascinating essay toward the end of the book. In 
addition to reporting that his brewer told him in 1784 that changes in the cultivation of 
barley indicated global cooling, Lord Dreghorn conjectured, drawing upon other 
anecdotal sources, that the ultimate cause of the cooling had something to do with the 
Libson earthquake of 1755.12 Lord Dreghorn’s views were published in various places 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that both Noah Webster and William Dunbar stopped short of arguing that the 
Earth’s climate as a whole was becoming cooler. The typical view of anti-warming thinkers seemed to 
be that, if the severity of one season was affected, it was typically balanced by a roughly equal severity 
in an opposite season—thus, hotter summers might be balanced by colder winters and vice-versa. 
11 Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), September 12, 1816, 1. 
12 John MacLaurin, The Works of the Late John MacLaurin, Esq., of Dreghorn: One of the Senators of the 
College of Justice (Edinburgh: J. Ruthven and Sons, 1798) II:302-03. 
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throughout the summer, but they seem to have found their way first into New England 
papers in mid-June, right after the freak snowstorm. A Connecticut newspaper quoted the 
essay, but added this curious antecedent suggesting that Lord Dreghorn’s account had 
attained new relevance given the recent weather shocks: 
The Weather is a constant subject of remark, and we have often heard 
speculations on a supposed change in the character of the Seasons, when 
probably nothing really extraordinary attended them. Winter always 
“lingers in the lap of May”—but now we have its chilling breath even in 
June. On this subject we find the following curious article in a curious 
book...13 
 
 
 Lord Dreghorn’s essay, together with this suggestive antecedent, also appeared 
verbatim in the Daily National Intelligencer. Interestingly, the article appeared in 
conjunction with another essay denouncing the sunspot causation thesis of the climate 
anomalies. Taken together, the two articles seem to suggest that, if sunspots were not 
causing the summer’s curious weather, an overall trend of global cooling might be to 
blame.14 Indeed the Daily National Intelligencer tended toward advancing global cooling 
theories. It was in its pages that appeared, in mid-September, the inventive idea already 
discussed that the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe and the subsequent absence of 
large clouds of smoke from musket fire were arresting a global warming trend.15 
A more empirical argument for global cooling emerged from a Virginia newspaper 
in late September. It took a much more persuasive tone, though its supposed scientific 
bases would be recognized as nonsense today. The unnamed writer argued that the 
temperature of the Earth’s climate was attributable to three main factors: solar radiation; 
                                                 
13 Connecticut Journal (New Haven, CT), June 18, 1816, 2. 
14 Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.), August 27, 1816, 2. 
15 Ibid., September 3, 1816, 2. 
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the “internal heat” of the Earth (presumably, geothermal heat, or heat left over from the 
Earth’s initial creation); and “the circulation of the electrical fluid through the 
Atmosphere.” It was an imbalance in this “electrical fluid” that was supposedly the main 
cause of the summer’s strange weather, but, aside from that, the editorial argued that 
Earth was growing colder in general. The evidence used to support this claim included a 
book that asserted the climate of Sweden had once been much warmer than it now was, 
the discovery of fossils of tropical creatures in Denmark, and the supposed “historical 
fact” that Greenland had once been lush, verdant and capable of supporting a large 
population.16 Like Lord Dreghorn, the editorial suggested a potential link between 
earthquakes and climate, arguing that the “electrical fluid” was somehow thrown out of 
balance during periods of increased seismic activity.17 The Year Without a Summer 
occurred only four years after the powerful New Madrid earthquake of 1812, and 
someone predisposed to believe in a link between seismic activity and climate change 
might well conclude that earthquakes were on the rise as a general trend. 
 Defenders of the traditional Williamson/Jefferson theory of anthropogenic global 
warming fired back. Another lengthy editorial, originally attributed to the Virginia 
Compiler, began to appear in various papers in September. “It needs ‘no ghost from the 
grave,’” the editorial began, “to satisfy us that our climate has undergone, and is 
                                                 
16 “On the Cold of the Present Season,” Lynchburg Press (Lynchburg, VA), September 26, 1816, 2. Ironi-
cally the “Greenland used to be green” argument is used today by deniers of anthropogenic global 
warming. To reach this conclusion they rely chiefly on the island’s name, which they contend was a 
term of literal description given to it by medieval Norse explorers. The argument is erroneous. The ice 
sheet covering Greenland is at least 400,000 years old, and while Norse settlement did occur during the 
“Medieval Warm Period,” the Vikings found the island only marginally more habitable than it is today. 
The name “Greenland” may have been a deliberate misnomer employed by Erik the Red, who hoped 
that a name suggesting lush conditions might attract more potential settlers. “Greenland Used to be 
Green,” Skeptical Science, http://www.skepticalscience.com/greenland-used-to-be-green.htm (accessed 
April 5, 2012). 
17 “On the Cold of the Present Season,” Lynchburg Press, September 26, 1816, 2. 
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undergoing several changes.” The article argued that global warming was verifiable fact, 
mining historical accounts for relevant examples that Europe was much colder in the past, 
such as accounts of the Danube freezing solid enough to serve as an ice road or reindeer 
frolicking in the Black Forest of Germany. While conceding that the summer of 1816 had 
indeed been “out of the ordinary course of things,” the anonymous author cast the events 
of the summer as an extreme outlier from which a general trend should not be 
extrapolated: 
We must regard these things in a general point of view, without 
descending to all the particulars. We must take the rule and not the 
exception. We must not suppose from any one year’s being cool, that our 
climate was becoming so; for it is not every swallow that makes a 
summer; it is not every variation that constitutes the general principle. We 
must have an eye to a long succession of seasons…18 
 
 
In this way the editorial uses the very strangeness of the weather anomalies as an 
argument for why jumping to a conclusion of global cooling is premature. Climate 
change presumably proceeds at a slow pace; if the Earth was indeed getting colder, would 
it not be so that each season would be only slightly colder than the one before, such that 
people would tend not to notice it unless they were looking back over a long span of 
time? “No one is surprised at what is common—it is a thing’s being extra-ordinary that 
makes us wonder at it.”19 In modern terms we might call this a “boiling frog” argument, 
predicated on the notion that a frog thrown into boiling water will leap out and save its 
life, whereas a frog in a pot where the water temperature is rising slowly and steadily will 
not notice the incremental change and thus boil to death. 
                                                 
18 New-England Palladium & Commercial Advertiser (Boston, MA), September 8, 1816, 2. 
19 Ibid. 
  86 
Not surprisingly, a staunch defender of the global warming theory was Warwick 
Palfray, Jr.’s Essex Register. In its zeal to deny that climate anomalies were occurring, or 
that, if they were, they were nothing to be concerned about, the Salem, Massachusetts 
paper was predictably hostile to the idea of global cooling. Early in July the Register ran 
a front-page story declaring “[t]hat the whole Atmosphere of the Globe has not become 
colder, we may conjecture from an article respecting the plague at Smyrna.” The 
newspaper attributed the appearance of the disease in that city “to an uncommonly mild 
winter, or rather hardly any winter at all.”20 The article’s author did not attempt to explain 
how the mildness of winter in one specific city should be judged indicative of macro-
scale global climate trends. Nevertheless, the Register was eager to go on record in the 
climate change debate. Later in July the paper published its longest commentary yet 
regarding the weather anomalies. In addition to attacking the sunspot causation theory, 
the Register’s lengthy editorial attempted a forceful critique of the global cooling thesis 
through a technique calculated to appeal to erudite readers: an examination of ancient 
history from classical sources. 
 The Register’s editorial lauded a writer called Meilhan, whose 1813 book—its 
title is not given—included a chapter “on the people of the north.” Melihan had evidently 
criticized other writers, most notably the seventeenth-century Swedish doctor and 
scientist Olaus Rudbeck, who maintained that the Earth had been growing steadily colder 
since antiquity. Rudbeck had claimed that the lost civilization of Atlantis had actually 
existed in modern-day Sweden, thus suggesting that Scandinavia had once been much 
warmer. Employing the common trope of measuring how “enlightened” various peoples 
                                                 
20 Essex Register (Salem, MA), July 6, 1816, 1. 
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were to each other, the editorial pointed out the lack of evidence for global cooling from 
an anthropological perspective: 
If the Globe grows colder, this can only be by degrees, and a cold, 
increasing insensibly, destroys not entire races of men….The inhabitants 
of the countries which experience this change of temperatures, must retire 
little by little, to those in which the cold is less sensible, and must 
necessarily preserve the knowledge, sciences and arts which distinguished 
the other people. It would result from this progressive movement, that 
the…Laplanders would be still at this day the most enlightened people.21 
 
 
The assumption that peoples generally migrate toward areas of warming was 
taken for granted.22 While professing to keep an open mind about global warming or 
global cooling, the writer of the Register’s editorial challenged, perhaps rhetorically, 
anyone to come forward and explain the prehistoric migration of peoples between 
Northern Asia and North America, presumably a reference to the “land bridge” theory. 
Summing up anthropogenic global warming, the editorial noted that “one of our best 
philosophers has produced facts for the increasing heat of American as well as European 
climate, from changes made by settlements upon the surface of the globe by the clearing 
of lands.”23 
One newspaper, the South Carolina Camden Gazette, endeavored to make sense 
of the debate as well as to examine the Year Without a Summer as a whole, on a macro 
level. On September 12 there appeared in this paper possibly the longest single feature 
run in an American newspaper on the climate anomalies that summer, absorbing nearly 
three of four columns on the front page. Entitled “Climate of the U. States,” the article 
                                                 
21 Essex Register (Salem, MA), July 24, 1816, 2. 
22 The assumption, typical of nineteenth century speculations on ancient history, does not account for why 
Eskimos remain in certain areas of the Arctic.  
23 Ibid. 
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began with a consideration of global climate, accepting as a fact that the Earth had 
generally become warmer since Roman times. In support of this view the author asserted 
that snow fell in Italy in ancient times, and the Crimea then had a climate not unlike 
Siberia.24 Yet the editorial admitted the possibility that perhaps this trend had reversed, 
noting that “since 1812, the seasons have been very unlike what they formerly had been.” 
The editorial launched into a litany of weather anomalies from across the United States, 
from the New England snowstorm to mass animal die-offs in Quebec, the sharp frosts, 
droughts, and crop failures. Interestingly, the editorial mentioned the hailstorm in 
Westchester, Pennsylvania on July 2, which had allegedly dropped stones from the sky. 
The writer also mentioned the sunspot causation theory—without committing himself or 
herself to asserting its truth or falsity—and quoted Lord Dreghorn’s essay about his 
brewer and the Lisbon earthquake.25 By both asserting the literal truth of historical global 
warming and suggesting strongly that the planet had begun to cool noticeably since 1812, 
the Camden Gazette constructed a new narrative that essentially split the difference 
between the two theories: yes, global warming was a fact, but the climate is now moving 
in the opposite direction. 
What did this climate change mean, and what were its potential consequences? As 
to this question the Camden Gazette editorial was unabashedly optimistic:  
                                                 
24 “Climate of the U. States,” Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), September 12, 1816, 1. These asserted facts 
were likely derived from the work of Samuel Williams, one of the leading anthropogenic global warm-
ing theorists, whose 1794 book Natural and Civil History of Vermont argued that the ambient tempera-
ture of Italy had risen about seventeen degrees since the time of the Caesars. Williams got there by sur-
veying Roman literature for references to weather. This approach was one of the elements of the an-
thropogenic global warming theory most strongly criticized by Noah Webster, who argued that Wil-
liams cherry-picked his sources. Ironically Webster sought to counter Williams’s claims by himself us-
ing classical sources to find references to the range of frost-sensitive trees in the ancient world, such as 
olive and date trees, in support of the proposition that the climate of Italy in classical times hadn’t 
changed appreciably. Fleming, 25-26, 46. 
25 “Climate of the U. States,” Camden Gazette, September 12, 1816, 1. 
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All seem disposed to hope that the seasons will return again as such they 
were in former years, but if they do not, it may be a matter of no 
consequence. Vegetables receive new constitutions when transplanted to 
an uncongenial soil or climate, so will the habitude of our bodies be 
doubtless changed to suit the changes of the seasons. The first effects of 
this natural revolution have already begun to disappear, and in a short time 
we shall have little to fear except from the effects of a counter-revolution, 
that will require our systems to relapse to their former tone.26 
 
 
In this rosy-colored view we glimpse a common thread with the climatological 
patriotism of Hugh Williamson and the ostensibly impartial, but perhaps bemused, 
observations of Thomas Jefferson. In the minds of these thinkers climate change posed no 
serious danger to human civilizations, and in fact Americans, with their hardy frontier-
conquering ways, might be uniquely constituted to adapt to changed climate conditions 
and even find opportunities in them. This climatological patriotism could have existed 
only in America, and only in a time when Jeffersonian ideals of political and cultural 
dominion over the physical environment were still the dominant ideology. In the Camden 
Gazette’s editorial, it is essentially immaterial whether the climate of the Earth is getting 
hotter or colder, whether it stays that way or reverts to its previous trend. Climate change 
is viewed as just another challenge that will ultimately be overcome by the processes of 
nature and, one presumes, the inherent ingenuity of man—and especially Americans. 
 
 C. How Little Things Change: 1816 and Contemporary Climate Debates 
The Year Without a Summer did not end the debates about global warming versus 
global cooling. In the following year when summer returned more or less normally the 
debate largely fell off of America’s newspaper editorial pages and retreated to the less 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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visible arenas of scientific discourse. Ten years after the Year Without a Summer, the U.S. 
Army began a systematic effort to keep and publish meteorological observations for the 
specific purpose of documenting whether climate change was taking place and, if so, how 
it was manifesting itself. In the middle part of the nineteenth century scientists and 
observers began to rely increasingly upon empirical weather data and systematic 
meteorological records. Researchers such as Lorin Blodget, Elias Loomis, Charles A. 
Schott, William Ferrel and Cleveland Abbe further developed these methods, which by 
the latter decades of the century had become the basis for the modern science of 
climatology.27 
By the late twentieth century the touchstone issue in climatology was the 
greenhouse effect—the modern problem of anthropogenic climate change caused or 
significantly exacerbated by effects upon the atmosphere and hydrosphere of human 
industrial processes, particularly emissions from the burning of hydrocarbon fuels. A 
history of the science and cultural context of modern anthropogenic climate change—
even a short one—is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the global warming 
versus global cooling debate of 1816 never quite went away. Echoes of it resurface in 
much more modern examples of climate discourse. Examining just a few such examples 
helps to illustrate how many of the climate issues surrounding the Year Without a 
Summer continue to resonate today. 
The basis of modern analyses of anthropogenic global warming and predictions 
for future climate change are firmly rooted in empirical data, collected and synthesized 
                                                 
27 Fleming, 45-53. 
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according to highly sophisticated systematic processes.28 This data and the breadth of its 
coverage—everything from analyses of the width of tree rings in Arizona to ice cores 
taken in Antarctica—are far beyond anything available to Williamson, Jefferson and 
Webster, whose chief sources on climate conditions of the past consisted of references in 
classical literature and the fading “memor[ies] of the oldest man living.”29 Yet even today, 
despite the overwhelming depth of undisputed evidence that the Earth’s climate is 
warming as a result of human activity, there is still controversy regarding these 
conclusions. “In fact global warming has stopped,” claimed Henrik Svensmark, a Danish 
scientist, in a 2009 newspaper editorial, “and a cooling is beginning. No climate model 
has predicted a cooling of the Earth—quite the contrary.”30 A perusal of climate change 
denial literature, much of it published on the Internet, reveals a litany of complaints 
against the scientific consensus: models used to predict rising temperatures are argued to 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Ba-
sis, Susan Solomon, Dahe Qin, Martin Manning et. al., Eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
29 The phrase “memory of the oldest man living,” or variations of it, appear with frequency in sources re-
garding the Year Without a Summer. For example, an article in the Connecticut Mirror (New Haven, 
CT), June 24, 1816, 2, uses a phrase like this, as does the American Beacon (Norfolk, VA), July 4, 
1816, 3 (“The oldest person here has no recollection of a like season”) and the Concord Gazette (Con-
cord, NH), July 2, 1816, 2 (“The oldest inhabitants do not recollect such a season”). The recurrence of 
this phrase is interesting because it is indicative of how common people of 1816 conceptualized weather 
and climate from the past. Today we are accustomed to precise weather records; most local news 
weather reports, for example, include references to the historic record high temperature or record low 
temperature for that particular date. In 1816, before such records existed, the most common means of 
ascertaining weather in the past was to ask an old person. As modern climate historian James Rodger 
Fleming argues, however, people’s memories of weather tend to be unreliable; they most often remem-
ber severe weather events, and even those recollections can be heavily influenced by what others are 
saying or reporting about the weather. Fleming, Historical Approaches, 46. Most of us, particularly 
when young, can recall hearing grandparents or other elders speaking of severe weather conditions in 
their youth, often deep snows that had to be traversed on the way to school, etc. The potential discon-
nect between memory and empirically measurable reality has traditionally been a large issue in the his-
toriography of the Year Without a Summer. See, e.g., Milham, “The Year 1816.” 
30 Henrik Svensmark, “Svensmark: ‘Global Warming Has Stopped and a Cooling is Beginning—Enjoy 
Global Warming While it Lasts,” Watts Up With That?, September 10, 2009, 
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/09/10/svensmark-global-warming-stopped-and-a-cooling-is-
beginning-enjoy-global-warming-while-it-lasts/ (visited April 7, 2012). 
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be unreliable31; the “hottest year on record” is erroneously asserted to have occurred in 
the 1930s32; electronic correspondence stolen from a climate research center suggests a 
shadowy conspiracy by scientists to forge data on climate change33; or even that the very 
idea of global warming via greenhouse gas emissions supposedly violates the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics.34 In reality the consensus among scientific experts that climate 
change is happening, and is being caused or significantly exacerbated by human activity, 
is remarkable in its virtual unanimity.35 Yet, just as the Essex Register pursued a 
campaign of denial of the facts and implications of the climate anomalies in 1816, 
individuals, organizations and media outlets today deny the overwhelming scientific 
proof of anthropogenic global warming. The reasons for modern denial of anthropogenic 
global warming have to do, at least in part, with the economic and political agendas of 
industrial cartels or adherents of particular political ideologies. Regardless of the reasons 
for denial, however, climate change deniers today cloak their arguments in scientific-
sounding words, or seek the opinions of experts (or those who can be passed off as 
experts) in order to make their cases, just as deniers did in 1816. Debate about climate 
                                                 
31 Lawrence Solomon, “Fighting Climate ‘Fluff,’” Canada.com, 
http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=985641c9-8594-43c2-802d-947d65555e8e 
(visited April 9, 2012). 
32 Michael Asher, “Blogger Finds Y2K Bug in NASA Climate Data,” Dailytech.com, August 9, 2007, 
http://www.dailytech.com/Blogger+finds+Y2K+bug+in+NASA+Climate+Data/article8383.htm (visited 
April 9, 2012). 
33 Andrew Bolt, “Climategate: Warmist Conspiracy Exposed?”, Melbourne Herald-Sun, November 20, 
2009, http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/index.php/heraldsun/comments/hadley_hacked/ 
(visited April 9, 2012). 
34 Gerhard Gerlich & Ralf D. Tseuschner, “Falsification of the Atmospheric CO2 Greenhouse Effects 
Within the Frame of Physics,” International Journal of Modern Physics B 23, no. 3 (2009): 275-364. 
35 William R.L. Anderegg, James W. Prall, Jacob Harold & Stephen H. Schneider, “Expert Credibility in 
Climate Change,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
June 21, 2010, http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2010/06/04/1003187107.abstract (visited April 9, 
2012). 
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change—both reasonable and unreasonable—seems to be a permanent fixture of 
American engagement with climate issues. 
Some of the ways in which the global warming versus global cooling debate 
found its way into a public conversation in the summer of 1816 have been repeated in 
more recent times with eerie congruity. Take, for instance, a 1974 article in Time 
magazine reporting on the possibility that the Earth was headed for another ice age.36 The 
article began by serving up reports of various weather and climate anomalies around the 
world, such as a persistent drought in Africa and a rainy winter in Britain. “Telltale signs 
are everywhere,” the article asserted, “from the unexpected persistence and thickness of 
pack ice in the waters around Iceland to the southward migration of a warmth-loving 
creature like the armadillo from the Midwest.”37 The article cited scientific experts 
sparingly and in general terms, relying mostly upon more general observations of Arctic 
ice cover, animal migrations and patterns of icy northern winds. The anonymous author 
even suggested that sunspot cycles might be a factor in global cooling, though he or she 
conceded that there was no scientific evidence to support this supposition.38 With the 
exception of stylistic differences and the specific institutional backgrounds of the few 
scientific experts referred to in the piece, one could envision the article appearing 
verbatim on an 1816 editorial page as an argument in favor of global cooling. A similar 
article in Newsweek from 1975—also predicting global cooling—utilized more statistics, 
but its argument was still seemed to proceed less from modern science and more from 
                                                 
36 This article, and similar articles from the same era, are often cited by modern deniers of anthropogenic 
climate change as “evidence” that the consensus for global warming is shaky. See, e.g., Dan Galnor, 
“Fire and Ice: Executive Summary,” MRC Business and Media Institute, November 3, 2010, 
http://www.mrc.org/special-reports/fire-and-ice-executive-summary-0 (visited April 9, 2012). 
37 “Another Ice Age?”, Time, June 24, 1974, 86. 
38 Ibid. 
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generalization. It relied not upon empirical data analysis, but on more general assertions 
such as the lengths of growing seasons, tornado outbreaks and perceptions regarding the 
amount of sunshine reaching the surface of the Earth.39 Even with a great advancement in 
scientific thinking in the past two centuries, it seems that Americans’ traditional modes of 
arguing about climate take a longer time to change than does global climate itself.  
 
 D. Inconvenient Truths: The Meaning of Climate Debates 
Which side was “right” about climate change in 1816 is far less material than the 
implications of the debate itself. The evidence presented here indicates that Americans in 
1816 were concerned about climate change, were divided about its causes and effects, 
and were unable to resolve their doubts in a way that constructed a common consensus 
regarding what was happening. The fact that similar debates—with many of the same 
features and methods of argumentation—continue today, even in the presence of 
scientific (if not public) consensus on anthropogenic climate change, demonstrates that 
there is something both deeply fascinating about climate change to the society at large, 
and also deeply disturbing. The weather anomalies of the Year Without a Summer 
presented an unusual and urgent opportunity to debate climate change, but the public 
relevance of that debate was by no means limited to that time or particular situation. 
As argued earlier, most of the facts and assumptions Americans used to evaluate 
the climate anomalies came from a pastiche of knowledge that was much less heavily 
weighted toward expert scientific study than our similar body of collective knowledge on 
climate is today. In 1816 people looked toward experts to explain large natural processes 
                                                 
39 Peter Gwynne, “The Cooling World,” Newsweek, April 28, 1975, 64. 
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like climate, but they also looked to the stars and the zodiac, the experiences of their 
elders, and collections of folk knowledge and conventional wisdom. In the early twenty-
first century we would be much more tempted, if we happened to witness a snowstorm in 
June, to consult a scientific expert as a largely definitive source for an explanation. Yet 
today the public conversation regarding climate change is not so different than it was in 
1816. This suggests that there is something about the debate itself that is hard-wired into 
our collective consciousness. 
What does seem to have changed in 200 years is our understanding of the broader 
implications of climate change and alterations in the global environment. Largely absent 
from discussions about climate in 1816 are explicit expressions of what consequences 
either global warming or global cooling might have on human society as a whole. 
Beyond the obvious impacts on short-term crops and harvests, what few expressions of 
consequence exist, like Hugh Williamson’s or those of the anonymous author of the 
editorial in the Camden Gazette, are essentially apologia for either ignoring the impact of 
climate change or welcoming it: we’ll either adapt, as plants often do to new 
environments, or the changes will make us better, stronger and more enlightened 
Americans. By contrast today’s climate debates seldom avoid discussing consequences 
and implications: loss of biodiversity, rising sea levels, effects on global food production, 
economic shocks, and effects on population and demographics. Besides the undergirding 
of either pastiche of knowledge or methodological science, if there is a key difference 
between the 1816 climate debates and today’s, this is it: an understanding of 
consequence. 
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Why? One possible answer is globalization. Today our world is interconnected 
like never before through a complex web of economic relationships, technology and 
communications, and shared interrelated historical experiences—such as the two world 
wars of the twentieth century—that increasingly emphasized the transnational or global 
dimensions of events that might once have seemed purely local. Consequently, we can 
conceive of environmental and climatic conditions being interrelated in the same way as 
many other aspects of our modern society are. But this cannot be the whole answer. 
People in 1816 clearly did conceive of the events of the Year Without a Summer 
occurring in a transnational or global context, as evidenced by frequent comparisons 
between climate anomalies, harvests or other conditions in the United States and 
Europe.40 Although concerns were primarily local, such as with harvests or local market 
conditions, there clearly was awareness of the global dimensions of the climate 
anomalies. Nor can the answer be as simplistic as a naked assumption that Americans and 
Europeans were heedless of any potential negative environmental effects of human 
activity until deleterious effects of the Industrial Revolution began to manifest themselves 
concretely in the form of pollution or illnesses—a narrative that assumes, without 
evidence, that environmental consciousness is an invention of modernity, particularly 
post-World War II. Both of these approaches are reductive and miss the vast complexities 
and subtleties about environmental thinking in the pre-industrial age. 
A richer and more complex answer may be that conception of serious negative 
consequences of climate change may have been difficult in the absence of a generally 
accepted awareness that the Earth’s climate could potentially be, as a whole, subject to at 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Boston Intelligencer (Boston, MA), September 7, 1816, 2. 
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least some human control. This is not to say that people in 1816 were ignorant that 
human activity could affect global climate. Clearly they were not, as the debate over the 
effects of deforestation and cultivation demonstrates. However, totally missing from the 
climate debates of 1816 is any suggestion that human institutions could, as a practical 
matter, take action to influence the planet’s climate. The commonly-understood agents of 
anthropogenic climate change, forest clearing and agricultural activity, were conceived at 
least in the United States as being part and parcel of the development of an 
entrepreneurial American society which, like an inexorable tide, would ultimately civilize 
the frontier and widen the range of economic opportunities for citizens. Economies could 
be influenced on their fringes by governments or social processes, but the real locus of 
control over an economy was in the realm of market forces themselves. Thus, if market 
forces and economic processes were inexorable, wouldn’t their indirect effects upon 
climate and environment be equally impervious to meaningful control? 
Today’s climate debate, in a marked difference from that of 1816, presupposes 
that human institutions can make significant impacts upon the global environment. Today 
most governments, especially of economically advanced countries, are debating at some 
level appropriate policy responses to anthropogenic climate change. Whether they are 
ultimately judged to be good or bad from a policy perspective, most of those potential 
responses—emissions caps, taxation schemes, investment in cleaner energy sources, 
etc.—are based on the assumption that they can have an effect, which itself is based on a 
more fundamental assumption that modern civilization possesses the practical tools, in 
the form of state actors, economic entities, or social institutions, to alter the world’s 
climate. We believe our existing institutions may be able to alter or mitigate the collective 
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human behaviors that have changed our climate. This belief does not seem to have 
existed in 1816. 
This argument conjectures—and it can only be a conjecture—that the will to see 
potential harmful effects of climate change could not have emerged until there had also 
emerged some sense that human beings could do something about them. The problem 
was invisible, and possibly unthinkable, until at least the possibility of a human solution 
was also thinkable. If this conjecture is tenable, it may offer food for thought on the 
philosophical implications of our current contemporary issues of climate change. 
However difficult it may be to influence the collective behavior of governments, 
industries and millions of individuals to change their behavior in order to achieve a 
particular climate result, at least our modern argument conceives that this could be 
possible and potentially desirable. 
In 1816, however, the situation was different. Although the Year Without a 
Summer was likely caused by volcanic catastrophe—the perhaps purest definition of a 
force of nature which nobody then or now could have prevented, even if they had 
understood what was happening—it occurred against the backdrop of a slowly-simmering 
argument about global climate change. A subset of that argument was the notion of 
anthropogenic climate change. The point to be drawn is that neither the climate change 
debate of the time nor public consideration of the Year Without a Summer occurred in a 
vacuum. They were all bound up in the same inextricable mass, weaving science, 
superstition, environmental awareness, opinion and belief into a richly complex tapestry. 
The modern debates about climate change give us a pair of glasses with which we can 
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begin to see some of the threads of this tapestry in a new light—and those threads may be 
more connected to our modern conditions than we might have thought at first. 
  100 
CHAPTER VII 
“THE AUTUMNAL EQUINOX IS PAST”: THE AFTERMATH 
 
 A. Winter Returns…or Continues 
 The end of summer can be calculated precisely for each year and each locality 
through astronomical measurements. The moment of equinox occurs when the Earth’s 
axis is tilted neither toward nor away from the sun, but when the center of the sun is in 
the same plane as the Earth’s equator.1 In Boston, the summer ended at 11:37 PM local 
time on the evening of Sunday, September 22, 1816.2 At that moment the strange season 
passed into history. The long tail of the Year Without a Summer was just beginning. 
 Although summer ended with the equinox, the climate anomalies were not yet a 
thing of the past. Hard frosts continued to destroy late-ripening corn in many places.3 In 
some places untouched by the hurricane of early September, drought conditions, which 
had characterized most of the summer, persisted. “The Autumnal equinox has passed,” 
wrote one correspondent on the very day the summer ended, “but we have had neither 
wind nor rain. The oldest inhabitants say, that such a drowth [drought] has never been 
apprehended here since their remembrance.”4 It is impossible to tell when the climate 
anomalies related to the Mt. Tambora ejecta ended and the “normal” cycle of the seasons 
resumed; the very idea of such a delineation is largely meaningless. Many Americans 
                                                 
1 The equinox is not, as many lay people assume, simply the day on which the length of daylight and night 
is equal. In fact, on the day of an equinox, the day is usually a little longer than the night. 
2 “Seasons Calculator—Boston, Massachusetts, USA—Years 1800-1849,” TimeAndDate.com, 
http://www.timeanddate.com/calendar/seasons.html?year=1800&n=43 (visited April 13, 2012). 
3 Goffe, Diary, September 1816; Columbian Register (New Haven, CT), October 12, 1816, 2. 
4 Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, VA), October 19, 1816, 2. 
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must have felt weary at the prospect that, in late September 1816, they faced another six 
months of wintry weather before the next chance of a reprieve presented itself. 
 One of the ways in which the summer had been unusual was the erratic nature of 
the weather. Far from being, as some might expect from the moniker “the Year Without a 
Summer,” an unbroken spell of cold and wintry weather, there were temperate, summer-
like days in virtually all places, and even spells of extreme heat.5 The erratic temperature 
swings and sudden changes in weather were part of why the summer appeared so 
noteworthy. One indication that the climate was still suffering from Tambora’s effects is 
that the erratic nature of the weather continued into the winter of 1816-17. A strange 
warm spell, for instance, occurred in Massachusetts toward the end of December. Isaiah 
Thomas of Worcester recorded in his diary that on Christmas Eve day it was 60 degrees 
Fahrenheit indoors, in a room without a fire, and 64 degrees outside.6 Whether it was 
comfortable to lay a fire indoors was a key measure of weather.7 Only a few months 
earlier, at the end of August, Thomas had written by contrast that there was “no month 
but what in several days of it a fire has not been very agreeable.”8 
 In addition to an erratic winter, if the climate effects of Tambora were still 
pinching even after the summer was over, one would expect to see indications of a severe 
winter. There are such indications. Three weeks after the December warm spell, a severe 
                                                 
5 Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), September 12, 1816, 1. 
6 Thomas, Diary, December 24, 1816. 
7 The evaluation of cold in terms of whether fires were needed or comfortable indoors appears frequently in 
accounts of the Year Without a Summer. John Quincy Adams speaks of it in his diary entries. Adams, 
Memoirs, July 19, 1816, III:404. It also appears in newspaper accounts as a common yardstick of cold-
ness. See, e.g., Concord Gazette (Concord, NH), July 2, 1816, 2; Columbian Register (New Haven, 
CT), August 17, 1816, 2. 
8 Thomas, Diary, August 1816. 
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cold snap froze New England solid. On the next page after he noted the balmy weather of 
Christmas Eve, Isaiah Thomas recorded the following, in tiny, virtually microscopic 
handwriting that gives the reader an irresistible mental image of a man huddled in a chair, 
his hands numb with cold and the ink growing thick and gelatinous: 
[January] 14. Fair. Very cold. Wind N. Thermometer in the small South 
room morning ½ past 7 o’clock this morning 14 above 0. Out doors stood 
at 0. Wind at NW grew exceedingly boisterous. Coldest night this season, 
and for 20 years past.9 
 
 
 The winter and spring of 1816-17 was a hard one across much of the world. 
Effects of weather-related crop failures reverberated throughout 1817, especially in 
Europe. Although the climate anomalies were not its only cause, clearly they were a 
major contributor to the famine that some historians have characterized as the most 
severe situation of food scarcity in Europe since the seventeenth century. During 1817, 
wholesale prices of grain hit a five-year peak in every country in Europe, except Austria, 
as well as in the United States.10 Not only the quantity and price of grain was affected, 
but also its quality. Flour ground from wheat produced in the stunted harvest of 1816 was 
thin and insubstantial. A French peasant noted in 1817, “You could not eat the bread. It 
stuck to the knife.”11 The famine that struck Ireland beginning that winter reduced people 
to eating moss and cats. An equally severe famine struck Switzerland, where the city of 
Zürich was overwhelmed by hordes of hungry peasants. In January 1817, a riot broke out 
in Fauville, France, when an unusually scanty grain shipment sparked townspeople to 
                                                 
9 Ibid., January 14, 1817. 
10 Post, 27-37. Austria’s wholesale grain prices peaked in 1816. It is noteworthy that the data for the United 
States includes the period of the economic downturn occasioned by the Panic of 1819. Yet grain prices 
were almost double in 1817 what they were in 1819, and even greater than that in 1820. 
11 Ibid., 41 (quoting Louis Guéneau, “La disette de 1816-1817 dans une region productrice de blé, la Brie,” 
Revlue d’histoire moderne 9 (January-February 1929): 21-22). 
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stone a cadre of soldiers and sack the town hall. Similar riots played out all throughout 
the French countryside.12 The level of violence in France as a whole in 1816-17 was the 
highest it had been since the era of the Revolution.13 
 
 B. Would It Happen Again? 
 Looking back from the vantage point of history, the climate anomalies of 1816 
seem discrete and partitioned in time. The popular name given to the events—the “Year 
Without a Summer”—imposes historical myopia by stressing the singular dimension. In 
truth the climate had begun to react to Tambora in 1815, shortly after the eruption, and it 
does not seem to have returned to (more or less) “normal” until some indeterminate time 
in 1817. Indeed at the time there was no way of knowing how long the phenomena would 
last or whether cold summers and bizarre weather anomalies were destined to become the 
permanent state of things. The attention given to the scenario of global cooling indicates 
that some Americans were preparing themselves for the possibility that the climate might 
never return to normal. In May and June of 1817 in New England, however, there are 
suggestions that people feared the Year Without a Summer was about to happen all over 
again. 
 May 1817 seems to have been an abnormally cold month. William Paine, the 
Worcester, Massachusetts, doctor who almost always opened his diary entries with a 
description of the wind and weather, noted cold conditions many times during this month, 
usually describing it as “very cold for the season.” Frost—the perennial crop-killer of the 
previous year—persisted late into the month. On May 23 Paine wrote, “Mr. Lowle 
                                                 
12 Stommel, Volcano Weather, 47-50. 
13 Post, 69. 
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replanting onions which have been destroyed by frosts. I never knew such desperation in 
our fields, and gardens, as I have witnessed this season.”14 The cycle of cold weather, 
unexpected frosts and ruined crops must have seemed wearily familiar. 
 At the very end of May, a weather shock occurred. On Tuesday, May 27, 1817, a 
cold front moved in and deposited a considerable quantity of snow in central 
Massachusetts.15 The snowstorm must have affected many parts of the northeast, for there 
were also reports the same day of snow in Albany, New York.16 Isaiah Thomas recorded 
in his diary that snow fell on the evening of May 27 on Mt. Wachusett, located in 
Worcester County.17 The storm occurred only ten days earlier in the year than had the 
snow event of June 1816 which struck many people as unusual or alarming. In an article 
reporting the May snowstorm, a New York paper exclaimed, “When will the age of 
wonders pass away?”18 
 The New England snowstorm of May 1817 clearly gave rise to fears that the 
climate anomalies were going to repeat themselves for a second consecutive summer. 
Shortly after the snow a New Hampshire farmer penned a letter to a Boston paper 
expressing these fears: 
The weather has been as remarkable this season as the last in some 
instances. On Tuesday, the 27th of May, we had a rain from the south-west, 
and what is remarkable, it began to snow…so that the tops of our highest 
hills were white at 12 o’clock, noon. On Sunday morning, the 1st of June, I 
carried ice into the house at 9 o’clock A.M. as thick as common window 
                                                 
14 Paine, Diary, May 14, 1817. 
15 Boston Daily Advertiser (Boston, MA), June 4, 1817, 2. 
16 Ibid., June 6, 1817, 2. 
17 Thomas, Diary, May 27, 1817. 
18 Albany Gazette (Albany, NY), June 2, 1817, 3. 
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glass. Corn in some places is frozen to the ground. The prospect for a crop 
of corn and grass is as gloomy as the last season.19 
 
 
 The weather continued cold through the beginning of June. On June 12, Isaiah 
Thomas noted that fires indoors—again, that traditional indicator—had been “agreeable” 
for the past three days.20 
 Eventually the climate began to return to normal. After June 1817, there are no 
more widespread reports of significant anomalous cold weather, although depressed 
global temperatures in general persisted until 1819.21 Based on scientific models for 
volcanic eruption events, the gradual dissipation and fallout of the Tambora particulates 
probably took about six years.22 By 1821, five years after the Year Without a Summer, the 
agency that science was later to blame for causing the anomalies was no longer active. 
But other traces of the Tambora catastrophe—physical, intellectual, and historical—
remained. 
 
 C. The Emergence of Scientific Understanding 
 In the years following 1816, scientific understanding of the causes and effects of 
the climate anomalies slowly began to emerge. One of the most significant effects of the 
disaster was disease. An epidemic of typhus struck many countries of Europe between 
1816 and 1819, and was most likely caused by a convergence of factors—the climate 
anomalies, resulting famine, and economic hardship—in which the role of the weather 
                                                 
19 Boston Daily Advertiser, June 7, 1817, 2. 
20 Thomas, Diary, June 12, 1817. 
21 Cole-Dai, Ferri, Lanciki, et. al., 1. 
22 Rampino, 79. 
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disturbances was key.23 Understanding of the link between climate conditions and typhus 
existed even before the Year Without a Summer was over. The lengthy Camden Gazette 
editorial which attempted to throw a rope around the entire phenomena mentions that, as 
a result of the climate anomalies, typhus, “a disease hardly known in former years, has 
now become common amongst us.” The article claimed that typhus began in New 
England “in the course of a long period of unusually cold damp weather” and then spread 
outward to most parts of the United States.24 Three years later a scientific newspaper ran 
a long article on the subject of typhus, specifically linking its outbreak and increased 
occurrence to especially wet, cold seasons.25 Today typhus is not regarded as being linked 
to weather or climate, but is thought of as a disease common in situations of 
overcrowding and poor conditions—prisoner-of-war camps and ghettoes of World War II 
being two famous examples. It is not clear why nineteenth century doctors assumed a link 
between climate and typhus. 
Typhus was not the only disease that some have tried to link to climate conditions. 
Modern scholars have asserted the Year Without a Summer as a causal factor in the great 
cholera epidemic which peaked in 1832, but which may have begun in India as early as 
1816. There is no indication that contemporaries understood cholera in this way, 
however.26 
                                                 
23 Post, 127. 
24 “Climate of the U. States,” Camden Gazette (Camden, SC), September 12, 1816, 1. 
25 American Watchman (Wilmington, DE), July 10, 1819, 2. 
26 The hypothesis of the climate anomalies causing the worldwide cholera epidemic which took 16 years to 
circle the globe was the chief argument in Henry and Elizabeth Stommel’s article in Scientific American 
on the Year Without a Summer. Henry and Eliabeth Stommel, “The Year Without a Summer,” Scien-
tific American 240, No. 6 (1979): 176-86. This article was later expanded into a book four years later, 
but the cholera hypothesis appears as only one short chapter. In that chapter the Stommels admitted that 
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 The Tambora eruption was slow to be connected to the climate anomalies. 
Although the mountain’s catastrophic eruption had made contemporary papers—
ironically, news of it reached the U.S. eastern seaboard only a few months before the 
anomalies struck in earnest in the late spring of 181627—its true effects and importance 
were not immediately apparent. Within ten years, scientific observers had begun to 
understand how colossal and exceptional the eruption had been. An 1825 article, for 
instance, correctly characterizes the Tambora eruption as having resulted in unusual 
amounts of dust, ash and particulates flying into the atmosphere.28 But it was not until the 
early twentieth century that this understanding, placed into the context of the newly-
emerged scientific field of climatology, crystallized into a cogent theory of causation. 
 On New Year’s Day, 1913, W.J. Humphreys, professor of “meteorological 
physics” at George Washington University, presented a paper in Cleveland, Ohio, before 
the Astronomical Society of America. His paper argued that global climate changes—
observable from physical traces found in lake beaches, glacial moraines and other 
geological sources—were caused by dust injected into the atmosphere by significant 
volcanic eruptions. His paper eventually became an article published in the Journal of the 
Franklin Institute which compared various historic eruptions and attempted to quantify 
the climatic effects of volcanic dust with empirical and mathematical evidence. In 
addition to Tambora, he noted the 1783 eruption of Mt. Asama in Japan and various other 
eruptions such as Peleé (Martinique, 1902) as especially significant agents of climate 
                                                                                                                                                 
the hypothesis was farfetched, noting that “the rate of spread seems to have been extraordinarily slow.” 
Stommel, Volcano Weather, 111. 
27 Evening Post (New York, NY), February 27, 1816, 2. 
28 National Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), July 9, 1825, 4. 
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change.29 Humphreys did not claim to be the first to assert a theory of this nature, though 
he may have been the first to do so in English. He cited the work of two Swiss scientists, 
the Sarasin brothers, as a strong influence; their theory, published in 1901, was evidently 
that ice ages were “caused by the absorption of solar radiation by high volcanic dust-
clouds.”30 Presaging modern climate change research, Humphreys compiled tables of 
temperature data from 1880 to 1912 and correlated statistical departures from average 
temperatures against the record of volcanic eruptions from the same period. The valleys 
of his temperature graphs corresponded with the aftermath of major eruption events.31 
 A likely reason for the timing of the emergence of this theory was the presence, in 
the recent past, of another major volcanic eruption that could serve as a basis of 
comparison. On August 26, 1883, Krakatoa—also located in Indonesia—erupted so 
violently that the shock wave annihilated much of the island on which the mountain was 
located and generated 100-foot tsunamis that killed at least 36,000 people.32 This was the 
first major eruption capable of causing noticeable climate change that occurred after the 
advent of telegraphy and instant global communication. Krakatoa catalyzed a sea change 
in understanding the link between volcanism and climate change not just because people 
                                                 
29 W.J. Humphreys, “Volcanic Dust and Other Factors in the Production of Climatic Changes, and Their 
Possible Relation to Ice Ages,” Journal of the Franklin Institute CLXXVI, no. 2 (August 1913): 131-
172. 
30 Ibid., 137 (citing P. & F. Sarasin, Verhandlungen der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft in Basel, Vol. 13 
(1901)). 
31 Ibid., 154. 
32 Ian Thornton, Krakatau: The Destruction and Reassembly of an Island Ecosystem (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-3. The official name of the volcano, and the island associated with 
it, is “Krakatau.” At the time its eruption was reported, however, it became known as “Krakatoa,” pos-
sibly as a result of a transcription error by a single editor of the London Times. This is the name and 
spelling that has stuck in popular consciousness, not least of all due to the 1969 film Krakatoa, East of 
Java, which portrayed the events of the eruption with appalling inaccuracy. (Krakatoa is actually west 
of Java). Because of its recognition in popular culture, for purposes of this paper I use the term “Kraka-
toa.” 
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all over the world—at least those who read newspapers—knew about the eruption shortly 
after it happened, but because its evidence was visible in the skies, especially at sunset. 
Volcanic particulates from Krakatoa are credited with causing particularly brilliant 
sunsets that inspired late nineteenth century painters including Edgar Degas and Jasper 
Francis Crospey.33 There is some evidence that Krakatoa had a slight cooling effect on 
the climate. Humphreys’s data on temperature deviations from normal shows the single 
largest negative deviation—1.6 degrees below the statistical average, compiled from 
seventeen American weather stations—in 1884, the year after the eruption.34 The 
Krakatoa eruption was of a far lesser magnitude than the 1815 Tambora blast, although 
many people did not understand this at the time.35 
 Humphreys’s theory was accepted, and within a decade or so it had become the 
generally accepted explanation for the cause of the Year Without a Summer. In December 
1924, Williams College astronomer Willis I. Milham authored an article on the climate 
anomalies of 1816 in which he cited Humphreys and characterized his analysis as the 
leading causation theory. Milham summarized various battles among meteorologists as to 
                                                 
33 C.S. Zerefos, V.T. Georgiannis, D. Balis, S.C. Zerefos, and A. Kazdntzidis, “Atmospheric Effects of 
Volcanic Eruptions as Seen by Famous Artists Depicted in Their Paintings,” Atmospheric Chemistry 
and Physics 7 (2007): 4027-4042. Even Edvard Munch’s famous picture “The Scream,” painted ten 
years after the Krakatoa eruption, is said to have been influenced by the famous sunsets, which suppos-
edly appear in the painting as the red skies behind the figure. Russell L. Doescher, Donald W. Olson 
and Marilynn S. Olson, “When the Sky Ran Red: The Story Behind ‘The Scream,’” Sky & Telescope 
107, no. 2 (February 2004): 28. The link between volcanic eruptions and spectacular sunsets is now 
well-known by many people today. I recall associating particularly stunning sunsets in the late summer 
and early fall of 1991 with the recent eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, long before develop-
ing any academic interest or consuming any scholarly material on the subject. 
34 Humphreys, “Volcanic Dust,” 154. 
35 Humphreys erroneously asserted that the Krakatoa eruption was larger than Tambora. He was under the 
impression—not shared by modern scholarship—that the largest eruption in recorded history was the 
1783 eruption of Japan’s Mt. Asama. Likely he was conflating two separate eruptions. Laki, a volcano 
in Iceland, also erupted in 1783. This is the volcano that seems to have caused the “dry fog” that Ben-
jamin Franklin wrote of while he was residing in France. Rampino, 74. Humphreys cited Franklin’s ob-
servations in the context of the Asama eruption. 
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whether 1816 was in fact as “abnormal” as popular culture had it, and proceeded to argue 
that it was not. He claimed that other years of the early nineteenth century, especially 
1837, were statistically as cold as 1816, based on extant weather data, but the prevalence 
of cold snaps all bunched together in the summer months gave the impression that the 
year’s climate was extraordinary.36 Yet Milham’s analysis was fundamentally flawed. He 
ignored and continually minimized well-documented reports of weather anomalies, 
particularly snowfalls, in an attempt to reduce the phenomenon to “three cold spells” that 
were not qualitatively different, in his view, than cold snaps in a normal year.37 In 
discussing sunspots—again, the traditional obsession—Milham also replicated the same 
error made by observers both before and after him, by asserting that sunspot activity was 
at a high in 1816 rather than a low.38 
 Milham’s 1924 article set the pattern that was followed by most academic scholars 
regarding the Year Without a Summer until the end of the twentieth century: general 
acceptance of the Tambora causation theory, but argument over how severe the effects 
were and what their scientific implications might have been. Articles taking this approach 
continued to appear sporadically, almost always written by scientists.39 Historians were 
largely uninterested. Given that virtually all of the published literature on the Year 
                                                 
36 Milham, 563-70. 
37 Ibid., 564. 
38 Ibid., 566. Milham can possibly be forgiven this error, due to the fact that he relied on indices compiled 
from reports of visible sunspots. As we know, the volcanic dust from Tambora suspended in the atmos-
phere rendered sunspots more visible in 1816 than they otherwise would have been, despite the fact that 
they were then toward the down-slope of an 11-year cycle, and also in a larger down cycle called the 
Dalton Minimum. Although Milham, writing in the early 1920s before satellite and infrared observation 
of sunspots was possible, can be forgiven for this error, subsequent historians’ duplication of it cannot 
be as easily countenanced. Skeen, for instance, cites Milham’s article as a chief scientific source, and 
possibly as a result Skeen asserts that sunspots were at a maximum in 1816. Skeen, 10. 
39 See, e.g., Patrick Hughes, “1816 The Year Without a Summer,” Weatherwise 32, no. 3 (1979): 108-11. 
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Without a Summer has been written by people with scientific backgrounds—usually 
meteorology, climatology or volcanology—the perception seems to have jelled that the 
subject belonged to scientists alone. 
 The scientific thought behind the Year Without a Summer did not change 
significantly until the twenty-first century, but beginning in the 1980s the subject began 
to take on new relevance as issues of climate change grew in public importance. Popular 
interest in the 1816 anomalies seems to have increased in the early 1980s, with a book on 
the subject emerging in 198340 and other articles coming out after that.41 One possible 
reason for this increase in relevance was the development of the “nuclear winter” theory, 
which warned that catastrophic global cooling could result from smoke particles pumped 
into the atmosphere from burning cities in the aftermath of a large-scale nuclear war. 
“Nuclear winter” was first given serious study in a 1982 paper published by the Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences42 but propelled into public light by the advocacy of 
popular astronomer Carl Sagan, whom the public identified as the face of scientific 
opposition to nuclear weapons.43 Coming as it did at the tense climax of the late Cold 
War period, when public interest in nuclear issues was at an all-time high, the nightmare 
scenario of nuclear winter resonated powerfully. Due to its similarity to volcanic-agency 
                                                 
40 Stommel, Volcano Weather. 
41 See, e.g., Stephen Eric Levine, “Year Without a Summer in New England?”, Weatherwise 40, no. 1 (Feb-
ruary 1987): 5; Stephen Self, “The Year Without a Summer? World Climate in 1816,” Journal of Vol-
canology and Geothermal Research 56, no. 1-2 (May 1993): 173-74. 
42 Crutzen and Birks, 114-25. 
43 Sagan co-authored a 1983 article on nuclear winter (R.P. Turco, O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack 
and Carl Sagan, “Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions,” Science 222, 
no. 4360 (December 23, 1983): 1283-1292), but even before this he had been powerfully associated 
with scientific opposition to nuclear weapons by way of his popular television series Cosmos which first 
aired in 1980. At the end of his life—he died in 1996—Sagan was also associated with scientific activ-
ism to combat anthropogenic global warming. 
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climate changes, references to the Year Without a Summer appeared frequently in nuclear 
winter literature.44 Indeed, nuclear winter represents a sort of apocalyptic man-made 
facsimile of the Year Without a Summer: instead of being caused by a volcano—an 
agency that no human being can control—it is brought about by man’s own action, and 
instead of dead crops and a freezing summer, the likely result is the total extinction of 
humanity. 
 
 D. Modern Scholarship: The Toba Catastrophe and “Mountain X” 
 It was modern research into anthropogenic global warming that opened the next 
chapter in the scientific historiography of the Year Without a Summer. With the dawning 
of widespread public awareness of anthropogenic climate change around 1990, 
climatology research of all kinds began to assume critical importance. The search for 
answers to modern problems of global warming illuminated previously undiscovered 
events of the past, directly relevant to the Year Without a Summer. 
 In 1988, a major paper appeared in the Annual Review of Earth Planetary Science 
discussing the phenomena of volcanic winters. Using data from ice cores taken in 
Greenland and Antarctica as well as modern computer modeling then being employed to 
study global warming, the authors of the article—Rampino, Self and Stothers—explained 
the exact chemical processes behind volcanic climate change with a precision that 
Humphreys could only have dreamed of.45 The article also analogized volcanic winter to 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Barbara G. Levi and Tony Rothman, “Nuclear Winter: A Matter of Degrees,” in Physics and 
Nuclear Arms Today, ed. David W. Hafemeister (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1991), 19-
26. 
45 Rampino, 73-99. The Rampino article contains probably the most precise scientific work that had been 
done up to that time on the Year Without a Summer, calculating the size of the ash cloud and the length 
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nuclear winter. Toward the end of the article, the authors referred to a “supereruption” of 
a volcano called Toba, also in Indonesia, which occurred about 75,000 years ago. 
Referring to the evidence of this eruption found in ice cores, the article noted that “[t]he 
Toba ash layer is extraordinarily widespread.” The authors calculated that the amount of 
material ejected from Toba was a staggering 20,000 megatons—one hundred times the 
amount of stratospheric aerosols generated by Tambora in 1815. “The atmospheric after-
effects of a Toba-sized explosive eruption,” Rampino and his colleagues noted tersely, 
“might be comparable to some scenarios of nuclear winter, although the aerosols are 
expected to have a longer residence time than would the nuclear winter smoke.”46 
 Five years later another study appeared elaborating upon the ominous ring of the 
Rampino article. This article, authored by Ann Gibbons, postulated that the catastrophic 
Toba eruption was responsible for a “human population bottleneck”—in other words, a 
mass die-off of the human species that had profound implications for the evolutionary 
development of the modern human race.47 Rampino and Self, who wrote the 1988 article, 
eagerly supported Gibbons’s analysis.48 Although the “Toba Catastrophe Theory” is not 
without controversy, having been debated hotly in scientific literature, popular science 
outlets and the Internet,49 it has significant cachet among well-respected scientists.50 If 
                                                                                                                                                 
of time it lingered in the atmosphere. Ibid., 83-85. Stephen Self, one of the co-authors of this article, 
had previously written on the Year Without a Summer for Weatherwise magazine. 
46 Ibid., 90. 
47 Ann Gibbons, “Pleistocene Population Explosions,” Science 262, no. 5130 (October 1, 1993): 27-28. 
48 Michael R. Rampino and Stephen Self, “Bottleneck in Human Evolution and the Toba Eruption,” Science 
262, no. 5142 (December 24, 1993): 1955. 
49 See, e.g., “Mount Toba Eruption—Ancient Humans Unscathed, Study Claims,” Anthropology.net, July 6, 
2007, http://anthropology.net/2007/07/06/mount-toba-eruption-ancient-humans-unscathed-study-
claims/ (accessed April 20, 2012). 
  114 
true, the Toba Catastrophe Theory represents an example of the Year Without a Summer 
writ nightmarishly large: a volcanic eruption so huge and catastrophic that the resulting 
climate change nearly annihilated the entire human species. Should such an event occur 
again, and be even slightly more severe than the Toba eruption, it could cause the end of 
human civilization.51 Seen in this context, the Year Without a Summer represents a small 
sip from a bottle containing an elixir of ultimate annihilation. 
 Climate change research involving ice cores also altered the narrative of causation 
of the Year Without a Summer itself. In the early twenty-first century, scientists began to 
notice that ice cores taken at opposite poles of the Earth, in Greenland and Antarctica, 
contained not only traces of the Tambora fallout dated to the 1815 eruption, but another 
layer of fallout just beneath it—from a totally unknown source. A 2009 article explained: 
[A]n initial study found high concentrations of sulfuric acid in the 1810-
1811 snow layers in a few ice cores from Greenland and Antarctica and 
suggested that a stratospheric eruption occurred around the year of 1809, 
six years before the Tambora eruption. The volcanic fallout in both polar 
regions indicated the volcano was in the tropics, for only large eruptions in 
the tropics can deposit volcanic sulfuric acid in both polar regions.52 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 See, e.g., Stanley H. Ambrose, “Late Pleistocene Human Population Bottlenecks, Volcanic Winter and 
Differentiation of Modern Humans,” Journal of Human Evolution 34 (1998): 623-51. 
51 If inclusion on Wikipedia is any sort of bellwether as to popular zeitgeist, volcanic winter has a secure 
place in a list of end-of-the-world scenarios. Wikipedia’s article on “Risks to Civilizations, Humans and 
Planet Earth” mentions volcanic winter alongside potential planet-killers such as global nuclear war, 
alien invasion or the impact of an asteroid similar to the one believed to have killed the dinosaurs (the 
“K-T Event”). This article mentions both the Toba Catastrophe Theory and the Year Without a Summer 
as examples of this potentiality, and concludes ominously that it is probably more likely than other sce-
narios listed on the page: “Supervolcanoes are more likely threats than many others, as a prehistoric In-
donesian supervolcano eruption may have reduced the human population to only a few thousand indi-
viduals, while no catastrophic bolide [asteroid] impact, for example, has occurred since long before 
modern humans evolved.” “Risks to Civilizations, Humans and Planet Earth,” Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risks_to_civilization,_humans_and_planet_Earth (accessed April 20, 
2012). 
52 Cole-Dai et. al., 2. 
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 Given the position of the evidence in the ice cores and the amount of time it likely 
took for the fallout to reach the poles, the article hypothesized that the mysterious 
eruption most likely occurred in February 1809. The evidence in the ice cores indicated 
that the eruption was significant enough to alter the Earth’s climate at least slightly—thus 
accounting for unusually cold temperatures beginning in 1810.53 Seen from this 
perspective, then, the Year Without a Summer is more of a progression than a specific 
event disparate in time. The eruption of “Mountain X” in February 1809 nudged the 
Earth’s climate toward a colder average, but not enough to manifest itself in noticeable 
climate anomalies; the subsequent eruption of Tambora, however, pushed the already-
stressed climate even further, thus resulting in the Year Without a Summer. This potential 
narrative could explain why some contemporaries in 1816, especially those arguing in 
favor of a global cooling trend, perceived that the climate had already been trending 
colder even prior to that year.54 
 The extant historical record contains no mention of a very large eruption in 
February 1809.55 However, the ice core data indicates positively that it must have 
happened. Which volcano, then, is “Mountain X,” and where is it located? In a table 
listing historic volcanic eruptions that coincided with sunspot anomalies, Humphreys 
listed a potential eruption of Mt. Etna in 1809 that was evidently unconfirmed.56 At first 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 1-5. 
54 “On the Cold of the Present Season,” Lynchburg Press (Lynchburg, VA), September 26, 1816, 2. 
55 Cole-Dai et. al.,1. The scientists evidently searched for such evidence in eyewitness accounts of volcanic 
eruptions, atmospheric observations and what limited volcanological data exists from the early nine-
teenth century. Cole-Dai, the chief author of this article, confirmed that the identity of “Mountain X” 
remains unknown, but that it is not of much interest to climatologists; it is up to historians to resolve 
this question. Jihong Cole-Dai, email message to author, November 12, 2011. 
56 Humphreys, “Volcanic Dust,” 162. The entry reads, “Etna (?), Sicily, 1809. (Uncertain).” 
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blush it seems unlikely that “Mountain X” is Mt. Etna. A volcano located in a European 
country erupting with enough force and ejecta to change the climate of the globe would 
not have gone unnoticed, and in any event Sicily may not be located in appropriate 
latitudes for its particulates to be spread to both poles. There are many powerful 
volcanoes, however, in tropical locations like Indonesia or the Philippines—areas thinly-
colonized by European powers in 1809—that possess the necessary volatility to fit the 
profile of “Mountain X.” It is easy to imagine a scenario in which a catastrophic eruption 
occurred and was recorded in native records, oral histories or other sources that would 
have gone unnoticed to European colonizers and thus might well appear invisible to 
Western scholarship even today.57 If this is the case, the identification of “Mountain X” in 
a formerly unrecognized source lurks as a tantalizing potential discovery for future 
historians studying the Year Without a Summer. 
 
 E. The Long Tail: A Strange Summer Remembered 
 Eighteen-sixteen is one of the most-remembered summers in history. It is famed 
as the backdrop against which Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein—arguably the most famous 
horror novel in the English language with the possible exception of Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula—was conceived. Its amazing tales of snowstorms in June, frost in August and 
hardscrabble survival in the face of adversity are rich fodder for folklore. Its obvious 
relationship to troubling modern issues of climate change, as well as its similarity (in 
kind if not in scale) to a potential doomsday scenario that could mean the end of all 
                                                 
57 Indeed, all of the principal sources we have today regarding the 1815 Tambora eruption are European. If 
a historian has made an attempt to examine or assess the Tambora catastrophe from the viewpoint of na-
tive inhabitants of Sumbawa, this author is unaware of it. 
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human life on Earth, continually replenishes its relevance. The long tail of the summer 
that began with the autumnal equinox has not run out yet, even almost two centuries later. 
 The Year Without a Summer has remarkable saturation in modern popular culture. 
It is classic Reader’s Digest material, and indeed has been profiled in that popular 
publication.58 Blogs and articles on the Internet continually re-hash its anomalies, its 
wonders and its implications.59 The old tropes that surround the story—Frankenstein, 
Tambora, the June blizzard, speculation about sunspots, etc.—tag along with it in faithful 
tandem. The phrases “Year Without a Summer” or “Eighteen Hundred and Froze to 
Death” have a level of name recognition among members of the general public that is 
remarkable for a historical event that occurred 200 years ago and did not involve war, 
political events or famous personalities.60 Public interest in the phenomenon is likely to 
increase and peak as its bicentennial approaches, but it will probably always remain 
popular as a historical anecdote. 
 The aftermath of the Year Without a Summer presents almost as many interesting 
angles as does examination of contemporary reaction itself. Anxiety plays an almost 
commanding role in this aftermath: the initial anxiety in 1817 that the anomalous summer 
                                                 
58 Fairfax Downey, “The Year Without a Summer,” Reader’s Digest (August 1940). 
59 See, e.g., “The Year Without a Summer in Jane Austen’s Life,” Jane Austen’s World, October 2, 2007, 
http://janeaustensworld.wordpress.com/2007/10/02/the-year-without-a-summer-in-jane-austens-life/ 
(accessed February 27, 2011); Jaime McLeod, “The Year Without a Summer,” Farmer’s Almanac Blog, 
March 22, 2010, http://www.farmersalmanac.com/weather/2010/03/22/the-year-without-a-summer/ 
(accessed February 28, 2011). A Google search for the phrase “Eighteen Hundred and Froze to Death” 
results in over 7,000 hits, most of them short articles of a general nature, almost all of them including 
one or all of the tropes mentioned here. There is even a “fan” page on Facebook for “Eighteen Hundred 
and Froze to Death.” http://www.facebook.com/pages/Eighteen-hundred-and-froze-to-
death/143764325637118 (accessed February 28, 2011). 
60 Name recognition does not equate to correct identification or understanding, however. Based on the au-
thor’s admittedly imprecise and informal polling of random members of the public, overwhelmingly the 
most common reaction to the words “Year Without a Summer” is something to the effect of, “I know 
I’ve heard of that but I don’t know anything about it.”  
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would repeat itself, anxiety about disease vectors and climate change, and even 
existential anxieties about potential doomsday scenarios of which the 1816 anomalies 
might have been a small taste. Clearly something about the Year Without a Summer plays 
on our fears at the same time as it fascinates us. The almost total absence of historians 
from conversations about the Year Without a Summer is puzzling. Nevertheless, this brief 
overview of the long tail of the summer of 1816 should underscore in no uncertain terms 
the main argument of this paper: that, for all the different ways in which people reacted to 
this event, it mattered in very profound ways. If it did not, the tail of that summer would 
not have been quite so long; in truth we have not yet seen the end of it. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: “THE MIGHTY OPERATIONS OF NATURE” 
 
 A. What Does It Mean? 
 The main argument of this paper is that the myriad of reactions to the Year 
Without a Summer—scientific, religious, political, spiritual, and artistic—demonstrate 
that, far from being an isolated incident or a curious anomaly, the climate disaster of 1816 
carried implications that stretched deep into American society. At its core the Year 
Without a Summer shows Americans’ apprehensions about their relationship to their 
physical environment, their incomplete trust of science or other sources of foundational 
knowledge, and their appreciation that they existed and lived their lives in a precarious 
position that could be upset or undermined at any time by environmental factors 
incapable of easy explanation. Furthermore, the continued scientific and popular attention 
given to the event in the two centuries since its occurrence shows the way in which the 
issues it raised—especially climate change—are closely related to contemporary 
problems and debates. If we wish to understand the totality of climate change and our 
potential reactions to it, we ignore the Year Without a Summer at our peril. 
 Exploring societal reactions to the Year Without a Summer also provides us a 
chance to understand the history and development of environmental awareness, 
especially as it relates to climatology. Many of the examples presented here—especially 
the public debate about global warming versus global cooling—challenge traditional 
notions that societal awareness of global environment, and appreciation of mankind’s 
capability to affect it, are fairly recent developments. Today we take for granted that 
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ecosystems and environmental actions are connected. We are not surprised by the idea 
that pesticides sprayed on grapes in Chile might sicken schoolchildren in California, or 
that carbon emissions from Chinese auto factories might affect the severity of hurricanes 
in the Gulf of Mexico. The reductive view of environmental awareness often begins post-
World War II, or even with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. This view does not easily 
admit the fact that people in the early nineteenth century understood that human activity 
like clearing forests and cultivating lands could have a cumulative measurable effect 
upon the environment of the planet. We did not discover the possibility of anthropogenic 
climate change in the era of the internal combustion engine; understanding of that 
possibility existed long before. Correctly understanding humanity’s past relationship with 
global climate and global environment seems intuitively to be a prerequisite to solving 
current climate-related problems. Evaluating reactions to the Year Without a Summer can 
contribute to this understanding. 
 Furthermore, appreciation of Americans’ relationship to science and knowledge of 
the natural world in 1816 can also be instructive as our modern society continues to 
grapple with issues related to science in education, faith and public policy. When they 
were snowed on in June or watched their crops die from frosts in the dog days of August, 
Americans drew upon their collective pastiche of knowledge for answers—not just 
science, but also superstition, religion and conventional wisdom, sometimes sage and 
sometimes ridiculous. There are cautionary lessons here. Perhaps Americans in 1816, 
lacking solar probes, a Hubble telescope or even a well-developed institutional discipline 
of climatology, can be forgiven for thinking so often that sunspots could be affecting the 
weather. It is much harder to understand why, in our modern era, erroneous ideas about 
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sunspots affecting climate persist, even when our modern tools of scientific investigation 
have failed to uncover any reliable evidence of a link between them. Similarly, basing a 
judgment that global climate was getting cooler upon anecdotal testimony from German 
brewers and Swiss vintners, or a naked supposition that a legendary earthquake somehow 
caused it all, might have been defensible in 1816, when most of what passed for scientific 
observation was anecdotal and non-systematized. Less defensible, in our age of scientific 
achievement and intense methodological study of climate, is a broad dismissal of the 
reality of anthropogenic global warming because “it’s cold today in Wagga Wagga.”1 But 
the similarity in reasoning (or lack thereof) in these examples, separated in time by two 
centuries and a vast difference in the level of scientific understanding available, shows us 
that we must still be careful when reaching conclusions about how the environment and 
the natural world really work. 
  
 B. The Year Without a Summer as a Challenge to the American Project 
 An overarching theme in reactions to the 1816 climate anomalies was 
apprehension, anxiety or fear. People feared that their crops would fail and they would be 
left destitute. People feared that the weather might never return to normal and they would 
have to adapt permanently to an unfavorably altered climate. A small minority literally 
feared the end of the world. Americans might have had particular reason to be 
apprehensive, as the Year Without a Summer potentially challenged their emerging 
national identity. 
                                                 
1 Coby Beck, “It’s Cold Today in Wagga Wagga: Weather and Climate are Different,” Grist, 
http://grist.org/climate-energy/its-cold-today-in-wagga-wagga/ (accessed April 21, 2012). 
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 In 1816 the American project was still new. Only forty years distant from the 
American Revolution, the new nation had only a year before emerged from their second 
war with Great Britain, a contest interpreted by many as a vindication or completion of 
the Revolution of 1776.2 Although Thomas Jefferson in 1816 was happily retired to 
Monticello, the Democratic-Republican project that he had founded in 1800—a nation 
looking to western frontiers, hoping to build an “Empire of Liberty”—was still the 
dominant socioeconomic ideology, perhaps more so in 1816 than ever before as the 
Federalists faded into powerlessness. Conquest of a frontier and the reduction of it to a 
controlled space, consistent with American political and economic values, necessarily 
implies dominion over the environment. The Year Without a Summer was a forceful 
reminder that environment could not always be controlled. 
 Is there evidence that the Year Without a Summer challenged Americans on this 
level? There may be, but like most other effects of the climate anomalies, it is impossible 
to attribute any one response or group of responses precisely to that (or any other) 
agency. Certainly it seems that crop failures and other climate-related effects motivated 
many Americans to emigrate west in 1816-17, particularly to Ohio and parts of New York 
that would eventually become instrumental in the Second Great Awakening. This 
migration has been interpreted as a direct response to the climate anomalies.3 Western 
emigration in this period doubtlessly would have occurred in the total absence of the 
anomalies, but somewhere in the complex mix of motivations that spurred families from 
New England or the Middle Atlantic states to try their fortunes in the West, there might 
                                                 
2 Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels & Indian Allies 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 3-12. 
3 Skeen, 13. 
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have been expectations that climate conditions elsewhere might be more favorable, less 
mercurial, and ultimately more controllable. If the Year Without a Summer threatened the 
assumption that environment was reducible to human will, what better way to answer this 
threat than to double down and prove that Americans could control their physical 
environment? In this sense it is understandable how speculations on the capability of 
deforestation and cultivation could change climate could be seen as likely positives rather 
than negatives. Americans felt destined to tame their continent. This might mean that the 
climate would change as a result of clearing and cultivation, but as the American project 
was a positive one, so too must be the ultimate result of that climate change. 
 There is also in this argument—as with many others regarding 1816—a parallel to 
contemporary conditions. Today, people in the developed world, and especially the 
United States, continue to have immense faith in our technological potential. Americans 
won World War II, put twelve of their citizens on the Moon, and spearheaded the 
computer and information revolution largely through the use of technology and 
application of industry. The specter of anthropogenic global warming now poses a 
challenge to positivist assumptions about the power of technology: here is a literally 
world-threatening side effect of technological and industrial development, an unintended 
consequence with the potential to shake our faith in our own prowess and capabilities. Yet 
many of the proposed solutions to anthropogenic global warming stem from that same 
trusted faith in technological achievement. We must invest in clean energy, so the 
arguments go; we will build clean solar plants, harness the energy from the wind or tides, 
or build more fuel-efficient engines to reduce our collective carbon emissions. 
Particularly exotic conceptions of climate change solutions are even more unabashedly 
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optimistic about technological solutions: molten salt batteries, fusion reactors, carbon 
scrubbers. Like responding to the 1816 climate changes by moving west, these proposed 
solutions show a propensity to double down and increase one’s faith in the very 
assumption that is being challenged.  
  
 C. The Year Without a Summer as a Challenge to Historiography 
 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that historians have largely missed the 
opportunities for historical understanding that the Year Without a Summer presents us. In 
the past fifty years, only one scholarly book has been published on the subject, and it did 
not purport to be a comprehensive history.4 Despite the evidence presented in this paper 
that the 1816 climate anomalies carry significant implications in the realms of political, 
cultural, scientific and religious history, historians have almost wholly conceded the field 
of scholarly writing on this topic to scientists, whose interests lie in examination of the 
physical causes and effects of the phenomena. 
 This unfortunate oversight has had the effect of skewing understanding of the Year 
Without a Summer in two unproductive directions. The first is the implicit assumption 
that it’s not worth discussing; that, interesting though it might be because of the unusual 
nature of the weather manifestations or the Frankenstein connection, it is an irrelevant 
anomaly that happened and went away, without leaving much in its wake. All narratives 
of the Year Without a Summer necessarily begin (and most end) with weather, and we 
                                                 
4 Post, The Last Great Subsistence Crisis, was primarily an economic history and focused mostly on the 
political and economic aftermath of the Year Without a Summer in Europe. The Stommels, who wrote 
Volcano Weather, are not historians. Although their book contains useful historical information, it is not 
sourced or indexed in a manner consistent with scholarly history and appears to have been aimed large-
ly at a popular audience. Volcano Weather was expanded from a 1979 popular science article whose 
main goal was to advance the argument that the 1816 climate anomalies were indirectly responsible for 
the worldwide cholera epidemic of the early 1830s. 
  125 
tend to think of weather events as temporary, ephemeral and not very consequential once 
they’ve passed. A thunderstorm or even a snowstorm breaks upon us and may cause 
considerable havoc in the short term, but once the clouds clear or the snow melts we 
relegate the event in our minds to a comfortably compartmentalized past. This is the way 
the Year Without a Summer has been thought of. The lack of historical attention 
reinforces the sense that there’s no “there” there. 
 The second false direction invited by historians’ disinterest is to create the 
impression that the main value of the Year Without a Summer is as a generator of colorful 
folklore. The prevalence of folklore in accounts of the climate anomalies is unavoidable, 
and was noticeable from the occurrence of the events themselves; the repetition of the 
story about Joseph Walker’s foot being amputated from frostbite is a case in point.5 But a 
void in bona fide historical analysis of the event abandons the subject to superficial 
accounts, aimed at popular audiences, that often consist of nothing but folklore—the 
classic “Reader’s Digest” approach, which has been unintentionally mirrored in the 
treatment of the Year Without a Summer on the Internet. Although examination of the 
folklore aspects of the Year Without a Summer would undoubtedly be a useful endeavor 
if undertaken by scholars of folklore, the lack of substantive historical scholarship about 
the events themselves fosters the erroneous impression that most of what people have 
heard about the summer of 1816 is exaggerated or made-up, and that investigation of the 
facts would likely reveal the event to have been of much smaller magnitude and 
importance than the “tall tales” make it seem. In fact, many things that might be 
dismissed as “tall tales”—the rain of stones in Westchester, Pennsylvania, for example—
                                                 
5 Reporter (Brattleboro, VT), September 17, 1816, 3. 
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really did happen. In a realm where snow really did fall in June and other seemingly 
improbable things are documented and verifiable, it is easy to overlook what is really 
there. 
 How and why did popular conception of the Year Without a Summer—the public 
memory of the event—develop largely without the participation of historians? It may be 
because the issues it raised were nascent and potential rather than direct and observable. 
Even if one assumes, for example, that the Year Without a Summer had the potential to 
challenge American exceptionalism or the notion of climatological patriotism, it does not 
seem to have sparked any public discussion along those lines. Americans did not have to 
debate the implications because most of them did not come to pass. The political and 
ideological constructs of society in the Early Republic had enough potential existing 
fracture points—slavery, economic conditions and the changeover to a market economy, 
gender relations—without taking on hypothetical challenges arising out of environmental 
conditions that no one could control. Similarly, the debate about global warming versus 
global cooling remained largely academic, because the climate did not change enough, in 
one direction or another, to make a reckoning with the effects of climate change an 
imperative or urgent matter. Because discussing these questions served no clearly 
identifiable political or cultural purpose at the time, historians have tended not to raise 
them after the fact. This left the undeniable public fascination with the events themselves 
unaddressed by professional interpreters of the past. Public memory needed to include the 
Year Without a Summer on some level, but its ephemeral nature made it unproductive to 
serve the objectives or satisfy the professional curiosities of historians. Consequently, the 
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cold summer of 1816 was inducted into public memory as a form of folklore rather than 
history. 
 By reclaiming the Year Without a Summer from scientists and folklorists, 
historians have the opportunity to make an important contribution to environmental 
history and the broader understanding of human relationships with Earth’s climate in the 
fairly recent past. This paper has already sought to demonstrate the relevance of this 
inquiry to modern issues of climate change. This contemporary relevance merely 
underscores the need to address a peculiarly blank spot in the historiography of the early 
nineteenth century. Hopefully, this paper is a small step forward in that process. 
  
 D. Unanswered Questions: What Remains to Be Explored 
 Given the fact that volcanic activity is a permanent condition on this planet, and 
has been since its formation, we would expect to see other examples of episodes similar 
to the Year Without a Summer throughout history. Indeed, volcanoes erupt quite 
frequently, and the mathematical odds of a truly catastrophic eruption—the size of 
Tambora or greater—are a virtual certainty over a long period of time. Why, then, is the 
historical record not rife with such events? Why is there only one unequivocal example of 
human response to rapid volcanic-agency climate change in the period of recorded human 
history? We likely have such a catastrophe in the very distant human past—that being 
Toba—but is the human race just lucky that the only time it has happened since the 
advent of writing and archival memory was in 1816, and that it was a comparatively mild 
case, at least compared to Toba? 
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 The answer may be that it has happened before, and on a much larger scale than in 
1816, but we don’t quite recognize it for what it is. Near the turn of this century, scholars 
began re-examining various episodes in the past in the context of rapid climate change 
events. Wherever telltale signs of volcanic climate anomalies—strange severe weather 
shocks, oddly-colored or acidic precipitation, unexplained periods of darkness or fogs, 
etc.—appear in the historical record alongside widespread upheavals such as wars, 
plagues or famines, a historian may be looking at a candidate for a volcanically-induced 
rapid climate change event. One may take, for example, the chaos of late antiquity. 
Historical sources in China and the Middle East speak of the light of the sun being blotted 
out for eighteen months during 535 and 536 A.D., a period that coincides with massive 
population shifts, catastrophic wars and the genesis of a worldwide plague pandemic that 
historians have named the Plague of Justinian after its most famous victim (and survivor), 
the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I. The same ice cores from opposite poles of the Earth 
from which we deduce the “Mountain X” eruption of 1809 contain an exceptionally thick 
layer of volcanic fallout indicating a catastrophic eruption in 535 or 536 A.D.6 There is 
also speculation that a great famine that swept Europe in 1315 might have been linked to 
some sort of volcanic event.7 Although the culprit volcanoes have not been identified, 
these episodes, if they can be substantiated in both historical and geologic records, would 
represent rapid climate change events several times greater in impact than the Year 
                                                 
6 David Keys, Catastrophe: An Investigation Into the Origins of the Modern World (New York: Ballantine, 
1999), 249-66. Keys is not a professional historian and his analysis has not commanded widespread at-
tention among specialists in the period. However, his methodology is generally sound, and in any event 
it is difficult to dispute the concrete evidence contained in the ice cores that an eruption of extraordinary 
intensity occurred in the mid-530s. Keys places his own “Mountain X” in Indonesia, in fact suggesting 
that it may have been Krakatoa. 
7 Norman Cantor, In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World it Made (New York: Free 
Press, 2001), 74. 
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Without a Summer. More work needs to be done in these areas to evaluate these 
hypotheses. 
 Regarding the Year Without a Summer itself, there are several important avenues 
that remain to be explored. The first and most tantalizing is the identity of “Mountain X.” 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the 535 and 1315 events were triggered by 
volcanic eruptions, the dearth of sources from these periods mean that it may never be 
possible to identify conclusively the volcano(es) involved. By contrast, the positive 
identification of “Mountain X” from 1809 sources is much more likely. A comparison of 
weather conditions prior to 1809, between 1809 to 1815, and in the Year Without a 
Summer may help paint a clearer picture of what was happening to the Earth’s climate 
during this crucial decade and how each separate volcanic event melded together into a 
cumulative alteration of climate conditions. This would be a particularly interesting 
inquiry given peoples’ notice of cooling conditions even prior to 1816, as evidenced by 
the global cooling arguments such as Lord Dreghorn’s. 
 Furthermore, the net needs to be cast wider geographically as well as temporally. 
Both the scientific examination and the folklore approach to the Year Without a Summer 
have relied primarily on American and European sources. It was in Europe and the 
United States that most meteorological observations intelligible to western historians 
tended to be kept, and conversely, it is from these societies that folklore about the event 
has resonated and made its way into popular culture. But at the same time this was a 
worldwide event, and identifiable reactions to it cannot have been limited to the United 
States and Europe. There has been, for example, no sustained analysis of weather 
conditions during 1816 in China or Japan, both highly literate societies with extensive 
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documentary records. An investigation into the impact of climate anomalies in the 
southern hemisphere would be particularly interesting. Records from European colonial 
powers alone—the British in Australia and South Africa, or the Spanish in Latin 
America—would be a useful starting point for inquiry, but beyond these lie a host of 
sources from native and non-European peoples that could help to paint a clearer picture 
of the global impact of this event. In North America, Native American and Spanish 
sources—which to date have not been extensively investigated for material pertaining to 
this topic—would expand the scope of historiography about the Year Without a Summer 
from its current American and Euro-centric focus. 
 However these questions are considered, and whatever choices future historians 
make regarding the appropriate avenues to pursue, it is clear that there is much more 
about the Year Without a Summer that can and should be explored by academic 
historians. An event with such close and profound relationships to contemporary 
environmental issues must not remain a footnote to history, chiefly visible through 
scientific literature, the occasional popular magazine article, or Internet trivia blogs. The 
bicentennial of the event, now fast approaching, offers a unique opportunity to focus 
much-needed historical attention upon it. And, if a slumbering volcano somewhere in 
Indonesia or elsewhere should suddenly roar to life with sufficient power to cause climate 
change—as could happen at any time8—the world will suddenly be asking, “Has this 
                                                 
8 Krakatoa—famous of course for the 1883 eruption, but also suspected by some as the volcano involved in 
the 535-36 catastrophes—has been growing increasingly active in the past few years. Periodic eruptions 
on “Anak Krakatau,” a small volcano formed during the 1883 event, began to capture worldwide press 
attention in 2007. See, e.g., Supriyatin, “Indonesia’s Krakatau Roars, Dazzles with Fireworks,” Reuters, 
November 11, 2007, http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/11/11/idINIndia-30436520071111 (accessed 
April 26, 2012). As of this writing these eruptions continue; one can follow their daily progress, includ-
ing photos and video, on the Internet. See, e.g., Øystein Lund Andersen, “Personal Homepage and Pho-
tography Portfolio,” http://oysteinlundandersen.com/index_main.html (accessed April 26, 2012). 
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happened before, and if so, how did people react?” Historians should be prepared with an 
answer. 
  
 E. Epilogue: Watching the Skies 
 For some people, the Year Without a Summer never ended. It continued to be 
replayed again and again in their memories, stories, and consciousness, a strange freezing 
season that itself became frozen in time. “On the Fourth of July,” wrote Chauncey Jerome 
forty-four years later, “I saw several men pitching quoits in the middle of the day with 
thick overcoats on, and the sun shining bright at the same time.”9 Jerome died in 1868 at 
the age of seventy-four, but this image that had stuck in his memory for decades has 
survived him for far longer than he was alive. An Internet search, conducted in 2012, for 
the terms “Jerome,” “quoits” and “1816” yields over four thousand results.10 Like a tiny 
loop of video, the image of the Plymouth Fourth of July revelers in their heavy overcoats 
repeats in someone’s mind every time Jerome’s account is quoted or read. The 
strangeness of the Year Without a Summer and the interest it continues to engender had 
the extraordinary effect of uploading this image—which once existed only in Chauncey 
Jerome’s head—into the collective public consciousness of America. While there are 
many far more famous images in American history, one should keep in mind that this is 
not an iconic image of war, political upheaval, great men and women, or anything that 
might be far more likely to resonate in historical memory. It’s an image of men playing a 
                                                 
9 Jerome, 32. 
10 Google Search 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&as_q=Jerome+1816&as_epq=quoits&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_nlo=
&as_nhi=&lr=&cr=&as_qdr=all&as_sitesearch=&as_occt=&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=not
+filtered+by+license (conducted April 26, 2012); results 4,420 hits. 
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game outdoors on an unusually cold day. Yet it survives, a fascinating example of the 
persistence of memory, a compelling portrait of the highly unusual event that occurred on 
planet Earth two centuries ago. 
 Many Americans were unsure of what was happening to them in that year. Some 
took solace in the opinion of scientific experts; others were unconvinced. Some worried 
about their crops; others reassured each other that everything was fine. Some thought the 
planet was growing warmer, while others insisted the opposite was happening. Some 
were afraid. Others were hopeful. In the midst of this uncertainty, perhaps all one could 
do was to watch the skies for some sign, however attenuated, of what might be coming 
next. One such watcher was Isaiah Thomas, the Worcester philanthropist, diarist and 
publisher of his own Town & Country Almanack, a publication exemplifying the pastiche 
of knowledge from which he drew his reckoning with the world. In the Almanack for 
1817, which must have been going to press not long after the summer of 1816 ended, 
Thomas noted to his readers: 
The following wonderful phenomenon was noticed, Sept. 8, 1816, at 
Washington, and at other places in the U. States.—The sun was 
surrounded with a circle, or halo, of the usual diameter, but uncommonly 
bright and well defined; being tinged, especially in its upper or northern 
part, with prismatick colours…While we are certain that the appearances 
were the result of the reflection and refraction of light, yet we cannot 
conceive of any hypothesis by which we can account for them…this 
compound halo is, we believe, yet wholly unaccounted for by any writer.11 
 
 
 The compound halo of the sun seen in September was remarked upon at the time 
by various newspapers, who attempted to discern from it a harbinger of what the 
unpredictable climate might do next. “Haloes or circles around the sun,” said the Daily 
                                                 
11 Isaiah Thomas, Isaiah Thomas, Junior’s Town & Country Almanack, or Complete Farmer’s Calendar, 
for the Year of Our Lord 1817 (Worcester, MA: William Manning, 1816), 3. 
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National Intelligencer, “have always been considered as the precursors of rain or 
snow…and there is scarcely an old woman in the country who will not predict the 
number of hours to elapse before failing weather, by the number of stars visible within a 
circle about the moon.”12 In this case at least, the premonition gleaned from sky-watching 
may have been accurate; the great eastern storm at the end of the Year Without a 
Summer—most likely a hurricane—began shortly thereafter.13 
 But what did it all mean? How did the people who lived though these events, in 
all their strangeness and contradictions, come to accept and assimilate them into their 
understanding of the world around them? There can be no single answer to that question; 
indeed, a major argument of this paper has been that the multitude of disparate reactions 
defies any pat conclusions, any easy categorization. There were clearly some in 1816 who 
took it all in stride. If the climate anomalies were products of nature, wasn’t there indeed 
an argument for treating them not as anomalies at all, but as perfectly normal and 
ordinary manifestations of much larger natural processes? This was the argument of the 
Essex Register in perhaps the summer’s most eloquent editorial, written probably by 
Warwick Palfray himself, which sought to place the events of the Year Without a Summer 
into a broader—indeed almost cosmological—context: 
These facts [referring to previous phenomena of solar haloes] are as well 
authenticated as anything in history. Let no one therefore be astonished, 
even if the sun should be entirely black, or the moon turn red, or new stars 
appear, or old ones go out of the system, or earthquakes remove kingdoms, 
and shake down cities, or mountains vomit fire, or floods inundate 
countries, or kingdoms change masters, or comets gleam athwart the 
heavens, or stones fall from the sky, or rain, hail, tempests, hurricanes, 
water spouts &c. &c. &c. continue to appear; let no one be ignorant of the 
mighty operations of nature, and though uncommon, are a part of the 
                                                 
12 Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, DC), October 3, 1816, 3. 
13 Ibid. 
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system of things; and are no more wonderful than the showers of spring, 
or the rising of the sun, or the return of winter.14 
 
 
 Palfray’s eloquence—if indeed he was the author—sought to catch the wild 
phenomena of the summer of 1816 into a single net of reassurance and faith. In 1816 the 
sun did not go entirely black, though some feared it might; floods did inundate countries, 
stones did fall from the sky, and the reports of hail, tempests and things that could be 
called hurricanes were certainly in evidence. All of it seems to have been brought about 
by a particular mountain that vomited fire on a spring day in April 1815. But about one 
thing the author was definitely wrong. Though clearly an example of the “mighty 
operations of nature,” the events of the Year Without a Summer certainly were wonderful, 
as that term was understood in 1816. Had they not been full of wonder, they would not 
exert the same pull of fascination that they do today, two centuries later—fascination 
about a winter that did not return, but instead never ended. 
 
                                                 
14 Essex Register (Salem, MA), August 31, 1816, 1. 
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